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ABSTRACT
British anti-communist propaganda and cooperation with the
United States, 1945-1951.
This thesis will argue that from early in the Cold War 
Britain developed a propaganda apparatus designed to fight the 
Cold War on an ideological front, and that in the period from 
1945 to 1951 the role of propaganda grew from being an adjunct 
to foreign policy to become an integral part of British Cold War 
strategy. Britain was the first country to formulate a 
coordinated response to communist propaganda. In January 1948, 
the Government launched a new propaganda policy designed to 
"oppose the inroads of Communism, by taking the offensive against 
it.' The development of this anti-communist propaganda policy 
will be the main focus of this thesis. It will also be shown 
that from the earliest stages in the development of Britain's 
response to communist propaganda, the degree to which such 
activities could be coordinated with United States Government was 
a primary consideration. It will be shown that cooperation and 
eventually coordination of propaganda activities with the United 
States Government became a defining feature of Britain's anti- 
communist propaganda policy. This was particularly the case 
following the launch of the American "Campaign of Truth 1 in 1950. 
Faced with a formidable and highly organised communist propaganda 
machine officials in both Britain and America came to realise the 
value of a unified response. As both nations developed their own 
policies for offensive anti-communist propaganda, cooperation 
became an increasingly important element, as Britain and America 
sought to "shoot at the same target from different angles. 1 
The thesis is comprised of an introduction and conclusion and 
four chapters covering: the origins of British and American anti- 
communist propaganda policies, 1945-1947; launching Britain 1 s new 
propaganda policy, 1948; building a concerted counter-offensive, 
cooperation with other powers, 1948-1950; "Close and continuous 
liaison. 1 British and American cooperation, 1950-1951.
IV
Introduction
Introduction
Writing in 1989, Britain's leading historian of Government 
propaganda, Philip M.Taylor, described the Cold War as "the 
apogee of the twentieth century struggle for hearts and minds... 
by its very nature a global propaganda conflict, the alternative 
to real war.' 1 In the absence of military conflict, propaganda 
was one of the principal means by which protagonists on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain sought to project their power, and 
undermine their enemies. Propaganda was also a vital tool for 
the creation of domestic support for policies of military 
expansion which were costly, and with the development of atomic 
weapons, not without considerable risk to the population. Yet, 
as Taylor later observed, the role of propaganda as an instrument 
of national and foreign policy is often neglected in the 
mainstream historiography of the Cold War. 2 This is 
particularly true in the case of the Western allies. In an 
important recent essay, W.Scott Lucas claims that the use of 
ideology as a driving force behind American Cold War strategy has 
been ignored, largely because ideology was always associated with 
the expansionist policies of the communist powers. Lucas 
suggests that, "if an eager student devoured the work of American 
historians on the Cold War 1 he would have to be remarkably 
perceptive to obtain from them any examination of a US 
ideological campaign. 3 Any student hoping to feast on the role 
of propaganda in British Cold War history, will find their diet 
similarly unsatisfying.
It is a central contention of this thesis that from early 
in the Cold War Britain developed a propaganda apparatus designed 
to fight the Cold War on an ideological front, and that in the 
period from 1945 to 1951 the role of propaganda grew from being 
an adjunct to foreign policy to become an integral part of 
British Cold War strategy. Britain was the first country to 
formulate a coordinated response to communist propaganda. In 
January 1948, the Government launched a new propaganda policy 
designed to "oppose the inroads of Communism, by taking the 
offensive against it.' 4 It also established a new Foreign 
Office department, the Information Research Department (IRD) , to
coordinate Britain's Cold War propaganda. The development of 
this anti-communist propaganda policy, and the organisation and 
methods of the IRD, will be the main focus of this study. The 
second contention of this thesis is that from the earliest stages 
in the development of Britain's response to communist propaganda, 
the degree to which such activities could be coordinated with the 
United States Government was a primary consideration. Although 
the new propaganda policy stated explicitly that it was up to 
Britain "as Europeans and as a Social Democratic Government 1 and 
"not the Americans' to give a lead to the forces of anti- 
communism, 5 it will be shown that cooperation and eventually 
coordination of propaganda activities with the United States 
became a defining feature of Britain's anti-communist propaganda 
policy. This was particularly the case following the launch of 
the American "Campaign of Truth 1 in 1950. Faced with a 
formidable and highly organised communist propaganda machine 
officials in both Britain and the United States came to realise 
the value of a unified response. As both nations developed their 
own policies for offensive ant i-communist propaganda, cooperation 
became an increasingly important element, as Britain and America 
sought to "shoot at the same target from different angles.' 6
The absence of any detailed examination of the role of 
propaganda in British Cold War history can be at least partly 
explained by the fact that, as with the British intelligence and 
security services, successive British governments were at pains 
to conceal the fact that they maintained a Cold War propaganda 
apparatus, or even had a policy for responding to communist 
propaganda. Although the IRD grew to become one of the largest 
departments in the Foreign Office, its functions remained 
strictly confidential. 7 The IRD did not feature in the 
published versions of any of the major enquiries into Britain's 
post-war information activities, 8 and official statements as to 
its function, were to say the least ambiguous. Although the IRD 
was listed in the annual Diplomatic List, and even featured in 
Lord Strang's account of the Foreign Office, the description of 
its functions was brief and ambiguous:
Responsibility for the compilation of information 
reports for His Majesty's Missions abroad. 9
The IRD's dissolution in 1977 did see a significant 
expansion on this statement with the admission that copies of 
these reports "were also sent to a number of interested people 
in the United Kingdom, including journalists and 
broadcasters. 110 However, the refusal of successive 
Government's to release the bulk of IRD papers to the Public 
Record Office served to discourage many serious historians from 
embarking on a study of this aspect of British Cold War history. 
This veil of secrecy was finally lifted when the 1993 White Paper 
on Open Government initiated a systematic review of previously 
retained papers, under the so-called Waldegrave Initiative. 11 
In the wake of the Waldegrave Initiative, historians, with the 
support of interested individuals such as Lord Mayhew, pressed 
for the early release of the IRD archive. 12 In February 1994, 
the Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd agreed that these "interesting 
papers' should be reviewed for release, and the first batch of 
IRD records were transferred to the Public Record Office in 
August 1995. 13 This archival windfall has provided the 
principal source for this thesis.
The first accounts of the IRD were written by investigative 
journalists shortly after the department was dissolved in 1977. 
Given that the IRD's work was directed largely at the media, it 
is perhaps not surprising that the department has been the object 
of indignant press fascination. Under lurid headlines such as, 
"Death of the department that never was' and "How the FO waged 
secret propaganda war in Britain,' they described how the 
resources and propaganda techniques developed in World War II 
were redirected to fight the Cold War. 14 The main criticism in 
most of these first accounts was that the IRD's propaganda was 
directed primarily at a domestic audience. In the most hostile 
examination, David Leigh claimed that, rather than countering 
Soviet propaganda, the IRD became "an instrument of news 
management' that "poisoned the wells of journalism, 1 and 
deceived, "people who read books and newspapers (and sometimes 
even those who actually wrote for them) about what is going on 
in the world.' Uncooperative journalists, Leigh claimed, were 
blacklisted and the BBC was "dragooned into functioning as an arm
of government 1 and "required to accept batches of undercover IRD 
material.' 15 The central argument in most of these accounts is 
that, by only presenting negative information about the Soviet 
Union, the Government deliberately suppressed a balanced analysis 
of Soviet actions. This, argued Richard Fletcher, was, "a 
serious subversion of the democratic process, ' and may even have 
prolonged the Cold War. 16
Another characteristic of the first accounts of the IRD, 
which was to re-emerge when the IRD papers were released, was the 
identification of prominent figures or "celebrities' who 
cooperated in the Government's propaganda campaign. In an 
article in 1978, the left-wing magazine The Leveller, named 
thirty one journalists whom they claimed received IRD material 
including media stalwarts such as Peter Snow, John Tusa and 
Peregrine Worsthorne. 17 Investigative journalist Paul Lashmar 
later suggested that the reputation of prominent academics such 
as Robert Conquest were built upon work derived from material 
provided by the IRD. 18 Similarly, Duncan Campbell and Andy 
Thomas, drawing on a document found at the Public Record Office 
attempted to show "how Whitehall schemed to inveigle Michael 
Foot, Bertrand Russell and a host of prominent intellectuals into 
the official propaganda machine. 1 Campbell and Thomas conceded 
that the Foreign Office rejected this particular proposal, but 
concluded that "the nastiest and most embarrassing material... 
never makes it to the Public Record Office.' 19
Herein lies the justification for much of this early 
sensational writing on IRD. The intelligence historian Richard 
J. Aldrich has observed, it is axiomatic that the lengthy closure 
of government files has provided "an invitation to 
entrepreneurial writers to speculate in an over-imaginative way 
on the nature of the "dirty secrets" that such archives 
supposedly contain.' 20 The IRD has been no exception. Early 
reports claimed that all IRD files had been destroyed to save the 
government's embarrassment, whilst others suggested that the 
retention of the IRD files was illegal. 21 The overall result 
was that the IRD was implicated in a whole range of devious 
plots, from undermining the Wilson government to human rights
abuses in Northern Ireland. 22 As late as 1995 when IRD papers 
were finally being reviewed for release, one journalist 
speculated that:
IRD still sounds like the place where the most
23political skeletons are buried.
When the release of IRD papers began in 1995 there was a 
fresh burst of media interest in the department's activities. 
Once again the media concentrated on the high profile 
"celebrities' named in the documents, including Denis Healey, 
Bertrand Russell, Stephen Spender and most notably, George 
Orwell. 24 Concerns about the IRD's domestic operations were 
also repeated. The documents, it was claimed, proved that the 
BBC was "conscripted' into the Foreign Office campaign and 
provided further evidence of an establishment conspiracy to 
manipulate the Labour Government. 25 The Times columnist Simon 
Jenkins described the Foreign Office as "obsessed 1 with deceiving 
the Labour Party, and in The Guardian Stephen Dorril claimed that 
Attlee's government was "hoodwinked 1 into creating a black 
propaganda unit by hardliners in the Foreign Office and the 
Ministry of Defence who were "fascinated by the clandestine.' 26 
Many of these stories were recycled in the first popular history 
of the IRD which followed shortly after the first release of IRD 
papers. Remarkably, Britain's Secret Propaganda War. 1948-1977 
by the investigative journalists Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, 
made only scant use of the newly released material. Instead 
Lashmar and Oliver drew heavily on the emerging scholarship on 
British Cold War propaganda to trace IRD involvement in Korea, 
Malaya and Suez, and with the aid of interview material, provided 
some new information on the IRD's role in the "confrontation 1 in 
Indonesia in the 1960s, in Northern Ireland, and most remarkably 
the campaign for British entry to the EEC in the 1970s. 27
Although Lashmar and Oliver repeated the criticisms of the 
IRD expressed by journalists in the 1970s and 1980s, the reports 
which followed the declassification of the IRD papers were 
generally less hostile towards the intentions of Britain's Cold 
War propagandists. 28 This more balanced view may be explained 
by the prevailing intellectual climate. It seems apparent that 
those journalists writing in the 1970s were influenced by the
revisionist interpretation of the Cold War, popular at the time. 
Part of this interpretation was that the people of Western 
democracies were tricked by cynical leaders into supporting an 
aggressive policy of economic imperialism through the propagation 
of the myth that monolithic communism threatened the survival of 
the nation. In contrast, those articles which appeared in the 
1990s may have been influenced more by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Revisionism is no longer in vogue and new evidence from 
the Soviet archives has suggested to some historians that Western 
leaders, and indeed propaganda, may have underestimated the 
Soviet threat. 29
The popular history of IRD has benefitted considerably from 
thfe emergence of a body of scholarship on British cold war 
propaganda. The IRD' s origins and modus operand! were examined 
in detail in an article by Lyn Smith published in the LSE journal 
Millennium in 1980. 30 Smith sought to fill in some of the gaps 
in the earlier press reports and show in particular that as well 
as influencing opinion at home propaganda was also used as "part 
of the government's mechanism for conducting relations with other 
states.' Smith's article was based largely upon a series of 
documents covering the period 1947 to 1949, provided 
confidentially by Christopher Mayhew. 31 As Parliamentary Unde,r- 
Secretary in the Foreign Office in the late 1940s, Mayhew had 
been instrumental in formulating Britain's anti-communist 
propaganda policy. Given the origins of the article it is not 
surprising that Smith placed considerable emphasis on Mayhew's 
role in launching the new propaganda policy. Nevertheless, Smith 
also uncovered a great deal of information about the IRD's 
operations and contacts throughout its existence. The 
department, she revealed produced two categories of material. 
The first consisted of secret and confidential studies designed 
for high-level consumption by heads of state. The second was 
less highly classified and suitable for dissemination by British 
missions to local contacts to be used on an unattributable basis. 
In the production of this material the IRD drew on secret service 
sources as well as information gathered openly by diplomats in 
British missions. It consisted of carefully selected factual
material dealing with deficiencies of the Soviet system and the 
advantages of Western social democracy.
All of this was energetically reproduced and 
distributed to a great variety of recipients. These 
included: British Ministers, MPs and trade unionists, 
the International Department of the Labour Party and 
UN delegates, British media and opinion formers 
including the BBC World Service, selected journalists 
and writers. It was also directed at the media all 
over the non-Communist world, information officers in 
British Embassies of the Third World and Communist 
countries, and the foreign offices of Western European 
countries. 32
Smith, however, found no evidence to suggest that any of 
these recipients were deceived about the origins of the material 
they received, and those that passed the material on 
unattributably did so willingly and confident of its veracity. 
Mayhew pointed out that IRD material was not forced on MPs, 
rather ""if some anti-Stalinist MP wanted information or briefing 
on some subject, then we were only too happy to send him the 
facts." 1 Smith also spoke to many journalists who received IRD 
material. They were, she wrote, aware that the material "was 
produced by the FO back-room boys' and selected the facts 
required for their particular needs. Most significantly, Smith's 
interviews with representatives of the BBC Overseas Services 
refuted the idea that the BBC was in any way deceived or forced 
into using IRD material. Sir Hugh Greene, Head of the BBC 
Eastern European Services in 1949 and 1950, did not find the IRD 
intrusive in any way. It was, he told Smith, "just another 
source of factual information... The BBC always had complete 
editorial authority - the freedom to take or leave IRD material, 
and that's what we did.' Similarly, Smith has reviewed a great 
many of the books which IRD covertly sponsored by authors as 
diverse as Susan Strange, Robert Conquest, Bertrand Russell and 
Leonard Schapiro, yet she found, "no evidence that writers' views 
were trimmed to particular political lines... rather it was the 
case that if their independent opinions fitted in with IRD 
requirements then their output would be used.' Nevertheless, in 
conclusion, Smith conceded that the IRD's influence may not have 
been entirely positive. It was certainly a major hidden 
influence on opinion at home and abroad, and, she speculated, the
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process of selecting material on communism may have resulted in 
a distorted picture of the Soviet bloc. 33
Smith's pathbreaking article set out the organisation and 
methods of British Cold War propaganda. Since then historians 
have sought to integrate these activities into a broader 
historical context. Scholars have generally approached the study 
of IRD from two distinct fields of historical enquiry: 
intelligence studies, and media history. Those historians from 
what B.C.Watt has termed the "British school of intelligence 
studies' have generally adopted a wide definition of the term 
"intelligence 1 which encompasses a whole range of covert activity 
including the collection and interpretation of information, 
special operations, covert propaganda and internal security. 
These historians have according to D.C.Watt, "come to consider 
positive clandestine action to influence the policy and opinion 
of other states an important part of the whole 
intelligence/covert action range.' 34 A small group of 
historians, led by Philip M. Taylor have sought to integrate the 
IRD into wider studies of British propaganda in the twentieth 
century, and in particular the use of propaganda in a series of 
conflicts in the postwar years, most notably, Malaya, Korea and 
Suez. 35 Recent attempts by these two separate but not unrelated 
groups of historians to integrate the activities of the 
intelligence services, and the media into scholarship on 
international relations has led directly to the development of 
a body of scholarly literature on British anti-communist 
propaganda. This has created a curious paradox whereby IRD is 
given equal weight in studies of the most open aspect of 
diplomacy - government publicity, and in studies of its most 
secret aspect - intelligence. 36
Historians of intelligence and the Cold War have sought to 
place the IRD within the context of an expanding postwar 
intelligence community in which many of the clandestine 
techniques developed during World War II were resurrected to deal 
with the new threat from communism. In 1987, the intelligence 
historian Wesley K. Wark, wrote that the IRD was "a true child 
of the high-tension atmosphere of international politics into
which it was born. ' In the early years of the Cold War faced 
with a concerted Soviet offensive, of which propaganda was just 
one part, Bevin, who was initially sceptical of the value of 
anti-communist propaganda, authorised a response designed to 
mirror the Soviets own offensive campaign. The nature of 
Britain's response, Wark claimed, was defined by the experience 
of two world wars which had served to "foster an enthusiasm for 
unorthodox methods of political warfare.' 37 Raymond Smith has 
shown that this enthusiasm was most prevalent among senior 
officials in the Foreign Office who from 1946 began to advocate 
a defensive/offensive response to Soviet propaganda modelled on 
wartime methods of propaganda and subversion. Despite Bevin's 
reservations, Smith argued, officials proved adept at developing 
British Soviet policy along their own lines. In an 
interpretation which highlights Bevin's administrative weakness, 
Smith concluded that through proposals for more targeted anti- 
communist propaganda activities, most notably in Iran, officials 
^chipped away' at Bevin's resistance and moved the Foreign 
Secretary towards a more offensive strategy which culminated in 
the creation of the IRD in January 1948. 38
The suggestion that senior officials were responsible for 
British policy towards the Soviet Union has led revisionist 
historians, such as Peter Weiler, to argue that the IRD was part 
of a concerted campaign to manufacture consensus in the Labour 
movement in Britain. In a critical assessment of British Labour 
and the Cold War. Weiler argued that the first years of the 
postwar Labour government saw the rejection of the communist and 
non-communist left in the Labour Party and Trade Unions, and the 
incorporation of the Labour movement into the hegemonic values 
and ideology of the state. Foreign Office propaganda, Weiler 
suggested, was central to this process. British labour's growing 
hostility towards the Soviet Union, Weiler argued, may have owed 
as much to the manipulation of opinion by elites in the Foreign 
Office as to Soviet actions. 39
Although Weiler provided important evidence of the Foreign 
Office's domestic anti-communist activities, several historians 
have contested his assertion that the domestic consensus
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regarding Soviet intentions was manufactured by the Foreign 
Office. Anthony Carew has argued that in promoting anti- 
communism in the TUC, the Government was effectively pushing 
against an open door. Moreover, Carew has shown that the 
Government' s involvement with the TUC was not motivated by 
domestic concerns, but the desire to counter communism in the 
international trade union movement. 40 Similarly, in The Secret 
State, a study of British internal security in the twentieth 
century, Richard Thurlow argued that Weiler overstated his case 
by suggesting that Labourism was hijacked by establishment 
elites. Thurlow noted that far from being led by the nose, 
democratic socialists had long recognised the horrors of 
Stalinism. When these socialists formed the government in 1945, 
Thurlow wrote, they established a "symbiotic and dialectical 
relationship 1 with the establishment in which both recognised the 
need to guard against the communist threat. The creation of the 
IRD, Thurlow argued, was the result of a convergence between the 
policies of the Labour Government and the interests of the 
Whitehall administration, "rather than the effects of anti- 
communist propaganda or a semi-conspiratorial incorporation of 
the Labour movement bureaucracy into the structure of the 
Capitalist state 141
The convergence of Labour policies and Foreign Office 
thinking has been examined in the most detailed study of the 
origins of Britain's anti-communist propaganda by W.Scott Lucas 
and C.J.Morris, which appeared in Aldrich's edited volume British 
Intelligence. Strategy and the Cold War. 1945-51. in 1992. 42 
Aldrich opened the volume with an essay on the postwar 
reorganisation of the British intelligence community, which 
placed the IRD within the context of a Whitehall administration 
struggling to cope with a Cold War conducted "by all means short 
of war. 143 Lucas and Morris set the Foreign Office's proposals 
for a response against the background of Bevin's need to 
accommodate the left-wing of the Labour Party. The new 
propaganda policy, they argued, emerged when the Foreign Office 
plan was wedded to a new tenet of British foreign policy, the 
positive projection of a British-led "Third Force' linked to the
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Empire and Commonwealth and independent of the United States and 
the Soviet Union. They suggested, however, that the "Third 
Force, ' may have been merely, "a device to win ministerial 
support 1 for the Foreign Office strategy. Within a year, they 
claimed, the "positive 1 element had disappeared from Britain's 
propaganda, and the offensive element was modified and expanded. 
Lucas and Morris claimed that the IRD shifted quickly from "Third 
Force propaganda 1 to "political warfare 1 which went beyond what 
was originally described as a "defensive/offensive 1 to include 
support for subversive operations being carried out by the 
intelligence services, and eventually operations in support of 
British interests outside the communist bloc. They argue that 
because the Government failed to establish effective control, the 
IRD became "a service department, "on call" to support the latest 
projects of other departments and agencies.' As a result, tl^ey 
concluded, the IRD evolved from anti-communist to "anti-anti- 
British. l44
Many facets of the IRD's operations, at home and abroad, 
behind the Iron Curtain, and in the colonies, have been drawn 
together in Richard J. Aldrich's recent and vast history of 
British and American Cold War secret intelligence, The Hidden 
Hand. 45 In one of the first works to take advantage of the 
declassified IRD papers, Aldrich focuses on the operational 
aspect of the Government's anti-communist propaganda policy in 
an effort to shed some light on how the Cold War was fought.
Cold War fighting, and a growing conviction that the 
Cold War could be won through special operations or 
covert action, was critical in determining the 
character of this struggle. By the early 1950s, 
operations to influence the world by unseen methods - 
the hidden hand - became ubiquitous and seemed to 
transform even everyday aspects of society into an 
extension of this battleground. 46
In Britain, Aldrich argues, clandestine operations to 
counter communist influence began as early as 1945. By the time 
the IRD was created in 1948 "it was playing catch-up with obscure 
sections of Whitehall that were ahead in authorising counter- 
measures against the Soviets.' 47 Not least amongst these was 
the Cultural Relations Department of the Foreign Office, which 
since late 1945 had mounted an orchestrated campaign to counter
12
48communist influence in international youth organisations. 
Responsibility for such activities was soon passed to the IRD. 
Aldrich is careful, however, not to describe a simple continuum 
between wartime and Cold War clandestine operations. The IRD, 
he asserts, was different from the diverse bodies dealing with 
wartime propaganda in that it was entirely under Foreign Office 
control. 49 Moreover, Aldrich paints a vivid picture of Bevin 
successfully resisting sustained pressure from the Chiefs of 
Staff for more aggressive propaganda and special operations aimed 
at the liberation of Eastern Europe. 50
The detailed research of historians such as Wark, Lucas and 
Morris, and Aldrich has shed considerable light on the Cold War 
origins of Britain's anti-communist propaganda policy. A second 
group of historians have placed the policy in a much broader 
context. These historians, led by Philip M. Taylor, have 
explained the origins of Britain's anti-communist propaganda 
policy as part of an historical trend towards the acceptance by 
governments that propaganda "a major requisite of modern 
warfare, ' is "no less essential to the maintenance of peace, 
power and prestige.' 51 This, Taylor claimed, was no less true 
for British governments than it was for the totalitarian regimes 
of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Taylor has shown that, 
despite a traditional antipathy towards propaganda, by the 1950s 
British Governments accepted that machinery for the effective 
employment of propaganda had become an essential weapon in the 
national arsenal, "part of the normal apparatus of diplomacy of 
a Great Power. ' This view was not only based on the experiences 
of two World Wars but also the ravages of the inter-war years. 
In the 1920s and 1930s successive Governments gradually and 
reluctantly came to recognise the importance of projecting 
Britain abroad, firstly as an aid to trade, and later as a 
response to anti-British totalitarian propaganda. This 
experience, Taylor argued was soon adapted to the harsh realities 
of the postwar world. 52
Taylor has also identified several distinctive features of 
British overseas propaganda. These were established at the time 
of the British Government's first foray into propaganda
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activities during the First World War, and were confirmed by 
experience of British propagandists in future conflicts. The 
most important was that effective propaganda was based upon the 
truth. In marked contrast to totalitarian governments' advocacy 
of the "Big Lie,' British Governments have found the selective 
presentation of the facts a more effective, and more palatable, 
employment of propaganda. Despite this, British Governments have 
also been keen to hide their propaganda activities. British 
governments, it was claimed, did not engage in "propaganda, ' they 
told the truth. Consequently, agencies responsible for directing 
propaganda overseas have usually operated in secret. The Foreign 
Office, in particular, has favoured an indirect approach to the 
dissemination of propaganda. The reason for this, was outlined 
by Sir Robert Cecil in 1916, "official propaganda known to be 
such was "almost useless".' 53 Unlike the totalitarian 
governments, the British eschewed direct appeals to mass opinion 
and targeted their propaganda at elite opinion formers. As 
Taylor, has also shown, for the Foreign Office in particular, 
mass public opinion was almost incomprehensible and only to be 
influenced indirectly. "Foreign Office-inspired propaganda was 
directed towards the opinion-makers, such as journalists, 
publicists and politicians, rather than to the mass of foreign 
peoples.' The principle being that it was better to influence 
those who can influence others than to attempt a direct appeal 
to the mass of the population. 54 These principles were to 
influence Foreign Office thinking in the production of propaganda 
during the Cold War, and were the source of some friction when 
the Labour Government proposed a new propaganda policy based upon 
an appeal to the masses.
Taylor's work has inspired a series of detailed case studies 
of British propaganda. Studies of propaganda during the Korean 
War, the Suez crisis, and colonial insurgencies in Malaya, Kenya 
and Cyprus have served to illustrate British governments' growing 
appreciation of the importance of propaganda and the media. 55 
These studies have also illustrated that during the Cold War the 
communist threat came to dominate all of Britain's overseas 
propaganda. In 1995, Susan Carruthers revealed that the IRD was
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closely involved in Britain's response to colonial insurgenqy. 
As a result, Carruthers observed, whether or not communism was 
a principal factor in the unrest, "the IRD's very raison d'etre 
meant it was almost bound to exaggerate the communist threat.' 56 
Although the IRD's involvement supported the claims of Lucas and 
Morris that the IRD moved from anti-communist to anti-anti- 
British propaganda, Carruthers suggests a more subtle thesis. 
In its engagement in colonial campaigns, she concluded, the IRD's 
principal concern remained ant i-communism. "If it was anti-anti- 
British, it was so precisely because it was anti-communist.'" 
Tony Shaw and Gary Rawnsley reached similar conclusions in their 
respective examinations of propaganda during the Suez crisis. 
Both have also suggested that the IRD was far more at home in 
dealing with Cold War crises such as the Hungarian uprising and 
the war in Korea. 58 In contrast to the crude attempts to 
shoehorn the communist threat into the presentation of colonial 
unrest, the campaign in Korea, Shaw concluded, "bore out the 
value to the British government of a propaganda department whose 
priority was anti-communism.'
The IRD's ability to devise and disseminate material 
demonizing the monolithic Soviet bloc in various forms 
to suit different audiences showed subtlety and 
imagination. (It also contrasted with the communists' 
overly crude and ultimately counter-productive 
tendencies.) The non-attributable (or "grey') nature 
of its output added to the public's impression that 
politicians were reflecting opinion rather than 
seeking to lead it... The department' s true research 
skills in tracking and countering communist propaganda 
helped the UN to keep a step ahead of its rivals in 
general throughout the conflict. 59
The literature suggests there were two influences on the 
generation of Britain's anti-communist propaganda policy. The 
first was the threat from Soviet propaganda and subversion and 
the need to formulate a response using means "short of war. ' In 
order to do so the British Government it is claimed, fell back 
on the lessons of the recent past and resurrected a series of 
covert wartime agencies. Others have sought to place these 
developments within the context of a world in which the advent 
of a mass media, and conflicts which increasingly affected the 
whole of the population, led governments to embrace propaganda
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as a tool of diplomacy. British propaganda in the Cold War, it 
is argued, did not merely represent a resurrection of wartime 
agencies, but was the application of principles developed in the 
Foreign Office since the First World War. The most accurate 
assessment, of course, lies in a synthesis of these views.
There is little consensus as to how Britain's anti-communist 
propaganda policy developed after 1948. Although the work of 
Carruthers, Rawnsley and Shaw has addressed British propaganda 
in a series of conflicts in the 1950s and 1960s, there has been 
little examination of the role of propaganda in building a 
concerted counter-offensive to the Soviets in the early Cold War. 
In particular, the ^Third Force 1 aspect of Britain's propaganda 
policy has been inadequately explored. It is generally assumed 
that the positive aspect of the new propaganda policy was never 
implemented, and the IRD in particular has been criticised for 
neglecting this aspect. It is also unclear as to what was the 
principal target for British anti-communist propaganda. 
Revisionists have stressed the domestic element. Others, such 
as Lucas and Morris, suggest that British propaganda quickly 
developed an offensive element directed at subversion in Eastern 
Europe. Lucas later suggested, that by the mid 1950s, the IRD 
was turning its attention to lesser opponents in the Middle East 
and Africa, leaving anti-communist work primarily to the United 
States. 60
In the literature there is in particular, a certain myopia 
with regard to the relationship between British and American 
anti-communist propaganda. Most of the work from Lyn Smith 
onwards has highlighted some degree of cooperation between 
British and American propagandists. Those who have employed 
American sources, such as Smith, Fletcher and Wark, have 
indicated that American information staff in the field were kept 
informed of the IRD's activities. Moreover, at a series of 
meetings in London in 1950, it has been shown that Britain and 
America exchanged details of their respective propaganda 
programmes and agreed to "close and continuous liaison 1 on all 
aspects of anti-communist propaganda. 61 However, this 
relationship has not been examined in detail. In general it is
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argued that although Britain led the field by providing a 
coordinated response to communist propaganda as early as 1948, 
Britain's modest propaganda activities were soon swamped by the 
superior resources of the United States." The release of the 
IRD papers has done little to change this perception. In 1995, 
Scott Lucas wrote, that by the 1950s the IRD was a pale shadow 
of the CIA propaganda machine, "it would be the US, with its own 
propaganda means and ends, that would define the image of the 
Free World.' 63 In 1998 Hugh Wilford reviewed the first two 
batches of IRD papers to be released. Wilford detected in the 
files "a growing tendency towards Anglo-American cooperation in 
the publicity crusade against communism, both between 
headquarters and between representatives in the field. ' Yet with 
only a small amount of material to review, it is unfortunate that 
Wilford fell back on the easy assumption made in much of the 
secondary literature that the British campaign was soon eclipsed, 
"as leadership of the anti-communist crusade passed to the 
Americans. 1 The Foreign Office's most powerful motive for 
cooperating, Wilford suggested, was to take advantage of the 
"superb resources' of the United States. 64 It is remarkable, 
and perhaps a little surprising that Britain's contribution to 
Anglo-American anti-communist propaganda has been so denigrated, 
when studies of other aspects of Anglo-American cooperation, most 
notably intelligence, have found ample evidence of the value of 
Britain's contribution of expertise and experience in a field 
dominated by American resources. 65
The declassification of material under the Waldegrave 
Initiative has clearly opened the field for serious historical 
enquiry into British propaganda during the Cold War. Although 
historians have already begun to mine this rich seam the body of 
literature on British Cold War propaganda can not compare with 
the vast literature on the use of propaganda in the two world 
wars. Moreover, most of the emerging studies of British 
propaganda during the Cold War years have tended to reflect this 
interest in the role of propaganda in wartime. Moreover, some 
fields of propaganda activity, notably broadcasting, have 
attracted considerable attention, 66 whilst others such as the
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press and publishing have received little attention. 67 Only a 
few historians, most notably Aldrich, have used the 
declassification of material under the Waldegrave Initiative to 
return to the development of British policy towards the Soviet 
Union in the early Cold War years, and examine the role of 
propaganda in peacetime. 68
This thesis has benefitted from access to a large volume of 
material released under the Waldegrave Initiative. 69 Most 
significantly, since 1995, almost all the policy files of the 
Foreign Office Information Research Department from the period 
1948 to 1951 have been transferred to the Public Record Office. 
The content of this extensive archive has shed considerable new 
light on British anti-communist propaganda policy, and provides 
the main source for this study. 70 The Waldegrave Initiative has 
also seen the release of a large number of files relating to 
anti-communist propaganda in the records of other Foreign Office 
and Government departments, and the return of previously retained 
material to collections of private papers of British public 
servants. 71 This material has also been used.
There is a methodological bonus in researching the work of 
organisations responsible for propaganda, even a secret 
department such as the IRD- That is, that such organisations 
depend upon the widespread dissemination of their product. Even 
when their methods are secret, their output is not. Thus 
propaganda material generated by the IRD was distributed widely 
across Whitehall, and beyond. Even before the recent release of 
IRD files, enough material relating to British Cold War 
propaganda had slipped past the "weeders 1 in the records of other 
government departments to allow a number of authoritative 
accounts of the IRD's work. This has been augmented by the 
release of further material under the Waldegrave Initiative. In 
researching this thesis documents pertaining to the IRD's 
activities have been found in the records of Government 
departments as diverse as the Central Office of Information, the 
Colonial Office, and the Ministry of Labour, and a host of other 
Foreign Office regional and information departments.
The nature of the IRD's work was such that evidence of the
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department's work has survived in collections outside the Public 
Record Office, some of which have been consulted for this study. 
Although the IRD's methods were clandestine, unlike the 
intelligence and security services its product was also designed 
for widespread distribution outside of Whitehall. The 
International Department of the Labour Party under the direction 
of Denis Healey was an early and avid consumer of IRD material. 
A large number of IRD briefing papers and some correspondence may 
be found in the Labour Party Archives. 72 The BBC also received 
IRD reports and recommendations and those working on western 
broadcasting during the Cold War have found much evidence of the 
IRD's work in the BBC archives. 73 A review of the IRD files at 
the Public Record Office reveals a host of other organisations 
in receipt of IRD material, including, the Church of England, The 
TUC, the National Council for Social Services, the National Union 
of Students, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Some 
historians have already begun to sift the archives of these 
organisations for examples of Foreign Office propaganda. 74 Many 
prominent individuals, journalists and academics worked with the 
IRD and some of this material survives in collections of private 
papers. 75 The IRD also distributed material to a large number 
of foreign governments. Although it is beyond the resources of 
this study, examples of IRD's output must reside in the archives 
of the foreign ministries of a large number of nations across 
Europe and Asia. 76
The wealth of material now available, does not, however, 
provide a complete picture of British efforts to counter 
communist propaganda. Significant numbers of files remain 
classified and may well remain closed for some considerable time. 
British clandestine activities in peacetime remain a more 
sensitive subject than similar operations during war. Most of 
the files of the wartime Political Warfare Executive were 
declassified under the thirty year rule, whilst records of its 
peacetime equivalent, the IRD, have only recently been released. 
Even following the Waldegrave Initiative, the release of a great 
volume of files relating to intelligence and special operations 
in World War II, has not been matched by the release of files
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from the early postwar years. It is also apparent that files 
from the post-1945 period are subject to a much more careful 
review, and their release has therefore been somewhat slower and 
more erratic. 77 The files of the IRD have certainly been 
carefully weeded. Some files have been retained in their 
entirety. In more cases, sensitive material has been removed 
from files or the policy of blanking out sensitive sections has 
been employed. Some extant material relates to the IRD's 
relations with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), 
(remarkably, numerous reports from MI5 can be found in the IRD 
files. 78 ) Information on the coordination of clandestine 
activities with other powers, such as the United States, is 
perhaps the most sensitive. Particularly when it relates to 
covert activities in other friendly countries, such as British 
and American efforts to counter communism in France and Italy. 
In addition to the continued classification of material, 
perhaps a more serious problem facing historians researching 
British Cold War propaganda is the destruction of records. Of 
course not all official documents are selected for permanent 
preservation, nor should they be. Nevertheless, policies for the 
preservation of material of historical interest have not been 
applied consistently across Whitehall. Concern has been 
expressed in particular about security and intelligence agencies 
applying their own criteria for the selection of material. 79 
The Foreign Office, along with the Cabinet Office, preserves the 
largest proportion of papers, more than 80% of the political 
papers are judged to be of historical interest, of which over 95% 
are released. 80 Nevertheless, there is a substantial gap in the 
documentary record of British Cold War propaganda. Although the 
policy files of the IRD have been preserved, much of the 
department's output, the propaganda itself, has not. In 1982 the 
Lord Chancellor's Department stated that apart from a handful of 
papers on general themes:
The items distributed by IRD to other FO departments 
and journalists were in the main ephemeral and not 
considered to be of sufficient historical importance 
to be selected for permanent preservation. 81
Although this statement caused several commentators at the
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time to fear that the whole of the IRD archive had been 
pulped/2 it referred only to the IRD's output. An, admittedly 
vast, number of briefing papers, on a whole range of issues, 
produced by the IRD on a weekly or monthly basis throughout its 
existence. Some of the IRD's output may be found in the 
department's policy files, and selected examples survive in files 
of other Government departments. 83 However, only two whole 
series of the IRD's briefing papers were selected for permanent 
preservation, as examples of the IRD's product. 84 This is 
undoubtedly only a tiny fraction of the IRD's output and the 
series chosen only represent the IRD's early concern with 
countering communism in Europe and the Far East. It is 
remarkable that other series of briefing papers produced to deal 
with particular situations, such as the Suez crisis, were not 
considered worthy of preservation. 85
Faced with British official secrecy, early studies of the 
IRD suggested that much information regarding British anti- 
communist propaganda could be gleaned from American sources. 86 
As Aldrich has observed, the United States Archives are often 
represented as some kind of "Wonderland 1 were classified British 
documents may be found in abundance. 87 This is, of course, only 
partly true. Aldrich refers to an agreement between the State 
Department and the British government detailing the categories 
of material that London requests be withdrawn from American 
files. 88 In the declassification of CIA documents the "third 
agency rule' has also meant that few documents relating to 
cooperation with allies in covert activities have been 
released. 89
Nevertheless, in America, as in Britain, the end of the Cold 
War has prompted a new policy of openness regarding the 
declassification of government documents and this study has made 
extensive use of material from the National Archives of the 
United States. In addition published collections of American 
documents such as those in the State Department series, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, and the volumes of CIA Cold War 
records published by the CIA History staff, have shed new light 
on American anti-communist propaganda activities in the early
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Cold War. Material in the American archives also casts a 
sidelight on British policy. This study has uncovered many 
examples of cooperation between British and American information 
officers in Washington and in the field, in the records of the 
State Department. In marked contrast to Britain, American 
archives also provide a wealth of oral testimony and the series 
of interviews with US Information Agency staff by the Foreign 
Affairs Oral History Program at Georgetown University is a 
particularly valuable source. 90
When the documentary record is incomplete supplementary 
information is often found in the recollections of those involved 
in clandestine activities. This study has benefitted from the 
memoirs, correspondence and interviews with those involved in 
British anti-communist propaganda. Memoirs provide a predictably 
patchy insight into British anti-communist propaganda. In the 
memoirs of some of the most senior officials involved in British 
overseas information activities, Sir Robert Marrett, Ivone 
Kirkpatrick, and Paul Go re-Booth, the IRD is notable by its 
absence. 91 As these were all written before the IRD's 
dissolution, and Marett's book in particular is otherwise so 
comprehensive, the omission can only be explained by 
considerations of official secrecy. Although the publicity 
surrounding the release of the IRD papers prompted a number of 
former officials to speak out in support of the department's 
work, some remain reluctant to refer to their work for fear of 
breaching official secrecy. 92
The utility of memoirs is also reduced by the nature of 
service in the Foreign Office. In many cases a tenure in the IRD 
was only a small part of a long Foreign Office career. For 
example, Cecil Parrott, who joined the IRD in its first and 
formative year, referred only to, "a preliminary run of a year 
in one of the Information Departments of the Foreign Office, ' 
after which he was transferred to the United Nations Political 
Department. 93 Even those who recall their work in more detail, 
often provide little substantive information about propaganda 
policy or operations. As one of the largest departments in the 
Foreign Office the IRD employed a great many people, however,
22
most of the IRD's work it seems was rather mundane, comprised 
mainly of detailed research, foreign press reading and the 
production of briefing papers. The dissemination of this 
information in the field, was often no more interesting. Dame 
Stella Rimington, the former Director-General of MI5 worked in 
the IRD's Delhi office in the late 1960s:
Nobody ever told me what was going on there. I was 
merely told to carry out the rather basic task of 
stuffing envelopes with all sorts of printed material, 
which was sent out from London, and posting them off 
to a whole series of addresses. It was very 
important, I was told, to get the right stuff in the 
right envelopes - not everyone got everything - and 
the whole operation, and in particular the names and 
addresses were very secret... Whether any of it had 
any effect I was not in a position to judge, though I 
did notice from time to time articles in the 
newspapers which seemed to have drawn on the stuff I 
had put in the envelopes. 94
Of course, Rimington adds, she now knows that the IRD was 
responsible for influencing public opinion by planting stories 
hostile to our enemies and favouring the British position. It 
is often the recipients of this material who have provided the 
most detailed accounts of the IRD's methods. Journalists and 
writers such as Brian Crozier, Richard Beeston, and Peregrine 
Worsthorne, who received confidential briefings from the Foreign 
Office or were employed as temporary contract staff by the IB£>, 
have less to fear from the guardians of officials secrecy and 
have been more candid in accounts of their dealings with tfte 
Foreign Office. 95 Similarly, politicians have traditionally had 
less regard for official secrecy than officials worried about 
their pension, even former heads of the Security Service. Thus, 
the most detailed, and some of the earliest, accounts of 
Britain's anti-communist propaganda policy came from those, who 
as Foreign Office ministers were responsible for its formulation. 
Christopher Mayhew, who was instrumental in creating the IRD, 
revealed the existence of the British government's ant i-communist 
propaganda policy as early as 1969. 96 He has since produced two 
detailed accounts of his role in British anti-communist 
propaganda policy. 97 Denis Healey and David Owen, who as 
Foreign Secretary presided over the department's demise, have
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also provided information on the IRD's methods. 98
There is now almost an embarrassment of riches for anyone 
wishing to research the work of this once secret department, and 
this study can only make a modest contribution to this field. 
This thesis does not aim to provide a comprehensive assessment 
of British propaganda from 1945 to 1951. The 1945 to 1951 Labour 
Governments presided over perhaps the greatest expansion of tfte 
British Government's propaganda apparatus until the election of 
the Labour Government in 1997. Propaganda was used widely by the 
Labour Governments: to explain their policies at home, and 
abroad; to reassure Britain's allies, most notably the United 
States about Labour's socialist policies; to promote trade; to 
counter colonial insurgency; to promote good relations with the 
newly independent colonies; and to undermine Britain's enemies. 
This study will focus on just one, very important, aspect of 
this, the use of propaganda to counter communism.
Furthermore, this study will be limited to an examination 
of ant i-communist propaganda policy. It will show how that 
policy expanded to become an integral part of Britain's strategy 
for dealing with the Soviet threat, but it does not seek to 
present a detailed account of the implementation of that policy. 
Although the organisation and methods of the Information Research 
Department will be assessed, details of specific propaganda 
campaigns or operations will be included only insofar as they 
illustrate the overall direction of Britain's anti-communist 
propaganda policy. In the period under consideration the IRD 
launched two large propaganda campaigns: to publicise the use of 
forced labour in the Soviet Union, and to counter the Soviet 
peace campaign. In addition the department was involved in 
psychological warfare campaigns in the Malayan emergency and the 
Korean War. Each one of these campaigns could be the subject of 
a more detailed examination, as some have been." They will 
only be considered in the course of this thesis within the 
context of Britain's overall strategy for combatting communist 
propaganda.
This thesis will also concentrate on one specific aspect of 
Britain's ant i-communist propaganda policy, cooperation with the
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United States. This is not, however, a comparative study of 
British and American anti-communist propaganda. It does not aim 
to provide a detailed assessment of America's response to 
communist propaganda, this has been extensively covered 
elsewhere. 100 It is a study of British ant i-communist 
propaganda policy, and the extent to which that policy was 
coordinated with Britain's principal Cold War ally, the United 
States. The study is comparative only in that British 
cooperation with the United States, will be compared with British 
cooperation with other powers in the field of anti-communist 
propaganda. This will serve to illustrate two fundamental 
points. Firstly, that cooperation with like minded governments 
in the field of anti-communist propaganda was an important part 
of Britain's propaganda policy. Secondly, that the degree of 
cooperation with the United States went some way beyond that with 
any other power. As such, this study serves not only to enhance 
our understanding of British policy towards the Soviet Union, but 
also Anglo-American relations in the Cold War.
Finally, it is not the intention of this study to examine 
the effectiveness of British propaganda in the Cold War. It is 
notoriously difficult to assess the impact of propaganda, 
particularly if it is directed at a foreign audience. One may 
identify propaganda policies, and assess the output of propaganda 
agencies, but it very difficult to gauge how the propaganda is 
received. This is as much a problem for the propagandist as it 
is for the historian. A review of the IRD's operations in 1951 
observed that it was becoming, "^increasingly difficult to assess 
precisely the results directly due to Information Research 
Department.' 101 Some assessment can be made through the records 
kept by the IRD of all known uses of its material, although these 
are far from complete. Even where such records are available, 
as they are for some of the IRD's major campaigns, accounting the 
column inches devoted to a particular propaganda line in the 
press, provides no indication of how many people read a 
particular article or whether they were receptive to the 
information it contained. What is clear is that the resources 
devoted to the anti-communist propaganda policy suggest that
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successive British governments were convinced of the importance 
of such work and presumably its impact.
Chapter 1 will examine the origins of Britain's anti- 
communist propaganda policy in the period between the end of the 
war and the drafting of the new propaganda policy at the end of 
1947. This chapter will examine the disposition of the British 
and American propaganda apparatus at the end of the war, and the 
development of a propaganda machine to fight the Cold War. 
Existing studies of the origins of Britain's cold war propaganda 
will be augmented by an examination of the degree of British and 
American cooperation in this formative period.
In January 1948, Britain launched a new propaganda policy 
to provide a response to communist propaganda. This policy will 
be examined in detail in Chapter 2. The debates surrounding the 
shape of the new policy will be considered. In particular it 
will be argued that Bevin successfully resisted pressure from 
within the Foreign Office, the Cabinet and the military for a 
return to wartime methods of political warfare. This chapter 
will also set out the organisational arrangements fpr 
implementing the new propaganda policy, focusing principally on 
the creation and methods of the IRD.
Chapter 3 will examine the development of Britain's anti- 
communist propaganda policy between 1948 and 1950 focusing in 
particular on cooperation with allies in an effort to build a 
"concerted counter-offensive' to the communist propaganda 
machine. The chapter will examine the tensions surrounding the 
policy for "Third Force' propaganda, and compare the various 
levels of cooperation with Britain's allies in Europe, the 
Commonwealth and the United States.
In 1950, the United States launched their own anti-communist 
campaign under the banner the "Campaign of Truth.' Chapter 4 
will examine the impact of this campaign on British and American 
cooperation. This period saw a substantial increase in British 
and American cooperation, and the increasing coordination of 
propaganda activities. It will also be argued that the period 
between the launch of the Campaign of Truth and the end of 1951 
saw the elevation of propaganda in the foreign policies of both
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nations to the level of a wide-ranging strategy of "political 
warfare.'
In conclusion this thesis aims to expand our understanding 
of the early development of Britain's anti-communist propaganda 
policy, and the extent to which this policy involved cooperation 
with the United States. In drawing these themes together it will 
be shown that Britain and America developed similar perceptions 
of the threat from communist propaganda and subversion, but 
different approaches in responding to that threat. Nevertheless, 
it will be argued that these, often markedly different 
approaches, in practice closely complemented one another and 3id 
indeed allow Britain and America to "shoot at the same target 
from different angles.'
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Chapter 1
The Origins of Britain's anti-communist propaganda
policy 1945-1947
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CHAPTER 1
The origins of Britain's anti-communist propaganda policy.
1945-1947
In January 1948, Britain launched a new propaganda policy 
designed to "oppose the inroads of communism by taking the 
offensive against it. 1 Britain's "future foreign publicity 
policy 1 was outlined in a paper presented to the Cabinet at its 
first meeting of 1948. It stated that since the end of the war, 
Soviet propaganda, had carried on "a vicious attack against the 
British Commonwealth and against Western democracy.' The time 
had come to "pass over to the offensive and not leave the 
initiative to the enemy, but make them defend themselves. 1 It 
also claimed that it was up to Britain, as a European social 
democratic government, and not the Americans to take the lead in 
uniting the forces of anti-communism. 1
Although the United States had also begun to respond to 
communist propaganda, in January 1948 Britain led the way by 
developing a policy and an organisational machinery to provide 
a coordinated global response to hostile communist propaganda. 
This chapter will examine the formulation of this new propaganda 
policy. It will identify the factors which, between the end of 
the war and the drafting of the Cabinet paper at the end of 1947, 
influenced Britain's decision to go over to the offensive. It 
will also argue that from the earliest stages Britain's response 
to communist propaganda was paralleled by, and even complemented, 
the propaganda policy and machinery of the United States.
The development of British and American propaganda policies 
during the first year of peace will be examined, from the 
dissolution of wartime propaganda agencies to the development of 
new policies for national projection and the creation of new 
government propaganda agencies to implement these policies. This 
is followed by an assessment of British and American perceptions 
of the Soviet threat. It will be shown that in the period from 
1945 to 1947 British and American policymakers developed 
complementary perceptions of the Soviet threat. Although the 
Soviet Union posed a considerable military threat the principal 
fear was communist subversion of democracy through the use of
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techniques short of war such as propaganda. Britain's initial 
response to communist propaganda was a propaganda policy based 
on the positive projection of Britain's national achievements. 
As this policy proved increasingly inadequate as a counter to 
hostile foreign propaganda Britain and the United States 
developed complementary propaganda policies designed to 
supplement passive national projection with various defensive and 
offensive measures. In the case of Britain a series of ad hoc 
offensive measures led eventually to the adoption of a 
coordinated global response to communist propaganda by January 
1948.
British and American Propaganda 1945-1946
The British and American governments emerged from World War 
II convinced of the value of a permanent peacetime propaganda 
machinery. During the war all the major powers had employed 
propaganda on an unprecedented scale both at home and abroad. 
Britain and America had developed a complex bureaucratic 
machinery for the dissemination of government propaganda and the 
coordination of allied psychological warfare. Before the end of 
the war, an official committee set up to consider the machinery 
of government in postwar Britain noted the potential for 
peacetime employment of propaganda for "securing publicity and 
goodwill for Britain abroad and the Government's policies at 
home.' 2 At the end of the war, British and American leaders 
expressed their conviction that propaganda was an important tool 
of policy. In December 1945, the British Prime Minister, Clement 
Attlee expressed himself satisfied that the information services 
"have an important and permanent part in the machinery of 
government under modern conditions.' He described the services 
as "essential 1 to keep the public informed about government 
policy and to ensure that, "a true and adequate picture of 
British policy, British institutions and the British way of life 
should be presented overseas.' 3 In the United States earlier 
the same year, President Harry S. Truman had observed that, "the 
nature of present day foreign relations makes it essential for 
the United States to maintain information activities abroad as 
an integral part of our conduct of foreign affairs.' 4 However,
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initially Truman and Attlee did not envisage peacetime propaganda 
as a defence against hostile foreign powers. They reverted to 
concepts of government propaganda which owed more to ideas of 
national projection and advertising developed in the inter-war 
years than the lessons of World War II. Propaganda was not to 
be employed in dishonourable and deceitful pursuits as 
exemplified by the totalitarian dictatorships. In the immediate 
aftermath of the war Britain and America developed government 
propaganda as a positive aid to diplomacy. By explaining their 
position more clearly to foreign powers, they hoped to promote 
international understanding and more particularly, to improve the 
prospects for international trade.
Before a peacetime propaganda machinery could be 
established, both governments had to overcome a widespread 
antipathy towards the use of propaganda. Although the use of 
propaganda could be excused as expedient in wartime, many British 
and American politicians and officials held deep seated 
reservations about the employment of government propaganda in 
peacetime. The maintenance of government agencies for the 
manipulation of opinion was viewed by many as the preserve of 
totalitarian dictatorships, and many wartime propaganda agencies 
were hastily dismantled. 5 In Britain there was a general 
feeling that Government departments generated by wartime 
necessity should be dissolved. Those agencies responsible for 
covert propaganda, the Political Warfare Executive and the 
Special Operations Executive, were dismantled early in 1946. 
Attlee noted brusquely that "he had no wish to preside over a 
British Comintern.' 6 The Ministry of Information was also 
abolished, and overall responsibility for overseas propaganda was 
shifted to the Foreign Office, where enthusiasm for such activity 
was by no means universal. As late as 1952 one senior Foreign 
Office official wrote sardonically to Sir Robert Fraser, Director 
of the Central Office of Information, that "no normal 
diplomatist, I suspect, can be a real enthusiast about publicity 
and propaganda.' 7
In the United States popular support for the dissolution of 
wartime agencies was if anything more pronounced. Congress and
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the public had a distaste for the application of wartime methods 
to the problems of peace and any wartime agency which was not 
clearly demonstrable as necessary to the government's peacetime 
policy was rapidly dismantled. The Office of War Information was 
dissolved in 1945, and responsibility for overseas propaganda was 
foisted on an unwelcoming State Department. A handful of 
officials argued the case for peacetime propaganda but the State 
Department information programme suffered drastic cuts between 
1946 and 1948. 8 America's covert propaganda apparatus fared 
little better. Sensational press articles predicting the 
creation of a v super Gestapo agency' stifled early plans for a 
postwar intelligence agency. 9 The Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) was praised for its wartime achievements and promptly 
abolished. 10 Although elements of OSS were transferred to other 
departments there was little apparent concern to preserve its 
propaganda apparatus. State Department officials considered that 
maintaining such a capability would be "contrary to the 
fundamental premises of our own Governmental system and would be 
honouring the totalitarians by imitating them. 111
Britain was the first to overcome such reservations. Faced 
with a worsening economy and a declining position as a world and 
imperial power, the Labour Government placed considerable faith 
in the projection of British power and achievements through 
propaganda. The social and economic policies of the Labour 
Government marked a radical departure from Conservative 
precedents, and Labour was aware of the need to explain its 
policies to a wide domestic and foreign audience. At home, 
propaganda was employed on an unprecedented scale to explain the 
benefits of Labour's economic policies to managers, workers and 
the public at large. 12 Competition in the world markets and 
Britain's increasing dependence on the United States economy made 
it essential that Britain's case should not be allowed to go 
unexplained overseas. In the United States in particular, 
British propaganda was widely employed to explain to sceptical 
Congressmen that British socialism was not a step on the road to
communism. 13
Beyond the explanation of Labour's socialist policy, this
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new commitment to national projection served other less tractable 
ends. The postwar expansion of Britain's overseas propaganda 
also reflected an awareness of diminished power and the need to 
convince the world that traditional prestige and skills could 
compensate for economic and military decline. 14 As the 
historian Philip M. Taylor has observed:
Propaganda may indeed fail ultimately to disguise 
weakness or the realities of decline but it can 
provide an illusion of strength and confidence that 
does serve to aid foreign policy objectives in 
effective short term ways. 15
In pursuing these ends, British postwar foreign propaganda 
reflected a concept of positive national projection developed in 
the inter-war years. This concept was most famously developed 
by Sir Stephen Tallents who coined the phrase "The Projection of 
England 1 in a pamphlet published in 1932. Tallents argued that 
because Britain no longer enjoyed that position of supremacy 
which had generated its own prestige and had enabled her to 
remain aloof for long periods in the past, she must forego her 
traditional insularity and make Britain more widely known and 
understood in the world. By "projecting 1 a balanced 
interpretation of British civilisation and personality, the 
Government would thereby ensure that its views and policies were 
clearly understood and appreciated abroad. 16
In the postwar years, Britain's straitened financial 
situation invested this theme with new value. One of the first 
directives sent to British information officers by the Foreign 
Office Information Policy Department (IPD) was entitled "The 
Projection of Britain.' The paper was designed to explain 
British policy and aid "the spread of British ideas and British 
standards' abroad. The principal themes were to be industrial 
welfare and the new social legislation of the Labour 
Government. 17 Initially at least, the overriding objective of 
the "Projection of Britain 1 was to foster the nation's economic 
well-being. When Bevin wrote to information officers announcing 
the continuation of information activities he suggested that one 
of the most important objectives for the postwar years would be 
the "promotion of British exports, and the explanation of British
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trading policy. 118 Bevin also believed that propaganda could be 
used overseas as a suitable tool for the projection of British 
social democracy. The Labour Party's election manifesto had 
stated that Britain "must play the part of brave and constructive 
leaders in international affairs, ' promoting worldwide prosperity 
through their own example of high production and a steady 
improvement in living standards. 19 "The Projection of Britain 1 
was likewise designed to depict Britain as a leading exponent of 
social democracy and the leading power in the development of 
progressive welfare legislation. 20 This was overseas propaganda 
at its most positive. The Government was clearly proud of its 
achievements and Bevin in particular was "anxious that our light 
should not remain under a bushel.' 21
Projecting British achievements had traditionally been the 
job of the BBC and the British Council. In the postwar years, 
implementing this national projection on an unprecedented scale 
was facilitated by the retention of significant elements of 
Britain's wartime information apparatus. The ease and speed with 
which postwar propaganda was instituted and expanded suggests 
that the dissolution of wartime information agencies was largely 
superficial. The Ministry of Information's functions were 
divided between various government departments that, in many 
cases, expanded their information activities accordingly. In 
1945 the Foreign Office had only two departments responsible for 
overseas propaganda, by 1947 it had nine. 22 Although the 
Ministry of Information was abolished, under a new system 
government information activities were coordinated by a high 
level committee under the chairmanship of the Lord President of 
the Council, Herbert Morrison. The retention of a Minister of 
Information was considered "politically dangerous,' but Morrison 
effectively became minister responsible for the information 
services. 23 In a candid discussion with American officials in 
1945 Britain's last Minister of Information, Edward S. Williams, 
noted that the disappearance of the formal Ministry would not 
result in the termination of "most of the present functions of 
the Ministry.' 24 Britain's covert propaganda agencies also 
continued to operate after their official dissolution. Problems
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related to the occupation in Europe, the Mediterranean and Asia 
ensured that the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) continued to 
function, 25 and that institutional ties between British and 
American propagandists continued. The vast Psychological Warfare 
Division (PWD) which had operated in all theatres became a much 
reduced Allied Information Service, operating in the former Axis 
states. Its principal function was political re-education 
concentrating on "public information, "consolidation" propaganda, 
counter-propaganda and much political intelligence.' 26
Not surprisingly, whilst the Labour Government was keen to 
advertise its achievements, it was less eager to reveal the 
manner in which these achievements were publicised. In response 
to several enquiries from information officers regarding what to 
tell foreign governments about the reorganisation of British 
information services, the IPD produced a directive outlining the 
need for discretion. Requests for information about British 
organisations were not to be discouraged, but the IPD noted, ^it 
is important not to give the impression that it is the intention 
of His Majesty's Government to build up a powerful publicity 
machine abroad.' It was suggested that requests for information 
should be used as an opportunity to publicise Britain by 
describing the output of these services rather than the 
organisation. It was they claimed, "more useful to tell other 
clients what we can provide than how we do it.' 27
The one notable exception to this rule on discretion was the 
United States. In 1945 the Foreign Office and the State 
Department exchanged detailed information regarding their plans 
for peacetime propaganda. These informal discussions were 
carried out by officials on both sides of the Atlantic. In the 
United States representatives of the British Information Services 
met with State Department officials. 28 In London, Embassy staff 
discussed developments directly with the Minister of 
Information. 29 These meetings were not confined to areas of 
mutual interest but covered the whole range of British 
information apparatus. The extent to which these relations 
differed from those with other powers is indicated by the fact 
that although British information officers had been instructed
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to be particularly careful not to reveal the scale of information 
activity to representatives of foreign powers, in 1946, the 
Foreign Office and the State Department exchanged lengthy and 
precise details regarding the budgets and personnel involved in 
overseas propaganda. 30
These discussions revealed that American plans for peacetime 
propaganda were considerably less ambitious than Britain's. The 
State Department described its information activities a,s, 
"facilitative and supplemental. 1 The State Department merely 
sought to keep channels of information open so that interested 
parties might learn about American life, if they wished. The 
British thought this approach "too limited and negative,' 
preferring "an active program of presenting British life, virtues 
and policy to the world through all available media.' 31 
Although America's first postwar propaganda did seek to present 
a balanced interpretation of America's national attributes, there 
was no active programme of explanation or persuasion. It was 
believed that the facts of American life were exemplary, and 
sufficient to influence world opinion without the employment of 
any techniques of persuasion. In a secret history of American 
psychological operations written in 1951, Dr Edward P. Lilly 
described the American position in 1945 as follows:
If the world were given straight facts about American 
objectives and desires, men would necessarily 
recognise the cooperative position of the United 
States... The unadulterated facts speak for themselves 
and are more acceptable to the common man than 
government opinion influencing efforts. America had 
no selfish post-war policies, and therefore we needed 
only channels to insure that all peoples knew the 
American policy. 32
Like the British, the American government was concerned that 
this programme of national projection should not be seen as 
propaganda. In a speech in January 1946, William B. Benton, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, called for a 
dignified "information 1 programme, as distinguished from 
"propaganda 1 with its unfavourable connotations. He made it 
clear that he intended to present a "full and fair picture' of 
the United States. "The State Department does not intend to 
engage in so-called propaganda, 1 he announced. 33 Benton's
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statement was perhaps closer to the truth than he intended. 
Despite his efforts, America's information programme virtually 
disappeared in the immediate post-war years. State Department 
officials were largely disinterested or hostile to the propaganda 
activities that they had inherited. Congressional hostility was 
even more pronounced and appropriations for overseas information 
were reduced by more than half between 1946 and 1948. 34 TJie 
American government's most well established information agency, 
the Voice of America (VGA), almost collapsed under the combined 
assault of Congressional budget cuts, and the hostility of 
private news agencies no longer prepared to service a government 
propaganda agency. 35
Despite such pressures, with the support of Truman and the 
efforts of individuals such as Benton, elements of America's 
wartime information apparatus were retained to support peacetime 
policy. Following the liquidation of the Office of War 
Information, ten new divisions were established in the State 
Department under a new Office of International Information and 
Cultural Affairs (QIC). 3S Further continuity was provided in 
the War Department, who viewed the employment of propaganda 
somewhat more favourably than their colleagues in the State 
Department. The American Forces Radio Service (AFRS), directed 
at GIs in the occupied territories, fulfilled an important 
propaganda function. Its activities were supplemented by 
stations such as Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) and Rad,io 
Red-White-Red which targeted the home audience in occupied 
Germany and Austria. 37 More significantly, the War Department 
provided a hospitable environment in which America's offensive 
propaganda developed. On the same day President Truman signed 
the Executive Order abolishing the OSS, he also wrote to 
Secretary of State Byrnes asking him to formulate plans for a 
comprehensive and coordinated intelligence programme. 38 In the 
ensuing reorganisation, the operational assets of OSS, including 
its covert propaganda capability, were absorbed in the War 
Department's new Strategic Services Unit (SSU). Whereas the 
State Department rejected covert propaganda as incompatible with 
a peacetime information programme, the SSU were keen to retain
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the propaganda assets of OSS. 39 Moreover, in the debate over 
the development of a peacetime intelligence agency, Truman's 
directive that the agency should perform "such other functions 
and duties' related to national security, was generally 
interpreted to encompass a wide range of activities including 
propaganda. 40
As the above evidence indicates, in the first year of peace 
the British and American governments displayed an ambivalent 
attitude to the continued operation of government information 
services. Public statements by leaders and officials suggested 
that propaganda was now an established feature of government 
activity. However, the public dissolution of wartime information 
agencies gave the impression that such activity was largely 
curtailed. In these reorganisations the British information 
services fared somewhat better than their American counterparts. 
Although the British government were keen to disguise the scale 
of their propaganda activities, there was no suggestion that such 
activity should not continue merely that it should be more 
discreet. Indeed, it seems apparent that after the initial 
demobilisation the Foreign Office, in particular, quickly stepped 
up its propaganda activity. In the United States, in contrast, 
there was a strong feeling that government propaganda should be 
stopped altogether. Appropriations were dramatically reduced and 
a handful of advocates were forced to fight for the survival of 
an overseas propaganda programme within the State Department. 
There was, however, one important area of continuity. Elements 
of America' s covert propaganda apparatus were retained in the War 
Department and it was from within the burgeoning intelligence 
community that a new plan for offensive propaganda would emerge. 
However, initially at least, the propaganda policies of both 
nations remained focused on the positive presentation of national 
achievements. American confidence led many to believe that 
positive policies spoke for themselves. Other nations would 
naturally be interested in American democracy and all that was 
required was a facilitative programme to distribute factual 
information where it was wanted. In contrast, Britain's
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declining status as a world power, coupled with a growing 
dependence on international trade, led her to place considerable 
faith in the ability of propaganda to disguise national weakness 
and elicit international economic support. Although both nations 
retained elements of their wartime propaganda apparatus neither 
yet had a policy for responding to hostile foreign propaganda.
British and American Perceptions of the Soviet Threat 
As the war drew to a close policymakers in Britain and 
America were unsure of Soviet intentions, and were forced to make 
assumptions about Soviet aims and objectives based on Soviet 
behaviour and ambivalent statements by the Soviet leadership. 
The Soviets had been courageous and formidable allies. The Red 
Army drove the Nazis out of the USSR, across Eastern Europe and 
back into Germany. It was the overwhelming power on the Eurasian 
land mass, and occupied much of continental Europe. The 
communists in Europe had also gained considerable political 
strength. Communist party membership had soared during the war, 
particularly in Eastern Europe, but also in France, Italy and 
Finland where the communist vote comprised 20% of the electorate 
in 1945. Meanwhile, Germany, Japan and Italy were defeated, 
France was humiliated, and Britain weakened. 41 In the view of 
Western policymakers, the Soviets were quick to capitalise on 
their advantages. Early in 1945, under Soviet pressure, 
communist controlled governments were formed in Roumania, 
Bulgaria, and Poland. In March 1945, the Soviet Union denounced 
the Turco-Soviet non-aggression pact and began to put pressure 
on Turkey over control of the Dardanelles, a threatening stance 
compounded by the ongoing communist insurrection in Greece. In 
Iran, the Soviets sought to strengthen their position by 
promoting aspirations for autonomy of non-Iranian groups in the 
Soviet occupied north. In February 1946, in his first major 
postwar address, Stalin dismissed any prospect of coexistence 
between capitalist and communist powers. He described the war 
as an inevitable crisis of the "last stage of capitalism, ' in 
which "our victory means, in the first place, our Soviet system 
has won. ' He called for a fundamental redistribution of raw
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materials and markets among countries according to their economic 
weight, something which he stated could not be achieved under 
present capitalist conditions. 42 According to the former Soviet 
foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov, ^there has been a return in 
Russia to the outmoded concept of security in terms of territory 
- the more you've got the safer you are.' 43
From 1945 until mid-1946, British and American policymakers 
developed an, often complementary, perception of the Soviet 
threat. As the war drew to a close, British and American 
military planners viewed Soviet military potential with alarm. 
In the aftermath of the war, the postponement of elections in 
Eastern Europe, the presence of Soviet troops in Iran, and Soviet 
pressure on Greece and Turkey served to further undermine faith 
in Soviet goodwill. Concerns regarding Soviet intentions in 
Eastern Europe and the Middle East were supported by numerous 
reports from British and American missions which highlighted the 
growth in hostile Soviet propaganda. Such reports provided the 
basis for a perception of the Soviet threat based upon political 
and not military fears. British and American policymakers and 
officials did not believe that the Soviet Union was ready to 
embark upon an imminent war. They did, however, fear the spread 
of Soviet influence through communist subversion. Western 
observers were concerned that the Soviet Union retained the 
potential to influence events beyond its borders through a well 
organised network of communist parties and agents. Once they had 
established control in Eastern Europe, it was feared that the 
Soviets would attempt to weaken and subvert Western democracies 
by a series of clandestine and overt methods short of military 
confrontation. Soviet actions in the immediate aftermath of the 
war did little to dispel these fears.
During the war, British and American leaders had divergent 
views regarding the prospects for continued three power 
cooperation after the defeat of Nazi Germany. Churchill regarded 
cooperation with the Soviet Union merely as an alliance of 
convenience. Relations between Britain and the Soviet Union had 
been characterised by ideological and geopolitical hostility 
since 1917 and Churchill was under no illusion that hostile
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relations would resume after the war. On his way to the Teheran 
conference in 1943 Churchill told Macmillan, "Germany is finished 
... Russia is the real problem now. 144 In contrast Roosevelt 
was determined to maintain cooperation with the Soviet Union as 
the key to world peace. Elusive as Roosevelt's views are there 
is little evidence to suggest that he shared Churchill's view of 
the Soviet threat. It is apparent that in Roosevelt's visipn 
Russia and the United States would manage world affairs through 
the United Nations. 45
It is tempting to ascribe the shifts in British and American 
policy towards the Soviet Union in 1945 to the changes of 
administration brought about by the death of Roosevelt and the 
British general election. However, Soviet actions called into 
question whether Roosevelt's concept of a postwar order could 
ever be realised. Truman assumed office promising to continue 
Roosevelt's policies. Like Roosevelt he was concerned to avoid 
the appearance of Anglo-American collaboration against the Soviet 
Union. Throughout 1945, with Secretary of State James Byrn^s, 
Truman sought accommodation with the Soviet Union. Faced with 
Soviet manoeuvres in eastern Europe and the intransigent 
negotiating position of Soviet delegates at the peace 
conferences, by early 1946 Truman resolved to follow a tougher 
policy towards the Soviet Union. According to Melvyn Leffler, 
Truman regarded Soviet actions in Eastern Europe as 
"opportunistic, arbitrary and outrageous.' 46 He characterised 
Soviet behaviour as a continuation of Tsarist Russia's 
expansionist past. Moreover, recent lessons indicated that if 
totalitarian nations were allowed to gather strength they could 
threaten the United States. At the end of 1945, on reading a 
report on the conduct of elections in Eastern Europe, Truman 
famously expressed himself, "tired of babying the Soviets.' He 
wanted the Roumanian and Bulgarian Governments radically changed, 
Soviet actions in Iran condemned and Soviet designs on Turkey 
checked. By the beginning of 1946, Truman resolved that, "unless 
Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war 
is in the making. |47 Shortly afterwards, Truman shared a 
platform with Churchill in Fulton Missouri, as the former Prime
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Minister gave his famous Iron Curtain speech.
In Britain, however, the new Labour Government had fought 
the general election campaign on the assertion that a socialist 
government would naturally enjoy closer relations with the Soviet 
Government than their Conservative predecessors. There was 
considerable sympathy for the Soviet position among Labour Party 
activists, and much pro-Soviet sentiment was expressed by the 
1945 intake of MPs in their first months in Parliament. In 
marked contrast to the party rank and file, those in the Labour 
leadership with first hand experience of dealing with the Soviets 
were inclined to be less conciliatory. 48 During the election 
campaign, Attlee had accompanied Churchill to the Potsdam 
Conference. When he returned to Potsdam as Prime Minister, faced 
with Stalin's geniality, Attlee was under no illusions about the 
Soviet's attitude, "I knew from experience that the Communists 
had always fought us more vigorously than the Tories because they 
thought we offered a viable alternative to Communism.' 49 On 
returning from the San Francisco conference in June 1945, Attlee 
pronounced the Russians to be "perfectly bloody to deal with; 
they tell us nothing yet are setting up puppet governments all 
over Europe and as far west as they can.' 50 Attlee's choice of 
Bevin as Foreign Secretary was, according to his press secretary 
and biographer Francis Williams, predicated on the fact that, 
"Soviet Russia would become tough, aggressive and uncooperative 1 
and Bevin was the most suited, "by temperament and experience to 
meet such a situation.' 51 Bevin's anti-communist credentials 
were undoubted. Although he was committed to a new 
internationalist, and if possible socialist, world order, he was 
not prepared to make concessions to the Soviets to achieve it. 52 
At Potsdam, Bevin claimed that, Churchill had gone "too far in 
throwing baubles to the Soviets.' 53 Unlike Churchill, Bevin 
would not acquiesce in Soviet attempts to extend their sphere of 
influence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. By the spring of 
1946, following the first frustrating Council of Foreign 
Ministers meetings, and Stalin's February speech, Bevin told 
Attlee that the Russians "have decided upon an aggressive policy 
based upon militant Communism and Russian chauvinism and seem
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determined to stick at nothing, short of war, to obtain their 
objectives. l54
Western leaders' perceptions of the Soviet threat were not, 
of course, based simply on their experiences of dealing with the 
Soviets at the peace conferences. Towards the end of the war, 
military and intelligence agencies in Britain and America turned 
their attention to the potential threat from the Soviet Union's 
vast military capability. In Britain, the Post Hostilities 
Planning Staff (PHPS) began preparing studies early in 1944 based 
on the assumption that the Soviet Union was the next potential 
enemy. 55 In the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
stressed the importance of deterring Soviet aggrandizement in 
Europe and Asia. 56 By the autumn of 1945, military planners on 
both sides of the Atlantic were worried that Soviet control of 
much of Eastern Europe would aid the Soviet Union's economic 
recovery, enhance its warmaking capacity and deny resources to 
Western Europe.
British and American intelligence agencies produced their 
first postwar assessments of Soviet intentions early in 1946. 
In the light of US possession of the atomic bomb, these 
assessments stressed that the immediate threat was not Soviet 
military strength but communist subversion. The principal fear 
was that following the establishment of Soviet control in eastern 
Europe the Soviets would attempt to weaken and subvert western 
democracies by a combination of clandestine and overt methods 
short of military intervention. In March 1946, the British Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) concluded that although the Soviet 
Union would avoid any course of action likely to provoke a war, 
she would respond "using all weapons, short of war 1 to any 
attempt to undermine her position in the satellite states. In 
addition to securing her frontiers the Soviet Union would adopt 
a "policy of opportunism to extend her influence wherever 
possible without provoking a major war.' According to the JIC, 
at most risk were those areas where they were least likely "to 
come up against firm combined resistance from the United States 
and Great Britain,' such as the Mediterranean, Turkey and Iran. 
The JIC identified several methods by which the Soviets would
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seek to extend their influence: Communist parties abroad would 
play a central role, both in consolidating power in the Soviet 
orbit and weakening non-communist states; the Soviets would also 
make use of their position in the United Nations, and various 
other international organisations such as the World Federation 
of Trade Unions and the World Youth Organisation; finally, 
propaganda would be used to the full, in particular to stir up 
trouble among colonial peoples. 57
The first estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities 
produced by the American Central Intelligence Group's Office of 
Research and Evaluation (ORE), also concluded that the Soviet 
Union would seek to avoid military conflict. Like the JIC, it 
acknowledged that the Soviet Union would insist upon dominating 
Eastern Europe. Elsewhere Stalin would pursue an "opportunistic 
and grasping' policy. The main targets for Soviet attention 
would be Greece, Turkey and Iran. The Soviets would also seek 
to be the predominant influence in the whole of Germany and 
Austria, and enjoy an influence at least equal to the United 
States in Japan, China, and Korea. In line with the British, 
this American assessment also stressed that the Soviets believed 
the success of their policies were dependent upon ensuring that 
Britain and America did not combine as part of a powerful western 
bloc. The report identified subversion as the principal method 
the Soviets would employ to undermine the unity and strength of 
foreign states. Through local communist parties and propaganda 
the Soviets would seek to: foment domestic discord, discredit the 
leadership, promote domestic agitation conducive to a reduction 
of their target's military and economic strength and to the 
adoption of foreign policies favourable to Soviet purposes, and 
incite colonial unrest. 58
These intelligence assessments were supported by reports 
throughout 1946 from British and American representatives abroad 
at the sharp end of Soviet propaganda attacks. These reports 
suggested a developing propaganda campaign directed at Britain 
and the US, and an increase in Soviet propaganda in vulnerable 
areas. From early in 1946 British and American missions began 
to report a new and increasingly hostile communist propaganda
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campaign. According to the US Ambassador in Moscow, the Soviet 
propaganda campaign combined "violent attacks on "British 
imperialism" 1 with "grotesque and slightly sinister 1 depictions 
of the American way of life. 59 The British Embassy reported 
that a delegation of Labour MPs to Moscow had been shocked by the 
"extent and virulence' of Soviet anti-British propaganda. 60 
Reports also suggested that communist propagandists were active 
in at least some of those areas identified as at most risk from 
Soviet subversion. A US weekly intelligence summary from August 
1946 observed that Soviet propaganda was increasingly aimed at 
splitting the "Anglo-America bloc 1 by playing up Anglo-American 
differences in the Middle East, and highlighting the competition 
for markets in India and the Far East. 61 In July 1946, a 
Parliamentary Delegation to Iran was dismayed by the level of 
anti-British propaganda by the communist Tudeh Party. On their 
return they recommended that "a strong British propaganda drive 
should be launched 1 in Iran. 62 British information officers 
implored the Foreign Office to allow them to respond on a broader 
scale, 63 and the American Ambassador in Moscow called for a 
"vigorous and intelligent American information program.' 64
Perhaps the most influential assessments of Soviet policy 
came from British and American representatives in Moscow. From 
their position near the centre of Soviet power, and often at the 
forefront of communist propaganda attacks, they dramatically 
illustrated the dangers of communist subversion. Most famously 
in February 1946 George Kennan, charge d'affaires at the American 
Embassy in Moscow, sought to define Soviet policy in his "long 
telegram" to the State Department. Kennan concluded that Soviet 
policy was guided by the belief that "with US there can be no 
permanent modus vivendi. 1 Stalin believed that "peaceful 
coexistence 1 was impossible, and that the world revolved around 
socialist and capitalist "centers' engaged in a constant battle 
for command of the world economy. Although Soviet foreign policy 
was not adventuristic they would seek to expand the limits of 
Soviet power "wherever it was considered timely and promising.' 
This policy, Kennan wrote, would be pursued on an official and 
a "subterranean 1 plane, in which the actions of Soviet officials
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would be supported by a series of measures undertaken 
agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit 
responsibility. ' According to Kennan the Soviet Union had at its 
disposal:
... an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of 
its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing 
flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose 
experience and skill in underground methods are presumably 
without parallel in history. 65
Kennan's views were echoed in a series of telegrams from the 
British charge d'affaires, Frank Roberts. 66 Roberts concurred 
with Kennan that the Soviet Union would seek to avoid a major 
war, but he too found little cause for optimism in this analysis. 
Instead, Roberts warned that "increasing attention was devoted 
to the renewed Marxist-Leninist ideological campaign.' He also 
emphasised the particular anti-British tone of this campaign. 
Kennan had noted that of all their perceived enemies the Soviets 
would wage a relentless battle against the so-called "false 
friends of the people 1 , namely moderate socialist or social 
democratic leaders. Roberts' experience confirmed Kennan's 
observation. He wrote that, in the new ideological offensive, 
Britain, "as the home of capitalism, imperialism and now of 
social democracy, is a main target.' Moreover, he expanded, such 
propaganda was not confined to the Soviet Union. All across 
Europe "communist propaganda is constantly directed against 
us.' 67
Kennan and Roberts' reports illustrate the degree of 
convergence between British and American official perceptions of 
the Soviet threat. They also indicate a marked degree of 
agreement in their proposed response to Soviet actions. Both 
suggested a response based on the projection of an image of a 
healthy and vigorous society to rival the appeal of Soviet 
communism. The "self-confidence, discipline, morale and 
community spirit of our own people', was, according to Kennan, 
"a victory . . . worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint 
communiques.' Only through presenting "a more positive and 
constructive picture of the sort of world we would like to see' 
could America hope to guide the rest of the world away from 
communism. Similarly, Roberts stressed that Britain "should act
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as champions of a dynamic faith and way of life with an appeal 
to the world at least as great as that of the Communist system. ' 
Kennan and Roberts also recognised that an appeal to 
international opinion would only succeed if coupled with a 
campaign to disillusion domestic public opinion about Soviet 
intentions. Both emphasised the need for a campaign to "educate 1 
the British and American public about the realities of Soviet 
communism. In conclusion, Kennan and Roberts believed that 
countering the Soviet threat would involve the coordination pf 
political and military strategy, domestic and foreign policy in 
a manner comparable with wartime. 68
Kennan and Roberts were both influential in defining the 
Soviet threat. Kennan's telegram was widely circulated within 
the US Government. The Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal 
thought it so inspired he had it despatched to "hundreds if not 
thousands' of senior officers in the armed services. Kennan's 
"long telegram 1 has been widely credited with defining the US 
policy of "containment 1 of the Soviet threat for the next forty 
years. Kennan returned to Washington shortly afterwards from 
where he continued to provide detailed assessments of the Soviet 
threat as head the new Policy Planning Staff tasked with 
"formulating and developing... long term programs for the 
achievement of US foreign policy objectives. 1 69 Although the 
impact of Roberts' analysis was less sensational it also struck 
a resonant chord in the Foreign Office, and was widely read in 
Government. The Head of the Northern Department, Christopher 
Warner, described his despatches as "magnificent 1 and Bevin 
instructed that the whole of Roberts' analysis be circulated to 
the Cabinet. 70
Roberts' analysis supported a growing consensus within the 
Foreign Office regarding the hostile nature of Soviet intentions 
and the need to adopt a more vigorous response. In 1946 senior 
officials in the Foreign Office began to reassess Soviet 
intentions. Prompted by the JIC and Roberts' reports from 
Moscow, they reached rather gloomy conclusions about the limits 
of Stalin's intentions and advocated a new "defensive/offensive 1 
strategy to respond to the Soviet threat. 71 The forum in which
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this response was developed was the Foreign Office Russia 
Committee. Roberts had recommended the creation of a new body 
within the Foreign Office to provide analysis of Soviet policy 
and formulate Britain's global response. The Russia Committee 
was established in April 1946 and is evidence of the growing 
awareness of the Soviet threat and the need to provide a 
coordinated response. The Russia Committee was designed to 
provide a weekly review of "all aspects of Soviet policy and 
propaganda', and consider what response was required, with 
particular reference to the "probable degree of support to be 
looked for from the United States of America, and to a lesser 
degree from France and others.' 72
At its first meeting, the committee considered a paper drawn 
up by Christopher Warner which outlined, "The Soviet Campaign 
Against This Country and Our Response To It.' Warner echoed 
Frank Roberts' telegrams by stressing that the Soviets had 
returned to a "pure doctrine of Marx-Lenin-Stalinism 1 which was 
naturally antagonistic to British social democracy. In pursuing 
this doctrinal policy the Soviets would, according to Warner, 
"play an aggressive political role, while making an intensive 
drive to increase its own military and industrial strength.' 
Warner's analysis reveals the degree to which recent experience 
influenced Foreign Office perceptions of the Soviet threat. 
Highlighting the proselytising nature of communism, Warner noted 
that, "we should be very unwise not to take the Russians at their 
word, just as we should have been wise to take Mein Kampf at its 
face value.' Warner stressed that as Hitler had occupied half 
of Europe by means short of war there should be no mistake about 
Soviet intentions. 73 Aggressive Soviet actions were evident 
around the world: in Eastern Europe, Germany, Iran, Manchuria, 
Korea and in the United Nations. British interests worldwide 
were threatened, in particular by aggressive Soviet propaganda. 
"The Soviet Government, ' he wrote, "are carrying on an intensive 
campaign to weaken, deprecate and harry this country in every 
possible way. f Wherever they have the opportunity the Soviets 
would, according to Warner seek to "stir up trouble for His 
Majesty's Government or to weaken their influence. 1 The threats
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to Britain were manifold: the establishment of communist 
governments in countries where hostile influence threatened 
Britain's national interest; the weakening of friendly elements 
in such countries; the creation of troubled conditions in the 
colonies; disruption of recovery outside the Soviet orbi,t; 
attempts to divide Britain from their allies; and attempts to 
discredit Britain as weak and reactionary. Faced with such 
threats, Warner argued, "concessions and appeasement' would 
merely serve to weaken Britain's position while the Soviets built 
up their industrial and economic strength. Britain, he concluded 
must launch a vigourous defence. Taking his lead from the JIC, 
Warner asserted that if the Soviets were to employ means short 
of war, such methods should also be Britain's defence:
The Soviet Government makes coordinated use of 
military, economic, propaganda and political weapons 
and also of the communist "religion 1 . It is 
submitted, therefore, that we must at once organise 
and coordinate our defences against all these and that 
we should not stop short of a defensive-offensive. 74
Warner's paper was endorsed by Bevin and Attlee. 75 The 
general acceptance of the Foreign Office's reassessment of Soviet 
policy, and in the United States the embracing of Kennan's 
analysis, indicates that on both sides of the Atlantic 
policymakers' views of the Soviet threat had crystallised by 
early 1946. However, public perceptions of the Soviet threat did 
not necessarily correspond with those of politicians and 
officials, and this remained an obstacle to a more robust 
response to the Soviet threat. In September 1946, US 
intelligence observed that Soviet propaganda which had sought to 
"keep alive in the US and UK any active opposition to any firm 
policy towards the USSR 1 had met with considerable success. It 
concluded that many moderate and liberal groups "have been so 
divided over the issue of policy toward the USSR that their 
potentialities for opposing Soviet tactics have been at least 
neutralised.' 76 If the British and American Governments were 
going to pursue a tougher policy with the Soviet Union they would 
also need to address public opinion at home.
The Soviet attempt to promote a more generous policy towards 
themselves in Britain and the US was largely pushing against an
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open door. In Britain there remained among the general public 
a widespread feeling of gratitude for the Soviet contribution to 
the war effort. Throughout the war, the British public had 
displayed a marked admiration for the achievements of the Red 
Army, and by extension, the Soviet regime. As early as 1941/ 
Churchill remarked on the "tendency of the British public to 
forget the dangers of communism in their enthusiasm over the 
resistance of Russia. 177 By March 1945, the Foreign Office 
suggested that it was necessary to encourage franker criticism 
in Britain of Soviet policy and to stop the "gush of propaganda' 
eulogising the Russian war effort and their system of 
government. 78 When, in September 1945, a Gallup public opinion 
poll asked the British public if their feelings towards Russia 
were more or less friendly than a year ago, 16% said they felt 
more friendly, 54% felt the same, and 19% less friendly. When 
asked the same question about the United States, only 9% felt 
more friendly, and 35% less friendly. 79 When questioned again 
about attitudes towards the Soviet Union in September 1946, 41% 
now pronounced themselves less friendly, but 41% recorded no 
change in attitude and 8% still expressed increased 
friendliness. 80 Moreover, when asked the reasons for tjie 
disappearance of allied cooperation, general mistrust and "each 
country out for itself came significantly higher than Russian 
imperialism and unwillingness to cooperate. 81 Remarkably, when 
Gallup compiled a list of people most admired by the British 
public in November 1946 Stalin came seventh, one place above the 
King and Queen! 82
Remarkably in the United States, where throughout the war 
Roosevelt had openly pursued a more accommodating policy towards 
the Soviet Union, the public was less pro-Soviet than in Britain. 
Polls carried out by the American Institute of Public Opinion 
indicate a consistent level of distrust of Soviet policies 
throughout the war and into peacetime. 83 Nevertheless, they 
also indicate that public concern about the nation's security was 
not entirely due to anti-Soviet sentiment. When pollsters asked 
in February 1946 which countries they distrusted, although the 
Soviet Union led the list with 52%, Britain came in a close
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second with 41%. 84 Moreover, suspicion of Soviet intentions did 
not transform into support for a new policy towards the Soviet 
Union. Following Churchill's "Iron Curtain 1 speech at Fulton the 
British Ambassador Halifax concluded that although the majority 
of "articulate comment' paid homage to the speaker, it disagreed, 
"either with his diagnosis or his cure, or both. ' Halifax noted:
Profound as the uneasiness is about Soviet policies, 
there is still a reluctance to face the full 
implications of the facts and a timidity about the 
consequences of language as forthright as Mr 
Churchill's. 85
Halifax's conclusions are supported by opinion polls which 
indicate that the majority of those polled who knew of 
Churchill's speech disapproved of his suggestions. 86 This 
reluctance to respond to Soviet policies reflected a wider 
feeling in both the United States and Britain, that foreign 
policy issues were not a major concern as the world recovered 
from the war. In October 1945, only 7% of Americans polled rated 
world peace as the number one problem facing the country. Jobs 
and labour unrest were, perhaps predictably, their foremost 
concerns. 87 In Britain, foreign policy was not included in 
pollsters' questions regarding the most pressing problems facing 
the country until 1947. When it was, in July 1947, only 5% 
considered foreign policy to be the most important problem, far 
below the food situation at 27% and housing at 13%. 88
By mid 1946, British and American leaders and officials had 
reached similar views of the Soviet threat. In responding to 
this threat, policymakers faced several problems. Firstly, 
diplomats and information officers in certain strategic areas, 
principally Iran, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, urgently 
sought permission to answer specific communist propaganda charges 
in their respective countries. In addition to the immediate 
problem of this ongoing communist propaganda campaign, observers 
feared the potential of communist subversion on a much wider 
scale. Those such as Kennan and Roberts, who took in the whole 
vista of Soviet behaviour recognised that the communist 
propaganda apparatus was widespread and highly organised. Their 
analyses suggested a piecemeal response to individual Soviet 
attacks would not do. They recommended the global presentation
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of Western values as a coherent doctrine to rival that of 
communism. Such an approach would necessitate a propaganda 
campaign comparable in scale and organisation to that of the 
Soviet Union. Finally/ British and American policymakers faced 
the problem of mobilising domestic opinion. British and American 
representatives abroad who witnessed hostile communist propaganda 
first hand were quick to advocate a vigorous response. The mass 
of the population of Britain and America was not, however, 
subject to such exposure. For some at least, the Soviet Union 
was a valiant ally which had suffered incredible losses and was 
not surprisingly concerned for its future security. A far larger 
majority cared little for foreign policy issues. They had 
survived a dreadful war and were more concerned with the 
immediate problems of domestic regeneration. If policymakers 
were to develop a coherent and effective response to Soviet 
propaganda they would need to employ government propaganda both 
at home and abroad at a level unprecedented in peacetime,.
The Development of Anti-Communist Propaganda 1946-1947 
Britain took the initiative in responding to communist 
propaganda. It was, however, an initiative taken with reluctance 
and caution. Faced with warnings from the JIG and calls from ftis 
most senior diplomats to allow them to react to communist 
propaganda, Bevin continued to place great faith in "The 
Projection of Britain.' His response to anti-British communist 
propaganda was to propose an ever more forceful presentation of 
British achievements. In January 1946, Bevin told the Cabinet, 
"The best means of preventing the countries of Southeastern 
Europe from being absorbed into an exclusive Soviet sphere of 
influence was to provide a steady stream of information about 
British life and culture.' 89 . By emphasising Britain's 
industrial welfare, Bevin hoped to "expose the myth current in 
many quarters that Soviet Russia is the only country in which 
attention is given to the welfare of workers.' 90 Although many 
of those posted abroad considered this response to be somewhat 
inadequate, the Foreign Office replied to their requests for 
permission to answer Soviet charges with Bevin's edict that "no
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active steps should be taken in the way of counter-attack.' 91 
At a joint Central Office of Information and Foreign Office 
Conference on overseas information, Ivone Kirkpatrick stressed 
that it was the Foreign Secretary's wish that:
. . . the steady political and publicity attack being 
made by Russia should not be met by anti-communist 
propaganda. The policy was that publicity should 
project the British social system, aspects of 
industrial welfare etc. being in fact educative. 92
There is evidence to suggest that this educative approach 
was paying off. Reports from British missions in Eastern Europe 
emphasised the "pathetic and encouraging 1 appetite of the general 
populace for British cultural material. 93 Similarly, in Italy, 
an area considered to be a principal target for communist 
propaganda, the British Labour Attache wrote that, "it would be 
more profitable to adopt a positive line of pro-British 
propaganda than the negative line of answering other people's 
propaganda.' 94 In June 1947, Kirkpatrick informed a production 
conference on overseas propaganda, that the Foreign Secretary 
"considered the tide of communism in Europe had receded, largely 
owing to the way in which the Russians had conducted affairs, and 
the way in which they [the British] had presented themselves to 
the world. ' 9S
Bevin's confidence in "The Projection of Britain' was nqt, 
however, shared by all his colleagues in the Foreign Office. 
From early in 1946, officials in the Foreign Office urged Bevin 
to adopt a more vigorous response to communist propaganda. Often 
couched in language reminiscent of World War II, this response 
went beyond the educative approach favoured by Bevin and included 
elements of offence as well as defence. It was a response which 
Bevin resisted through 1946 and 1947, yet one which ultimately 
prevailed. Faced with offensive communist propaganda, officials 
suggested that British overseas propaganda should concentrate 
less on projecting national achievements and focus greater 
attention on countering communist charges. As Ivone Kirkpatrick 
told the Central Office of Information in July 1946, "the stage 
of winning admirers and friends for Great Britain had now passed
the time had come to persuade each country to take 
action. |96
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In his paper on the Soviet campaign against Britain, 
Christopher Warner had begun to outline a new line for responding 
to offensive communist propaganda. Far from winning friends 
through the projection of national achievements, Warner stressed 
that British propaganda should be directed against communism 
which should be exposed as totalitarianism. British propaganda 
should attack and expose the myths the Soviet Government was 
using to justify its policy, such as: the supposed encirclement 
of Russia by capitalist powers; the myth that Germany was to be 
built up against Russia; that Russia gave disinterested support 
to subject races in contrast to colonial enslavement by 
capitalist powers; the fallacious distinction between the idea 
of a "western bloc 1 and the reality of the Russian eastern bloc; 
the Russian mis-interpretations of "democracy,' "cordon 
sanitaire' and "collaboration'; and the Soviet habit of calling 
all non-communists reactionaries and anti-democratic. In 
addition to this new line in British propaganda, Warner suggested 
that Britain should offer "all moral and material support as was 
possible without endangering their lives' to progressive forces 
in any country fighting against communism. 97
Prompted by Warner 1 s paper, Kirkpatrick drafted a detailed 
proposal for British counter-propaganda. Kirkpatrick was a 
veteran of wartime propaganda and his proposal contained much to 
recommend it to Bevin. He outlined several premises for an 
effective propaganda campaign, including: the cooperation of 
Government Ministers; the support of the BBC and the domestic 
media; and the closest coordination of domestic and foreign 
propaganda. He also cautioned against expectations of dramatic 
results. The essence of the campaign was to be education and 
would therefore proceed "at a steady drip rather than a sudden 
gush.' However, Kirkpatrick somewhat undermined the impact of 
his paper by linking his proposals for counter-propaganda with 
a more hazardous plan for subversion. By drawing on his wartime 
experience Kirkpatrick crossed a line between advocating actions 
short of war and the kind of direct intervention which could 
provoke one. In a much quoted passage, he concluded:
We have a good analogy in our very successful campaign 
during the war directed towards stimulating resistance
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movements in Europe. The V sign was blazoned all over 
the world, but at the same time we acted. We 
parachuted men, money and arms into occupied territory 
Propaganda on the largest possible scale was 
coordinated with our policy. 198
Despite support from senior officials, Kirkpatrick 1 s 
dramatic plan never received any degree of Ministerial approval. 
Bevin strongly opposed the scheme and minuted tersely underneath, 
"The more I study this the less I like it. I am quite sure that 
the putting over of positive results of British attitudes will 
be a better corrective. 1 " Far from sponsoring subversion, 
Bevin recommended greater publicity for the new Insurance and 
National Health Bills. 100 Although Kirkpatrick 1 s paper was 
discussed on several further occasions, on each occasion it was 
decided that anti-communist propaganda and subversion should be 
treated separately. 101 In contrast, Warner's paper had been 
distributed to selected Cabinet Ministers, and received the 
approval of both Bevin and Attlee. 102 It seems likely that 
Warner's appeal to unite the forces of social democracy was 
somewhat more palatable to Bevin than Kirkpatrick's reversion to 
wartime tactics. Although Bevin resisted the adoption of a 
defensive-offensive policy on a global scale, he did authorise 
such a campaign in several key areas, most notably Iran. 103
The Middle East was essential to Britain's emerging Cold War 
strategy. Foreign Office concerns about communist propaganda in 
the area coincided with military plans to use the Middle East as 
a base from which to attack the Soviet Union in the event of war. 
The United Kingdom was out of range of many important strategic 
targets, and the Chiefs of Staff considered bases in the Middle 
East vital to bring the industrial and oil producing areas of 
Southern Russia within long range air attack. 104 In 1945 the 
Joint Intelligence Committee had identified the Middle East as 
an area in which Britain was particularly vulnerable to hostile 
Soviet propaganda. In June 1946 it reported that the aim of 
Soviet policy was to "weaken the British position in that 
area.' 105 The Foreign Office had already decided to "go all out 
for the defence of our interests in the areas which the Chiefs 
of Staff eventually declared to be of vital importance. 1106 
Thus when the British mission in Teheran began to express concern
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at the influence of the communist Tudeh Party, the Foreign Office 
urged Bevin to make an exception to his rule and sanction a 
general counter-offensive in Iran. 107
In October 1946, Kirkpatrick drafted a directive for 
propaganda in the Middle East, and with reservations, Bevin 
approved it. Kirkpatrick proposed a two pronged counter- 
offensive designed to present Britain as the nation to which 
Middle East countries should look for guidance, whilst dealing 
factually with the Russian campaign of mis represent at iorjs. 
Bevin's only concern was that the campaign should be 
predominantly positive and not make the mistake of rousing 
"communist enthusiasm by excessive attacks on communism.' As 
Bevin wished, Kirkpatrick 1 s directive was designed to project 
positive themes and avoid futile controversy. Britain's 
progressive social policy was emphasised as was Britain/s 
willingness to extend this commitment overseas in the form of 
technical and humanitarian assistance. It was, Kirkpatrick 
claimed, important to "ram home 1 to the peoples of the Middle 
East Britain's interest in the "independence, security and 
prosperity 1 of the region, whilst also publicising British 
attempts to influence governments in the area to introduce social 
reforms and raise standards of living. The anti-communist aspect 
of the campaign sought to answer Soviet misrepresentations, 
depict the true state of affairs in Russia, and stress the 
failure of Russian diplomacy. Aware of Soviet experience in 
propaganda, Kirkpatrick noted that communist charges should be 
answered with discretion. It was important to avoid being drawn 
into debates on subjects chosen by the Soviets and always appear 
to be on the defensive. The positive work of "building the new 
Britain' was to be at the forefront of British propaganda. 108
These themes were projected on the widest possible scale. 
In addition to the British Government's information apparatus, 
the BBC, British companies in the Middle East, and the TUC were 
all mobilised. Sir lan Jacob, Controller of the BBC's European 
Services, had approached the Foreign Office earlier in 1946 to 
suggest that Britain was being too indulgent in its attitude to 
Soviet propaganda and that broadcasts might carry more anti-
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communist material. Jacob was promptly invited to attend 
meetings of the Russia committee as the only non-Foreign Office 
member. 109 When the campaign in Iran began in October 1946, 
Kirkpatrick recommended that Sir William Haley, the Director- 
General of the BBC, be asked to place the Middle East services 
under Jacob's control. 110 Although Jacob insisted that the 
BBC's impartiality should be preserved he urged the Russia 
Committee to provide more background information on the USSR, 
methods of the Soviet Government and British policy in the Middle 
East. 111 British oil companies were also asked to publicise 
their efforts to raise the standard of living in Iran. 112 In an 
effort to ensure their assistance, it was suggested that 
officials stress the danger of communist disruption of the labour 
force and that British oil companies, "can only hope to hold 
their positions if they order their affairs according to the best 
Western standards.' One company which did much to promote 
Britain's positive approach to labour welfare was the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) . In return for its cooperation Bevin 
asked the Minister of Supply, the President of the Board of Trade 
and the Minister of Labour to deal "rapidly and favourably 1 with 
all requests from the AIOC for facilities for their development 
programme. 113 Kirkpatrick recommended a similar approach to the 
Imperial Bank in Iran. The TUG was also asked to provide 
literature on "a considerable scale. 1114 Finally, in the 
tradition of successful wartime propaganda, overt propaganda was 
supported by a certain degree of covert activity. SIS was 
brought in to enquire into certain aspects of Persian opinion and 
carry out any investigation the Ambassador might request. 
Colonel Wheeler, the newly appointed information officer in 
Teheran, also suggested that Persian agents from India might be 
introduced for the oral dissemination of "black 1 propaganda. 115
The propaganda campaign in Iran was only the first tentative 
step towards a global response to communist propaganda. It was 
nevertheless a significant step. It was the first example of the 
more active offensive-defensive strategy for responding to Soviet 
propaganda, involving the coordination of overt and covert 
propaganda and the close support of the BBC and private
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organisations. Bevin, however, baulked at requests to expand the 
campaign to cover the whole of the Middle East. 116 When Sargent 
suggested that Kirkpatrick 1 s original proposals be reconsidered 
in the light of the new campaign, Bevin stood firm, "I am not 
going to commit myself to the whole of Kirkpatrick 1 s scheme in 
order to tackle Persia. 1117 The Foreign Office was nonetheless 
reluctant to allow Bevin's doubts to impede the general progress 
of the anti-communist campaign. As Raymond Smith has observed, 
there was a substantial measure of confidence that Bevin's 
objections could be "chipped away 1 as long as the momentum was 
maintained. Bevin's approval of the campaign in Iran alongside 
his general approval of Warner's paper proved to be "the hammer 
and chisel' by which this was to be done. 118 Officials followed 
a dual strategy whereby preparations were made so that a more 
vigorous campaign might be instituted the moment Ministerial 
approval was forthcoming. At the same time, they sought approval 
for a propaganda counter-offensive in various specific cases, in 
Germany, France and Italy, and at home in Britain.
In preparation for the expected change in policy, Warner 1 s 
memorandum was circulated to heads of Foreign Office departments 
and 30 diplomatic posts. 119 The Russia Committee suggested that 
British representatives abroad "should be furnished with the 
necessary background for any action which might be required' , and 
it should be made clear that "a departure from the normal 
practice of non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries will be involved.' 120 It was also agreed that, 
Britain's publicity machine should be maintained "at full 
efficiency, in order that it might be able to meet the 
possibility of Ministers approving an all-out anti-communist 
campaign.' 121 In July 1946, the Russia Committee established a 
publicity subcommittee to provide more detailed consideration of 
propaganda measures. 122
Throughout 1946 the Russia Committee also considered action 
in response to specific requests from British missions in Italy, 
France and Finland. In these cases, Ministerial approval was 
apparently not sought although the measures discussed clearly 
went beyond Bevin's instructions. In Italy the British
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Ambassador noted that efforts to prevent the country embracing 
communism were woefully inadequate. Anti-British propaganda was 
widespread and the Ambassador recommended the creation of an 
organisation like the Political Warfare Executive to carry out 
offensive propaganda. 123 In response the Russia Committee 
recommended that propaganda should compare the low cost of 
British occupation to Soviet calls for reparations, and suggested 
further publicity be given to misdeeds in countries under Soviet 
occupation. They also considered what opportunities might arise 
for "influencing elections in favour of our friends.' 124 
Concern that communists might take power through the ballot box 
was also evident in France. The question of influencing French 
elections was first discussed in March 1946, and by the end of 
April it was noted that Kirkpatrick and the French Department 
were "doing all that was possible to combat Communist propaganda 
in the French elections. 1125 When discussing such intervention 
the question of Ministerial approval was rarely mentioned 
although the Committee was apparently aware of the limitations 
imposed by Bevin. Its willingness to bypass Bevin's authority 
was clearly illustrated when the British representative in 
Finland asked for permission to expose communist myths through 
a programme of oral propaganda. The Russia Committee noted that 
such measures went "somewhat beyond what we are already 
authorised to do.' Nonetheless they approved the suggestions, 
and agreed to furnish the Embassy with all possible support, 
"provided they are carried out discreetly.' 126
Ministerial approval was secured in September 1946 for 
additional anti-communist measures in Germany, and more generally 
to publicise Soviet breaches of the Potsdam Agreement. 127 In 
Germany British propaganda activities had continued since 1945 
under the guise of "re-education,' in what Kirkpatrick later 
termed the "battle for the German mind' , 128 The new campaign 
stepped up these activities and drew attention to Soviet 
misrepresentations of British policy. Authority was given for 
"a campaign of enlightenment 1 regarding Soviet failure to carry 
out the Potsdam agreement. 129 Publicity was given to the 
production of war material in the Soviet zones of Germany and
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Austria. Kirkpatrick also arranged for Soviet troop numbers in 
South Eastern Europe to be publicised by the BBC. 130 In 
Germany, as in Iran, the Foreign Office sought to avoid "a 
slanging match were we are on the defensive and engaged in 
breathlessly countering Soviet charges. 1 Officials noted 
perceptively that, "the latest Soviet lie will always have 
greater news value than the latest British denial.' The main 
task was to explain British policy fully and where possible 
implicitly debunk Soviet propaganda about it. In addition, there 
was to be a certain amount of factual reporting of conditions in 
the Soviet zone, with particular emphasis on the Soviet desire 
for reparations. 131
The adoption of a more combative response to communist 
propaganda in Germany is indicative of a general shift in Bevin's 
attitude at the end of 1946. Prompted by the creation of 
communist Governments in Bulgaria, Roumania and Poland in late 
1946, Bevin moved towards a tougher line in responding to 
communist propaganda. In September 1946 Oliver Harvey informed 
the Russia Committee that they now had "general authority ... to 
defend ourselves against Russian propaganda attacks.' 132 In 
January 1947, the propaganda campaign already underway in Germany 
was extended to cover the whole of eastern Europe. Bevin told 
a meeting of British ambassadors from eastern Europe that 
following the elections they were "finally faced with 
totalitarian, Moscow-controlled governments' in Bulgaria, 
Roumania and Poland, as well as Yugoslavia and Albania. 
Consequently the campaign to secure "free and unfettered 
elections' in eastern Europe would come to an end. Instead, 
British diplomats were authorised to do everything possible to 
promote the western way of life and counteract misrepresentations 
and anti-British propaganda spread by the communists. The 
objective was "to hold the position against the spread of 
communism in order that Western concepts of social democracy may/ 
if possible, in the course of time be adopted in as many Eastern 
European countries as possible.' It was also felt that if 
Britain were to relax the pressure on the Soviets in Eastern 
Europe, "we should have to expect increased pressure from the
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Russians in Western Europe and the Middle East.' 133 In July 
1947, Britain's response to communist propaganda attacks in the 
Middle East were also stepped up when Kirkpatrick 1 s directive for 
propaganda in Iran was extended to cover the whole of the Middle 
East. 134
Britain's initiation of measures to counter communist 
propaganda coincided with a gradual stiffening of American 
resolve in its dealings with the Soviet Union, and a widening 
perspective in regard to America's global responsibilities. In 
early 1946 Warner had recommended that the United States be 
approached to see if they would take part in a general worldwide 
anti-communist campaign. 135 However, Foreign Office officials 
were by no means confident about the degree of support they could 
expect from the United States. In 1946 there was considerable 
concern that the United States was not taking a "realistic 1 view 
of the Soviet threat. It was also evident that the American 
government were keen to avoid any indication that Britain and 
America were uniting against their former ally. 136 
Consequently, the Foreign Office advocated a gradual policy of 
eliciting American support in certain key areas, whilst avoiding 
a general policy of cooperation. The policy was summarised by 
Christopher Warner:
. . . American dislike of "ganging up" with us being 
still so strong, we should probably be well advised to 
make no general approach to the State Department 
regarding an anti-communist campaign, but to consult 
them in each specific case, while seeking as at 
present to encourage the cooperation of the British 
and American representatives in the various countries, 
so that they may whenever possible, send their 
governments similar appreciations and 
recommendations. 137
By 1947 the mood in America was changing. Almost half the 
members of Congress travelled abroad in 1946 and 1947 and their 
exposure to the privations of post-war Europe and organised 
communist propaganda, led to the passage of significant 
legislation in 1947. 138 Truman's annunciation of his doctrine 
in March paved the way for the massive programme of aid for 
Europe proposed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall three 
months later. In addition the National Security Act creating a
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permanent intelligence apparatus was presented to Congress in 
February, and the Smith-Mundt Bill establishing America's first 
permanent peacetime propaganda programme was introduced in May. 
In both cases Congressional debate centred on the need to respond 
to external threats. 139 In July, George Kennan's long telegram 
was transformed into an anonymous article in the journal Foreign 
Affairs, following which the Russia Committee expressed their 
satisfaction that American officials and the American public were 
now under no illusions regarding Soviet intentions. 140 The 
previous month Sir Maurice Peterson, British Ambassador in 
Moscow, informed the Foreign Office that his American counterpart 
Walter Bedell Smith had stated that a "policy of toughness was 
now the order of the day.' Smith believed that the Soviets had 
returned to the tactics of the Comintern and the only method of 
combatting them "is to return blow for blow and to embark on open 
political warfare against communism.' 141
The first step away from the State Department's factual 
information programme towards the revival of offensive propaganda 
was taken late in 1946 by a subcommittee of the State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Committee. The Committee noted the Soviet Union's 
intensive anti-American propaganda campaign and recommended the 
establishment of a permanent subcommittee on psychological 
warfare to develop policies, plans and studies for its use "in 
time of war or threat of war.' 142 The development of plans for 
overt and covert propaganda were taken up by the National 
Security Council in November 1947. The NSC drafted two reports, 
NSC 4 on the coordination of overt "foreign information 
measures' , and NSC 4-A on covert "psychological operations' . The 
former highlighted the USSR's "intensive propaganda campaign' 
aimed at damaging the prestige of the US and undermining the non- 
communist elements in all countries. It proposed the 
strengthening and coordination of all "foreign information 
measures' under the direction of the State Department. In the 
annex NSC 4-A the CIA was given authority to conduct "covert 
psychological operations' to counteract Soviet and Soviet 
inspired activities. 143 On the 1st of December 1947, almost 
eighteen months after Warner's paper had been circulated to
62
British embassies, the State Department issued a new directive 
on American information policy. It proposed that in addition to 
the "factual, truthful, and forceful presentation of U.S. foreign 
policy and American ways of living ... we should take the 
offensive in dealing with Soviet policies and anti-American 
propaganda, as well as those of local communist parties. 1144
Although America's new policy did not immediately result in 
close cooperation with British attempts to counter communism in 
Europe, it did result in a certain degree of indirect support for 
British objectives. Long-established intelligence cooperation 
yielded information for British propaganda regarding Soviet 
breaches of the Potsdam agreement. 145 The assignment of foreign 
broadcast monitoring to the CIA led to a new agreement with the 
BBC facilitating greater exchange of monitoring reports. The CIA 
also considered the establishment of new radio stations in US 
zones of occupation through the transfer of equipment under 
British control. 146 In several cases America's adoption of a 
dynamic policy of containing Soviet communism closely resembled 
the response pursued by the British Foreign Office since 1946. 
If this policy was not coordinated with those British activities 
already in progress it certainly supported similar objectives. 
In Germany, where Britain had begun to answer communist charges 
in October 1946, General Lucius Clay Commander of the American 
occupation forces announced in October 1947 that the American 
military government were to launch a campaign against communism 
in the US zone. 147 In November American representatives in 
Austria informed the State Department that they had begun to 
publicise communist involvement in strikes, demonstrations and 
various illegal activities. 148 British propaganda in occupied 
Europe was also supported by the work of the combined Allied 
Information Service which conducted "concentrated and continuous 
counter-propaganda to communism.' 149 As early as October 1946 
American officials in Germany had urged an increased budget for 
AIS operations noting that the British side was "strengthening 
its personnel and increasing its contributions of money and 
equipment. ' 15 °
Like their British counterparts, American officials were
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also concerned at the prospect of communist electoral victories 
in France and Italy. The Marshall Plan was widely recognised as 
a bold attempt to undermine the standing of communists in Western 
Europe. In October 1947, Averell Harriman, the senior Marshall 
Plan representative in Europe, called for a psychological 
offensive to counter communist propaganda in France and 
Italy. 151 The following month George Kennan's Policy Planning 
Staff concluded that the Soviet Union was "very likely 1 to order 
the communist parties in France and Italy to "resort to virtual 
civil war 1 as soon as US occupation forces left Italy. 152 In 
response the CIA, under the direction of NSC 4-A, provided funds 
that helped defeat the communists in the French elections of 
1947, and subsidised non-communist elements in French trade 
unions. They also began a programme of aid for anti-communist 
forces in Italy in preparation for the elections of 1948. 153
The Foreign Office was clearly pleased at the increasing 
alignment of British and American thinking on the Soviet threat. 
Bevin, however, maintained his resistance to a global campaign 
against communist propaganda. In July 1947 the Russia Committee 
decided it would not be politic to request an extension of the 
propaganda line in the Middle East to the rest of the world. 
Warner informed the Committee that the Foreign Secretary would 
not sanction any policy based on open despair of reaching 
agreement with the Russians until after the Council of Foreign 
Ministers meeting in November. 154 Although the Russia Committee 
understood Bevin's position and were satisfied with the 
developments in responding to communist propaganda abroad, 
officials were growing increasingly concerned about the state of 
domestic opinion. The Foreign Office found itself in the 
position of promoting a foreign propaganda campaign which was 
increasingly inconsistent with domestic policy. It is axiomatic 
that effective foreign propaganda must be supported by a 
corresponding domestic campaign, yet by 1947 British foreign and 
domestic propaganda were clearly operating at different levels. 
As Frank Roberts noted in March 1947 despite the progress in 
persuading the Foreign Secretary to advocate anti-communist 
measures abroad, the British public remained unenlightened:
64
It is surely ridiculous to be enlightening the Arabs 
and the Persians and other peoples about the true 
nature of the Soviet State and of Soviet propaganda 
while leaving our own people in complete abysmal 
ignorance. 15S
Substantial elements of the British public and more 
particularly the left-wing of Bevin's own party still believed 
that Britain could maintain friendly relations with the Soviet 
Union. In late 1946 Christopher Warner noted that the BBC Home 
Service and the most of the daily papers were "studiously 
uncritical 1 of the Soviet Union and communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe. In general it was felt that not enough publicity was 
given to Soviet anti-British propaganda, and the activities of 
Soviet-sponsored communist parties in eastern Europe. In 
particular Warner had confidential information that at The Daily 
Telegraph there was a general instruction not to print news 
critical of the Soviet Union unless it was authoritatively 
sponsored or emanated from Government sources. The same was 
thought to be true of the Beaverbrook press. 156 The Labour 
Party was also a major cause for concern. In May 1946 the Russia 
Committee expressed alarm that some Ministers, "took the line 
that it would be wrong to consider Russia to be hostile to this 
country II57 , and as late as August 1947 Warner reminded them 
that "in view of the risk of a split in the Labour Party 1 they 
could expect no overall directives or public statements on Soviet 
policy. 158 Left-wing criticism of Bevin's foreign policy had 
been mounting throughout 1946. In the Autumn New Statesman 
published a series of articles on British foreign policy arguing 
that Britain should reassert its independence from America. In 
November over 100 Labour MPs abstained in a vote on a Commons 
amendment criticising the Government's foreign policy. At the 
beginning of 1947 a small group of Labour MPs began to meet and 
form an organised campaign for a return to socialism in Labour's 
foreign and domestic policy. Although this Keep Left group 
pressed for a more amenable policy to the Soviet Union, its 
foreign policy recommendations were also profoundly anti- 
American. 159 In 1946 Warner had highlighted the restrictions on 
Anglo-American cooperation due to America's wish to avoid the 
appearance of "ganging up 1 with Britain. In February 1947, in
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a remarkable reversal of transatlantic concerns, US intelligence 
reported that due to domestic pressures the British Government 
had in recent months "displayed a nominally independent attitude 
in foreign relations in contrast to its previous close 
collaboration with the US. ' Although this was not be interpreted 
as a trend towards closer collaboration with the USSR it was 
noted that it would curtail joint Anglo-American actions with 
regard to the Soviet Union. 160
In an effort to disillusion the public about Soviet 
intentions the Russia Committee proposed a number of measures to 
influence domestic opinion. It was felt that the Prime Minister 
and the Foreign Secretary could exert a great deal of personal 
influence in matters of domestic publicity. In March 1946, Bevin 
had asked the editor of The Times to put a stop to "the jellyfish 
attitude of The Times on all important matters of foreign 
affairs', particularly E.H.Carr's pro-Soviet articles. 161 In 
September Warner suggested that the Foreign Secretary or the 
Prime Minister might "have a word' with some of the editors and 
proprietors of the daily press to let them know that more 
publicity for Soviet actions would be helpful to the government. 
The Foreign Office also increased its own "off the record 1 
briefings with the press. With regard to the BBC, Warner 
apparently felt they could apply a little more direct pressure. 
It was suggested that the Director General should be asked to 
"modify 1 the policy of the Home Service with regard to the Soviet 
Union. More particularly it was proposed that the Home Service 
put on a weekly talk summarising the attitude of the Soviet media 
on the chief international topics of the week. 162 Other ad hoc 
projects included the distribution of the report of the Canadian 
Royal Commission into Soviet espionage, and a proposal to 
purchase the English rights to the autobiography of Soviet 
defector Victor Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom. 163
The campaign to influence Labour Party opinion was more 
coordinated and intensive. It was also a campaign in which the 
Foreign Office could rely on a considerable degree of support 
from within the Party itself. Several Labour MPs cooperated with 
the Foreign Office to ensure that information about Soviet
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intentions was distributed to the Parliamentary Labour Party. 
It was decided in 1946 that the Foreign Office weekly review of 
the Soviet Press, and monthly review of omissions and 
peculiarities in the Soviet Press, would be made available to the 
House of Commons library through Parliamentary Secretary Kenneth 
Younger. 164 It was also suggested that the Labour Party's 
series of "Speakers Notes' would be "an excellent system for the 
dissemination of useful information on foreign affairs.' Under 
Secretary Christopher Mayhew acted as a channel between the 
Foreign Office and Labour Party, through the Party's 
International Secretary Denis Healey. Mayhew provided Healey 
with information on foreign affairs, in return Healey provided 
information on the state of party and public opinion. 165 More 
significantly, in 1947 Assistant Under Secretary Gladwyn Jebb 
drew up a paper outlining Foreign Office views on British foreign 
policy. Bevin suggested that Jebb's arguments against the Keep 
Left approach might be embodied in a Labour Party pamphlet. He 
suggested that Jebb should get together with Denis Healey making 
sure to keep cooperation "very dark.' 166 At the 1947 Labour 
Party conference Healey's pamphlet Cards on the Table was 
distributed to all delegates. The pamphlet was a defence of 
Labour's foreign policy, designed to persuade Labour supporters 
of the Soviet Union's "sustained and violent offensive 1 against 
Britain. It also emphasised the importance of British social 
democracy as an ideological alternative to Russian communism and 
American capitalism. Although it described an exclusive line-up 
with the United States as "dangerous and undesirable', it argued 
that given Britain's straitened financial situation, the 
importance of international trade, and the needs of national 
security, it was unrealistic to believe Britain could pursue a 
completely independent foreign policy. 167 Dalton endorsed the 
pamphlet, and Bevin, pleased to have his case put by someone else 
in the party reiterated its conclusions in his conference 
speech. 168
However, it was not through the efforts of the Russia 
Committee or individuals such as Healey that British public 
opinion finally aligned with official perceptions of the Soviet
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threat. In September 1947, the Soviet Union with eight other 
European communist parties, including the French and Italian 
parties, established the Communist Information Bureau 
(Cominform) . With the founding of the Cominform, the Soviet 
Union officially reverted to the orthodox Bolshevik line that 
those who were not avowed communists were avowed enemies. It was 
the final rejection of any prospect of cooperation with the non- 
communist left in Europe. With this action the Soviets 
themselves did more to undermine left-wing sympathies in Europe 
than any of the measures implemented by the British and American 
governments. The CIA predicted that the immediate effect would 
be to reduce the voting strength of the communist parties in 
Europe and, were it not for the threat of economic crisis, 
substantially strengthen the position of the moderate non- 
communist parties in Western Europe. 169 In Britain the Russia 
Committee with some relief noted that the news had "at last drawn 
the United Kingdom public's attention to the Russian campaign 
against this country, which hitherto had gone largely 
unnoticed.' 170 Bevin informed the Cabinet in November that if 
no progress were made at the Moscow Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, he would have to "ask the Cabinet to consider a fresh 
approach to the main problems of our foreign policy.' 171
Bevin's frustration with the Soviets had been building 
throughout 1947. In May negotiations for a new Anglo-Soviet 
treaty collapsed, in July the Soviets withdrew from the Marshall 
Plan discussions, at successive Council of Foreign Ministers 
meetings Bevin strove against Soviet intransigence in the hope 
of some degree of accommodation. Even following the creation of 
the Cominform in September, Bevin pressed on in the hope of 
agreement at the December Council of Foreign Ministers in London. 
In his frustration following the collapse of these discussions, 
Bevin finally agreed to consider a global response to communist 
propaganda. The catalyst for Bevin's acceptance of a new 
propaganda policy did not come from the Russia Committee but from 
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary Christopher Mayhew. Mayhew was 
part of the British delegation to the UN, and like Bevin, was 
becoming increasingly disillusioned with the activities of his
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Soviet counterparts. In late 1947 Mayhew wrote home from the UN:
My general view is that we should try to discourage 
the Slavs from using the UN for blackguarding us and 
the Americans by occasionally pulling a skeleton out 
of their cupboard for a change. True, we fight at a 
disadvantage, since, unlike the Bolsheviks, we are 
likely to be cross-examined about our propaganda when 
we get home; but nobody except an undiluted Christian 
can listen to Mr Vishinsky for long without answering 
back once in a while. 172
In December, while returning to London on the Queen 
Elizabeth, Mayhew drafted a proposal for answering communist 
propaganda with a campaign of "Third Force propaganda. 1 Bevin 
read the paper and asked Mayhew to prepare a Cabinet paper 
outlining his recommendations. 173
The timing of Mayhew's paper was obviously crucial. It 
arrived at an opportune moment when Bevin, frustrated by Soviet 
intransigence, was grasping for new ideas. There is another 
reason why Mayhew' s paper may have held more appeal than previous 
proposals from the Russia Committee. Mayhew's idea for an 
effective counter to Soviet propaganda reflected Bevin's own 
developing interest in a British led "Western Union. ' Historians 
have shown that Bevin had a genuine interest in close links with 
the Continent which, alongside the African colonies and the 
Middle East, could form a "third force 1 in world affairs. 174 At 
the 1947 Party conference, Bevin effectively stole the thunder 
of the left with his own plans for a Western Union. Although tjie 
Western Union concept eventually proved untenable the period from 
December 1947 to January 1948 marked the peak of enthusiasm for 
the idea. 175 This was also the period in which Britain's new 
propaganda policy was prepared and launched. Mayhew entitled his 
paper "Third Force Propaganda 1 . In it he linked the need to 
answer Soviet propaganda with the hope that Britain could take 
a leading role in international affairs. He suggested opposing 
the inroads of communism with a "Third Force 1 comprising, "all 
democratic elements which are anti-communist and, at the same 
time, genuinely progressive and reformist, believing in freedom, 
planning and social justice.' Communism was to be exposed by 
comparison with "the broad principles of Social Democracy which 
in fact has its basis in the value of civil liberty and human
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rights. ' To this Mayhew added there should be a "positive appeal 
to Democratic and Christian principles ... We must put forward 
a positive rival ideology.' 176
It has been suggested that the "Third Force' concept may 
have been merely a "device to win ministerial support 1 . 177 This 
does not appear to have been the case. Mayhew did suggest 
employing a device to make the new propaganda policy more 
palatable to the Labour Party, but that device was anti- 
capitalism. In a memo accompanying his paper Mayhew suggested 
to Bevin that the new propaganda policy should "balance anti- 
communist with anti-capitalist arguments so as to reassure the 
Parliamentary Labour Party.' 178 Mayhew included in his paper a 
recommendation that they attack in equal measure the "principles 
and practices of communism' and "the inefficiency, social 
injustice and moral weakness of unrestrained capitalism. |179 
However, anti-capitalism and the "Third Force 1 concept were two 
different propositions. Anti-capitalism was a negative concept 
tagged onto Mayhew's paper in an unabashed attempt to sell it to 
the Labour Party. In contrast the idea of Britain leading a 
"Third Force' was integral to the paper as a whole. It involved 
the positive projection of social democracy and reflected Bevin's 
own interest in a British led "Western Union' . It had its roots 
in the 1945 General Election manifesto which presented Britain 
as "brave and constructive leaders in world affairs,' and built 
upon existing ideas about postwar propaganda as embodied in "The 
Projection of Britain.'
Mayhew discussed his paper with senior officials, including 
Kirkpatrick and Warner, on 30 December 1947. There was clearly 
a consensus regarding the need to launch a counteroffensive 
against communist propaganda. 180 Although Mayhew was not a 
member of the Russia Committee and later claimed to have been 
unaware of the earlier papers by Warner and Kirkpatrick, 181 his 
paper encapsulated many of the proposals for countering communist 
propaganda developed by the Russia Committee since 1946. The 
idea of projecting a positive rival ideology was a common theme 
in Foreign Office thinking since at least as far back as Roberts 
telegrams from Moscow in March 1946. Similarly, the idea of
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Britain providing a lead to all the democratic forces opposing 
communism in Europe had been a prominent theme in Warner's 
memorandum on the Soviet campaign against this country. More 
generally, the combination of positive national projection with 
a vigorous response to Soviet propaganda was the framework for 
propaganda campaigns already in progress in the Middle East, 
Germany and eastern Europe. The Foreign Office officials were 
not, however, entirely happy with the anti-capitalist and "Third 
Force 1 aspects of Mayhew's paper. It was felt that the paper 
might give the impression that the British government advocated 
"unfavourable reflections on the American way of life. 1182 It 
was also thought that the term "Third Force' was inappropriate 
for the forces of anti-communism to which Britain hoped to give 
a lead. The term had too many other meanings, including a very 
specific connotation in French politics, and could not be "taken 
over by us and given a different connotation. 1183 Despite these 
reservations it was decided to link Mayhew's proposal for "Third 
Force' propaganda with Bevin's scheme for a spiritual union of 
the West which was also being drafted as a Cabinet paper. It was 
suggested that the principal common element in the two ideas was 
that Britain should provide leadership to other nations with a 
similar point of view and that "by emphasising this we could 
avoid the political difficulties connected with the advocacy of 
unfavourable reflections on the American way of life.' 184 The 
idea of anti-capitalist propaganda also had a political value 
which outweighed obvious practical concerns. Moreover, the 
Cabinet paper would make clear that in practice this policy 
should not result in attacks on the United States. With these 
qualifications Mayhew's paper was drafted by Warner into a 
Cabinet paper on Britain's "Future Foreign Publicity Policy,' to 
be placed before the Cabinet at its first meeting of 1948. 185
Conclusion
The new propaganda policy presented to the Cabinet in 
January 1948 was a combination of views advocated by the Russia 
Committee since early in 1946, and the response of Bevin's 
Parliamentary colleague Christopher Mayhew to a series of more 
immediate problems. Although the Russia Committee had been
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advocating an offensive against communist propaganda for some 
time, MayheWs timely paper was clearly influential. Mayhew 
offered Bevin an important compromise in the crucial months at 
the end of 1947 when Bevin finally accepted the need for a 
fundamental shift in Britain's policy towards the Soviet Union. 
Following the formation of the Cominform few in the Labour Party 
would argue with Mayhew's proposal for a propaganda counter- 
offensive. However, although the Keep Lefters in the Party and 
the Cabinet were shaken by the formation of the Cominform they 
were not stirred from their commitment to a policy of 
independence from the United States. Mayhew's emphasis on 
Britain leading a Third Force propaganda campaign, reflected the 
hopes of the Labour Party and more importantly the Foreign 
Secretary that a change in Britain's policy towards the Soviet 
Union need not necessarily lead to a partnership with the 
dominant United States.
If Mayhew's paper was the catalyst for a new propaganda 
policy the composition of that policy had been tried and tested 
by the Russia Committee in a series of experiments since 1946. 
By the time Bevin agreed to propose a coordinated global response 
to communist propaganda British diplomats were already making a 
concerted effort to answer communist charges in several areas, 
most notably, Persia, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and 
eastern Europe. The BBC Middle East services were pursuing a 
general policy of highlighting communist shortcomings, and in 
October 1947 Jacob concluded that the time had come for the BBC 
Russian and eastern European services to make a more forceful 
presentation of British policy. At home the Foreign Office and 
the Labour Party were working closely to influence domestic 
political opinion. The activities of the Russia Committee meant 
that the new propaganda policy presented to Cabinet in January 
1948 did not mark a major departure from existing policy. It is 
evident, however, that there was a certain degree of tension 
between Mayhew's and the Russia Committee's conceptions of an 
anti-communist campaign. Despite the avoidance of Anglo-American 
cooperation in Mayhew's recommendations, in practice by the end 
of 1947 Britain and America had developed remarkably similar
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responses to the threat from communist propaganda. Although 
institutionalised cooperation was limited, Britain and America 
were responding to communist propaganda in a similar manner, in 
the same geographic areas. In the years that followed the 
propaganda machinery and policies of both nations expanded 
considerably and the ad hoc measures of the pre-1948 period 
became institutionalised as a global, coordinated and often 
unified campaign.
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In March 1946, Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Foreign Office Under 
Secretary responsible for information activities, claimed that 
counter-propaganda would be easy to arrange if the Government 
decided to attack communism. 1 Kirkpatrick's claim was finally 
put to the test almost two years later, when the Foreign 
Secretary conceded the need for a coordinated global response to 
communist propaganda and launched Britain's new propaganda 
policy. In the early months of 1948, Britain moved from an ad 
hoc piecemeal response to hostile Soviet propaganda to a 
coordinated and wide-ranging propaganda policy in which the 
positive Projection of Britain' was combined with offensive 
propaganda designed to oppose the inroads of Communism and 'give 
a moral lead to the forces of anti-communism in Europe and 
Asia.' 2 The new propaganda policy, which Kirkpatrick had played 
no small part in formulating, was placed before the Cabinet at 
its first meeting of 1948. In the months which followed, the 
short Cabinet paper on x Future Foreign Publicity Policy' was 
developed into a detailed propaganda policy in consultation 
between Bevin, the Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff, the Foreign 
Office Russia Committee, and a new Ministerial Committee on anti- 
communist propaganda. Britain's existing propaganda apparatus 
was redirected to follow the new policy, and arrangements were 
made to provide new instruments with which to coordinate and 
implement the new propaganda policy. The change in direction in 
Britain's propaganda policy was conducted with some urgency 
against the backdrop of increasing evidence of hostile Soviet 
intentions in Europe, most notably in the communist-backed coup 
in Czechoslovakia.
This chapter will examine how Britain's new propaganda 
policy was developed and organised in the early months of 1948. 
In these formative months the guiding principles for Britain's 
Cold War propaganda policy were established, and the British 
Government's principal Cold War propaganda instrument, the 
Foreign Office Information Research Department (IRD), was 
created. This chapter will trace the launch of Britain's anti-
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communist propaganda campaign through a detailed examination of 
the new propaganda policy, the organisation of the propaganda 
instrument, and the channels through which the new ant i-communist 
propaganda was to be disseminated.
The 'Future Foreign Publicity Policy"
The Cabinet discussed the new propaganda policy on the 8th 
January 1948. At this meeting Bevin placed a raft of papers 
before the Cabinet. Alongside the memorandum on "Future Foreign 
Publicity Policy', there were memoranda on "The First Aim of 
British Foreign Policy 7 , "Policy in Germany 7 , "Review of Soviet 
Policy', and "Extinction of Human Rights in Eastern Europe,' 3 
The broad sweep of these papers effectively set out the Soviet 
position and Britain's long-term response to that threat. In 
"The First Aim of British Foreign Policy' Bevin warned that "from 
behind secure entrenchments', the Russians were v exerting a 
constantly increasing pressure which threatens the whole fabric 
of the West.' In response Bevin proposed a "Western Union' 
backed by the Americans and the Dominions and comprising 
Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, Portugal, Italy and 
Greece and, as soon as circumstances permitted, Spain and 
Germany. But Bevin was not proposing a simple defensive pact, 
it was not enough to reinforce "the physical barriers which 
reinforce our Western civilisation':
We must also organise and consolidate the ethical and 
spiritual forces inherent in this Western civilisation 
of which we are the chief protagonists. This in my 
view can only be done by creating some form of union 
in Western Europe, whether of formal or informal 
character, backed by the Americans and the Dominions. 4
The means for mobilising this spiritual union were set out 
in the paper on "Future Foreign Publicity Policy.' It stated 
that Soviet propaganda had been carrying out a "vicious attack 
against the British Commonwealth and against Western democracy.' 
It was up to Britain "as Europeans and as a Social Democratic 
Government,' to take the lead in responding to that threat:
We should adopt a new line in our foreign publicity 
designed to oppose the inroads of Communism, by taking 
the offensive against it, basing ourselves on the 
standpoint of the position and vital ideas of British 
Social Democracy and Western civilisation, and to give
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a lead to our friends abroad and help them in the 
anti-communist struggle. 5
The new publicity policy was to be implemented by a small 
section in the Foreign Office that would collect and disseminate 
information on communist policy and tactics. In addition to the 
existing Government information services, experience had shown 
that the fullest cooperation of the BBC would be "desirable.' 
The paper suggested other channels which reflected the Labour 
Party's own anti-communist efforts. Anti-communist material 
would be made available to Ministers for use in their public 
speeches, and information was to be sent to Labour Party and 
Trades Union officials and through them to trade unionists 
abroad. Foreign trade-unionists and non-Communists from abroad 
were to be given the opportunity of studying British life and 
institutions. London, it was hoped, would become x the Mecca for 
Social Democrats in Europe.' 6
The paper set out in some detail the guiding principles fpr 
the new publicity policy. These combined an offensive element 
designed to 'attack and expose Communism', and a positive 
presentation of 'something far better.' Britain, the paper 
stated, "must provide a positive rival ideology' based on 
Democratic and Christian principles. Despite the reservations 
of the Foreign Office the anti-capitalist aspect of Mayhew's 
original paper remained. In contrast to 'totalitarian Communism 
and laissez-faire capitalism' it stated Britain should offer 'the 
vital and progressive ideas of British Social Democracy and 
Western Civilisation.' The new propaganda policy should 
'advertise our principles as offering the best and most efficient 
way of life.' The principles and practices of communism were to 
be denigrated by comparison, as was the 'inefficiency, social 
injustice and moral weakness of unrestrained capitalism.' The 
main target for Britain's propaganda was to be the broad masses 
of workers and peasants in Europe and the Middle East, and the 
main arguments used were designed to appeal to this group. Thus 
considerable emphasis was to be placed on the standard of living 
of 'ordinary people' in the Soviet bloc and the comparative 
benefits of life in the West. The aim of the new propaganda
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policy was to expose the Soviet x workers' paradise 7 as 'a 
gigantic hoax.' Britain's new propaganda should also stress the 
civil liberties issue and the many analogies between Nazi and 
Communist systems. The foreign policy of communist states was 
also to be targeted. Soviet foreign policy was to be portrayed 
as the 'stalking horse of Russian imperialism' and the satellites 
represented as 'Russia's new colonial empire.' Finally, it 
stated, the time had come to answer Soviet misrepresentations 
about Britain. British representatives abroad who had for so 
long urged the adoption of a more offensive line in Britain's 
response to Soviet propaganda were now to be provided with tjie 
'ammunition' to reply. 7
The Cabinet was generally supportive of the proposed moves 
to consolidate the forces of Western Europe. There was also 
qualified support for the new line in British propaganda. TJie 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, it was noted, had already 
sought to promote democratic principles in the colonies through 
the press, films, broadcasting, promotion of trade union 
movements and guidance to students from the colonies studying in 
the UK. With regard to publicity in Europe the possibility of 
establishing a Western European broadcasting station was 
mentioned. However, concerns were expressed about the anti- 
Soviet aspect of the new propaganda policy. It was feared that 
too much emphasis on the anti-Soviet aspect might alienate the 
socialist forces in Western Europe and those Eastern European 
countries which, 'though dominated politically by communists, 
still had a Western outlook.' Bevin replied that it would be 
impossible for him to give an effective lead without being 
critical of Soviet policy. But, he stressed, it was his 
intention 'mainly to concentrate on the positive and constructive 
side of his proposals.' With these reservations and assurances 
the Cabinet approved the new propaganda policy. 8
In fact the new propaganda policy had in effect already been 
launched by the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, in a party 
political broadcast on 3rd January, several days before the new 
line was discussed by the Cabinet. Attlee had seen drafts of the 
papers which were to be presented to the Cabinet on the
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January and had invited Christopher Mayhew to Chequers during the 
Christmas recess to discuss his paper on Third Force 
Propaganda. 9 Attlee's subsequent speech paraphrased large 
sections of the Cabinet papers on foreign policy and future 
publicity policy. It had two main themes: the deterioration in 
the international situation brought about by the Soviet Union, 
and the leading role Britain should play as a 'third force' in 
the world between communist totalitarianism and American 
capitalism. In recognition of his hosts Attlee began by 
highlighting the freedom of political debate in the West 
epitomised by the BBC which provided a platform 'for free and 
unfettered controversy' unrestricted by the Government or private 
interests. He compared this to the situation in Russia and the 
satellites where, 'the voice of criticism is silenced' and 'only 
one view is allowed.' He went on to attack the pretence by which 
the Soviet Union would limit freedom and suppress opposition 
whilst masquerading 'as upholders of democracy.' Far from being 
a workers' paradise, he characterised the Soviet Union as a place 
of growing inequality where the lack of political freedom had a 
direct impact on standards of living:
Where there is no political freedom, privilege and 
injustice creep back. In Communist Russia "privilege 
of the few" is a growing phenomenon, and the gap 
between the highest and lowest incomes is constantly 
widening. 10
Attlee went on to explain how Soviet communism was 
endangering world peace with a 'new kind of imperialism - 
ideological, economic and strategic' which threatened the welfare 
and way of life of the other nations of Europe. At the other end 
of the scale from Soviet suppression, Attlee set the United 
States with its commitment to individual liberty and human 
rights. But Attlee also criticised American capitalism which 
was, he said, characterised by extreme inequality of wealth. It 
was, he claimed, up to Britain, situated geographically, 
economically and politically between these 'two great continental 
states, ' to 'work out a system of a new and challenging kind, 
which combines individual freedom with a planned economy, 
democracy and social justice.' 11
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Attlee's speech was widely covered in the press where the 
new tone did not go unnoticed. Most newspapers gave particular 
prominence to the harsh anti-communist aspect of the speech and 
in general welcomed it. 12 Those in the Foreign Office who had 
been responsible for devising the new propaganda policy also 
welcomed Attlee's robust speech. Mayhew wrote in his diary at 
the time that the speech was 'ruder to the USA than even I think 
wise 7 but later praised the criticism of the Soviet Union which 
although x mild by later standards' was, x a useful send-off to our 
propaganda campaign.' 13 In the Russia Committee Sir lan Jacob, 
Controller of the BBC's European Services, stressed that if the 
new policy was to be successful the Prime Minister's broadcast 
should be followed by other Ministerial speeches on which the BBC 
could base their publicity. 14
The anti-communist message was reinforced by the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Herbert Morrison, in a speech to Labour Party 
members on the llth January. Morrison began by expressing his 
sorrow at the rift in Anglo-Soviet relations since 1945. He 
blamed this rift on increasingly hostile Soviet propaganda. 
Although the Government had sought active cooperation with the 
Soviet Union they had been frustrated by "untruthful and 
malicious attacks... by the reckless propaganda machines of the 
Russian communists.' In the face of such attacks, Morrison said, 
Britain could no longer be expected to lie down. Moreover, he 
said, Britain could not be happy when x country after country in 
eastern and south-eastern Europe find themselves subject to 
undemocratic and unrepresentative Communist Governments.' 
Morrison responded, like Attlee, with an attack on the 
imperialist Soviet foreign policy. He did not pull his punches, 
the communist parties of the world he said, were merely, x the 
servile automatic outposts of the Soviet Foreign Office.' The 
communist takeovers in Eastern Europe were characterised by 
suppression of other parties, curtailment of press freedom, 
"wholesale witch-hunting', and unjudicial execution of non- 
communist leaders. Morrison contrasted Soviet imperialism with 
British colonialism. Whereas Soviet action in eastern Europe was 
exploitative, the aim of British colonialism, he claimed, was
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"development 7 based on x the cooperation and goodwill of the 
colonial peoples themselves.' Soviet actions in Eastern Europe 
were more akin to the totalitarian rule of Nazi Germany. Like 
Attlee, Morrison expressed indignation that Soviet actions in 
eastern Europe were cloaked in the language of freedom, democracy 
and anti-Fascism when it was increasingly clear that the 
Communists were displaying all the characteristics of the extreme 
Right. X I have never admitted that the Communists are on the 
Left 7 he stated baldly, "they are on the Right. 7 Finally, Jie 
concluded, by pursuing these provocative policies the Communists 
v are not only running the risk of war at some time, but... are 
impeding the economic progress of mankind[.] ' 1S
Attlee and Morrison 7 s speeches clearly served to launch the 
new propaganda policy, but the most effective annunciation of the 
new line in British foreign policy was provided by the Foreign 
Secretary himself in his formidable contribution to the foreign 
affairs debate in the Commons on 22nd January. In this speech 
Bevin unveiled his ideas for a Western Union defence against 
Soviet aggression. As Attlee and Morrison had done earlier that 
month, Bevin began with a bitter attack on Soviet attitudes which 
had led to the breakdown in East-West relations since 1945. He 
related his own attempts to work with the Soviets at successive 
Council of Foreign Ministers meetings and revealed how weary Jie 
was of the consistently hostile attitude of Soviet delegations. 
Britain had, he claimed, always tried to cooperate with the 
peoples of Eastern Europe but v the activities of the Cominform, 
like those of its predecessor the Comintern, afford the greatest 
hindrance to mutual confidence and understanding. 7 He described 
the 'ruthless 7 progression of communism in Eastern Europe, and 
like Morrison compared the communists 7 creation of "police 
states' in Europe with those of Hitler and Mussolini. In 
response Bevin called for a moral rearmament of the West. 
Although Bevin was more careful than Attlee not to advocate a 
breach with the United States, the time had come, he said, for 
the nations of Western Europe to think of themselves as a unit. 
To draw more closely together and mobilise "such a moral and 
material force as will create confidence and energy in the West
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and inspire respect elsewhere. 7 :
How much these countries have in common. Our 
sacrifices in the war, our hatred of injustice and 
oppression, our Parliamentary democracy, our striving 
for economic rights and our conception and love of 
liberty are common among us all. Our British 
approach, of which my rt. hon. friend the Prime 
Minister spoke recently, is based on principles which 
also appeal deeply to the overwhelming mass of the 
peoples of Western Europe. I believe the time is ripe 
for a consolidation of Western Europe. 16
As with the Attlee, Bevin's speech was broadly welcomed and 
reaction indicated the emergence of a broad consensus among the 
Government, the Opposition, officials and the press regarding 
Soviet intentions and the need for a robust response. 17 It won 
the support of the Conservative Opposition. Eden replied that 
Western Union should be pursued with x the greatest possible 
vigour,' 18 and one Conservative MP recorded the relief on the 
Opposition benches that Bevin x did not intend to allow the 
Bolshies to run Europe if we could help it. 719 On his own side 
of the House Bevin won the support of most of the left-wing wjio 
embraced the idea of Britain, independent of the United States, 
leading a predominantly socialist Europe. The press, who had 
largely missed the third force aspect in Attlee's speech, were 
enthusiastic about Bevin's idea. The Times, for example, noted 
that although much of Bevin's vision remained to be worked out 
they welcomed his call for x an association of friendly nations' 
in Europe and the colonies, 'wide enough to win strength and 
independence together,' and acclaimed this as 'a challenge and 
a call to action.' 20
This speech by Bevin, following those of Attlee and 
Morrison, marked a clear and very public shift in Britain's 
policy towards the Soviet Union. It was a public statement tnat 
the Government, and Bevin in particular, had finally moved to a 
position, long held in the Foreign Office, that any kind of 
compromise with Moscow was doomed to failure. Relations had 
irrevocably broken down and the time had come for Britain to 
respond to Soviet hostility. Although the central feature of 
Bevin's speech was a rallying cry for a European Third Force, 
in the language and tone with which Bevin, Attlee and Morrison
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described the breakdown of East-West relations, and Soviet action 
in Eastern Europe, these three speeches also served to launch 
Britain's new propaganda policy. None of the speakers referred 
explicitly to a British propaganda campaign, indeed one feature 
of the speeches was an indignant condemnation of hostile Soviet 
propaganda since 1945. 'Propaganda 7 , Bevin told the Commons 'is 
not a contribution to the settlement of international 
problems. 721 Yet these speeches, especially when taken 
together, were themselves part of the new intensive and 
coordinated anti-communist propaganda campaign. They clearly 
followed the guiding principles set out in the Cabinet paper on 
'Future Foreign Publicity Policy 7 , and laid out the themes to be 
pursued in Britain's anti-communist propaganda. Each explained 
their more strident tone by reference to the increasingly hostile 
tone of Soviet propaganda. This was followed in each case with 
a forthright attempt to 'expose the myths of the Soviet 
paradise, ' in many cases in comparison with the benefits of 
Western social democracy. Thus Soviet moves in Eastern Europe 
were branded the new imperialism and compared unfavourably, by 
Morrison, with paternal British colonialism. Each compared the 
economic and political freedoms of the West with the suppression 
of civil liberties in Soviet occupied territory, and followed the 
line that Soviet Communism was a form of totalitarianism 
analogous to Nazi Germany. Moreover, Soviet actions like those 
of Nazi Germany were clearly represented as a threat to world 
peace. Finally, both Attlee and Bevin advertised an alternative 
to Soviet Communism which in the evocative yet vague language of 
the Third Force projected a positive aim to balance the 
offensive/defensive tone of the anti-communist aspect of the new 
propaganda policy. That these themes were drawn out in major 
foreign policy statements by three of the most senior Government 
Ministers is indicative of the importance of this new line in 
British propaganda, and of at least some degree of Cabinet 
consensus regarding the anti-Soviet aspect of the new propaganda 
policy.
Following this prominent launch the Cabinet paper on 'Future 
Foreign Publicity Policy 7 was passed to the Russia Committee for
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consideration of how the new propaganda policy was to be 
implemented on a broader front. Christopher Warner, who in 
January 1948 took over from Kirkpatrick as Assistant Under- 
secretary responsible for information activities, told the 
Committee that Britain's new propaganda would draw out two main 
themes: that the West provided higher standards of living than 
the Soviet system; and that a communist regime involved the 
suppression of political liberties. The positive side of the new 
propaganda policy was less clear but would be based on the policy 
outlined in the paper x The First Aim of British Foreign Policy, ' 
and unveiled by the Foreign Secretary in his Commons speech. It 
would seek to create 'some form of union in Western Europe. . . 
backed by the Americans and the Dominions. ' Propaganda material 
would be prepared for use abroad and designed to appeal not only 
to intellectuals but also the workers and peasants. At home, 
material would be available to Ministers and the Labour Party, 
visits would be encouraged from foreign Trade Unionists, and 
courses would be developed for representatives of foreign anti- 
communist parties. 22
The discussion in the Russia Committee was significantly 
different from the Cabinet's consideration of the new policy. 
Whereas the Cabinet minutes reveal concern regarding the strength 
of the anti-communist aspect of the new policy, several members 
of the Russia Committee raised concerns about the policy of 
attacking "unrestrained capitalism,' an issue apparently not 
discussed by the Cabinet. 23 In particular they stressed tjie 
risk of attacking the United States and other democratic parties 
of the Right. Warner drew attention to the qualification in tfte 
Cabinet paper which said that they should not attack or appear 
to attack any member of the Commonwealth or the United States, 
and Ivone Kirkpatrick replied somewhat obliquely that the phrase 
was 'of general application and expressed the view that no 
difficulties would arise over the practical interpretation of it 
in preparing publicity material. 724 It was suggested that 
rather than attacking the right as such, taking the lead from 
Attlee's speech, the line should be that communism was a form of 
totalitarianism. Rather than attacking capitalism and communism
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in equal measure, the policy would be to attack totalitarianism 
of the Right and Left. This was not quite the same 
interpretation of the paper as that of the Cabinet. Indeed far 
from attacking American capitalism the Committee discussed 
whether Britain should coordinate anti-communist propaganda with 
the United States and other friendly countries. At this stage 
though, any suggestion of Anglo-American cooperation was treated 
with caution. Warner stated that the right general policy would 
be to exchange information on propaganda with the United States 
whenever appropriate, but that Britain should not have a general 
agreement to consult with them and to take the same line. 25
The Committee discussed the implementation of the new policy 
in different regions. Sir lan Jacob, Head of the BBC European 
Services, enquired whether the propaganda would go so far as to 
encourage opponents of Communism in Europe. Kirkpatrick replied 
that whilst this was an aim in Western Europe, as regards the 
satellites, the intention was N to attack the suppression of 
freedom 7 but not to incite opponents of the existing regimes. 
It was suggested that a special directive would be required for 
Eastern Europe. The Committee also identified problems in 
implementing the new policy in the Middle East, given that the 
new policy was to be directed at x the mass of workers and 
peasants.' Although publicity channels existed among such groups 
in Europe, British propaganda in the Middle East had 
traditionally been directed at the educated elite. Given these 
problems it is evident that initially at least the focus for the 
new policy would be Western Europe. In Germany, where Britain's 
propaganda was already taking a more aggressive line, the new 
policy could take immediate effect. Moreover, it was suggested, 
this should be done with some urgency given recent evidence of 
planned communist disturbances in the Ruhr. 26 Similarly, 
Gladwyn Jebb and Robin Hankey drew attention to reports of plans 
for communist direct action in France and Italy in March. Jebb 
concluded the discussion by suggesting that Warner 'should make 
his plans on the assumption that some major Communist offensive 
might take place in the early spring and that all possible 
publicity ammunition would be required in repelling it. 7
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In fact it was events in Eastern Europe which injected a 
sense of urgency into the new propaganda policy. The Soviet 
backed coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 galvanised anti- 
communist sentiment in Britain, within the Labour Party in 
particular, and led to calls for Britain to adopt a more 
offensive propaganda policy. In the Foreign Office, according 
to Gladwyn Jebb, the effect of the coup in Prague was, 
'electrical.' "If the Russians could do this to one European 
democracy nearly three years after the end of the war, what was 
to prevent them doing it to other European countries, and notably 
in Western Europe?' 28 The impact on opinion in the Labour Party 
was even more marked. Bill Jones, historian of Labour's 
relations with the Soviet Union, describes the Party's response 
to the coup as the culmination of a process of reinterpretation 
of Soviet foreign policy towards a new "almost hostile, image of 
the Soviet Union.' 29 Tribune reported events under the 
unequivocal headline *Murder in Prague,' whilst in the Daily 
Herald Michael Foot lamented the most "tragic week since the end 
of the war.' On 3 March the Labour Party's National Executive 
Committee issued a fierce condemnation of Soviet actions stating 
that Czechoslovakia had "fallen victim to aggression from without 
aided by treachery from within.' 30 Two days later Bevin 
submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet on "The Threat to Western 
Civilisation.' In it he outlined the fast growing threat of 
Soviet expansion and the steps Britain should take to frustrate 
them. It was now clear, Bevin stated, that Soviet policy aimed 
for nothing less than world domination:
The immensity of the aim should not betray us into 
believing in its impracticability. Indeed, unless 
positive and vigorous steps were shortly taken by 
those other states in a position to take them, it may 
well be that within the next few months - or even 
weeks - the Soviet Union would gain political and 
strategic advantages which would set the great 
communist machine in action, leading either to the 
establishment of a world dictatorship or more probably 
to the collapse of organised society over immense 
stretches of the globe. 31
The Cabinet's response to Bevin's stark warning reveals a 
marked shift in opinion since Bevin placed his previous review
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of Soviet policy before them in January. The Cabinet continued 
to support Bevin's plans for Western Union defence, but also 
recommended a significant expansion of Britain's anti-communist 
propaganda. In contrast to their cautious acceptance of the new 
propaganda policy two months earlier in which they stressed that 
x too much emphasis should not be placed on its anti-Soviet 
aspect ,' 32 the Cabinet now accepted that x the weapon of 
propaganda must be used to the full.' 33 It was even suggested 
that "some organisation on the lines of the wartime Political 
Warfare Executive' could be established. The discussion which 
followed ranged across the kind of measures which could be used 
in a new campaign of political warfare. There were certain 
directions it was suggested, in which the Labour Party, not the 
Government, might be the most effective instrument for conducting 
propaganda, particularly among the social democratic parties in 
Western Europe. It was also suggested that the Christian 
Churches might be allied to the defence of Western civilisation. 
The International Council of Christian Churches might be 
persuaded to work with the Government, and it was noted, there 
had been growing sympathy with social democracy in the Catholic 
church. The campaign could also extend to economic warfare in 
which more generous terms or 'more aggressive methods' could be 
adopted in trade with Eastern European states. It was also 
recommended that a special effort should be made to concentrate 
propaganda on the Eastern European countries which were nearest 
to Western Europe. The aim of this proposed campaign of 
political warfare was 'to provide the people of Europe with tjie 
leadership in Western Europe which governments have so far failed 
to provide, but its scope should be worldwide.' 34
This call for a return to political warfare was echoed 
elsewhere in Whitehall. In March the Chiefs of Staff expressed 
disquiet at what they perceived to be the defensive nature of 
Bevin's recent proposals for responding to the Soviet threat. 
They were surprised that the new policy was designed to defend 
Britain rather than taking the offensive against Soviet 
propaganda, and they disapproved of the allocation of anti- 
communist propaganda to a 'small section' in the Foreign Office.
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The "cold war' they claimed could not be waged as an adjunct of 
diplomacy. The Chiefs of Staff advocated a propaganda policy 
more closely integrated with defence and coordinated by a 
resurrected Political Warfare Executive. The Defence Minister 
told Bevin that the Chiefs of Staff felt they had an important 
stake in this matter. They wanted an integrated Cold War 
strategy combining political warfare, economic warfare, and 
special operations. Through this policy they hoped to take the 
offensive against Soviet internal organisation or to disrupt the 
military or industrial connections between the Soviet Union and 
the satellites. 35
Bevin, however, was reluctant to sanction such an 
offensive strategy and restrained calls for a return to political 
warfare of the kind employed during the war. Bevin responded to 
events in Prague by consolidating his plans for a Western Union 
defence of Europe. The most immediate result was the signature, 
on 17th March 1948, of a mutual defence pact between Britain, 
France and the Benelux countries. At the same time, instead of 
planning subversion in Eastern Europe, more detailed plans were 
formulated to counter the spread of communism in the free world. 
The Chiefs of Staff were asked to formulate defence plans to 
support Bevin 7 s Western Union policy. 36 In response to the 
Cabinet's new found enthusiasm for propaganda, a Ministerial 
Committee on anti-communist propaganda was convened to consider 
the general application of the new propaganda policy. 37
However, before the first meeting of the Ministerial 
committee, the question of political warfare was decided at an 
informal meeting between the Foreign Secretary, the Prime 
Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of 
Defence. Bevin was concerned that discussions which were likely 
to cover covert activities by the intelligence services should 
not be disclosed to Ministers generally and future discussions 
of political warfare were to be confined to this small informal 
group. At this meeting it was decided that the phrase 'political 
warfare' was not to be used in any description of Britain's 
publicity policy, and that there was no reason to recreate a body 
like the wartime Political Warfare Executive. 38 The reasons for
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this policy of restraint were set out in a memorandum by the 
Cabinet Secretary, Norman Brook. The comparison with wartime 
political warfare Brook wrote was inappropriate, impracticable 
and indeed 'dangerous. 7 Although conditions behind the Iron 
Curtain were comparable with wartime conditions in enemy occupied 
Europe, Britain was not responding to those conditions with the 
same wide range of activities both overt and covert as had been 
employed during the war. Indeed consideration had not been given 
as to what methods of black propaganda might be employed under 
the new policy. Moreover, it was far from clear that the 
application of wartime methods of political warfare would be 
practicable in combatting the westward spread of Soviet influence 
in peacetime. Thus Britain was not at that time employing 
methods of political warfare, nor was it clear whether such 
methods would be desirable in the future. There were also no 
practical reasons for reconstituting a Political Warfare 
Executive to direct such activities. The PWE had been necessary 
because Ministerial responsibility for such activities had been 
divided between the Foreign Secretary and the Ministers of 
Information and Economic Warfare. In 1948 all overseas 
information activities, including black propaganda, were the sole 
responsibility of the Foreign Secretary, and Bevin was not about 
to relinquish this control. 39 Although Bevin conceded that some 
machinery was necessary to enable the Chiefs of Staff to make 
their contribution, Bevin would continue to exercise sole 
Ministerial responsibility for overseas propaganda policy, and 
in particular decide the extent to which black propaganda methods 
were to be applied in particular countries. 40
Bevin began the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on 
anti-communist propaganda by reiterating the reasons for his 
refusal to countenance a return to political warfare. In spite 
of the views of at least some of the Cabinet and the Chiefs of 
Staff, Bevin stated clearly x it is my considered view that we 
should not incite the peoples of the Iron Curtain countries to 
subversive activities.' Although he did not object in principle 
to the use of 'black 7 propaganda, for 'severely practical 
reasons' he felt it was of limited use in present circumstances.
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Drawing on the comparison with political warfare in World War II 
Bevin pointed out that 'we discouraged resistance movements from 
activity until our arms were at hand.' It was useless to stir 
up resistance to existing regimes unless there was a practical 
prospect of their being overthrown and in present circumstance 
Bevin stated x we should be doing ourselves and our friends in 
those countries [behind the Iron Curtain] a great disservice if 
our publicity now urged them to active resistance.' Propaganda 
in countries behind the Iron Curtain was to be limited to 
official statements carried by the BBC, and open promotion of 
A the virtues and achievements of Western methods, and that to a 
limited extent.' 41 There were also financial limitations on the 
implementation of political warfare. The amount of money 
available for all kinds of propaganda was limited and in 
peacetime conditions Bevin felt open propaganda paid a better 
dividend than subversive activities. In peacetime Bevin 
concluded overt propaganda was, more important than covert 
propaganda, and usually much cheaper. 42
Bevin then presented the Committee with an expanded version 
of the January Cabinet paper on future foreign publicity which 
outlined the work that was underway in the Foreign Office to 
implement the new policy. Focusing on overt media, Bevin 
outlined three main channels for the dissemination of material 
under the new propaganda policy. Firstly, the reproduction in 
the press abroad of Ministerial speeches, official and semi- 
official statements by Government spokesmen, and articles from 
the press in this country. In order for this to be effective it 
was important for all official, and especially Ministerial 
statements to be 'framed with the new publicity policy in mind.' 
In an effort to ensure consistency within the Labour Party Bevin 
said officials were constantly studying Party publicity on 
foreign affairs with the assistance of the Party's General 
Secretary Morgan Phillips and International Secretary Denis 
Healey. Arrangements were also in hand for liaison between the 
Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff to ensure that Service 
statements were framed with consideration to their effect abroad. 
The second major channel for disseminating propaganda abroad was
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the BBC and the official London Press Service. Bevin stated that 
the BBC's Sir lan Jacob, was fully apprised of the new policy and 
programmes were generally planned in line with the Government's 
publicity policy. However, Bevin rejected suggestions that the 
Government's relationship with the BBC should be altered to allow 
official direction on the content of overseas broadcasts. x lt 
would raise very serious issues here and might well diminish the 
influence and reputation in foreign countries of the BBC's 
broadcasts.' The third main channel for disseminating propaganda 
abroad was through the staff of Britain's Embassies, Legations 
and Consulates. In addition to the work of specialist 
information staff, it was, Bevin said, up to the whole of the 
diplomatic staff abroad to help with publicity work, "each in 
their own sphere and with their own contacts.' 43 As with 
official statements at home the new policy was to be applied 
broadly and consistently.
With regard to the themes to be pursued, Bevin reiterated 
the importance of combining offensive anti-communist material 
with a positive projection of British values, and now the Western 
Union. He concluded with an important statement of his 
priorities for the new propaganda policy:
This is only the beginnings of what is to be done, but 
I think it is on the right lines. I would only add 
that while anti-Communist publicity is important, I 
attach greater importance to publicising positive 
achievements in the field of Western Union, economic 
recovery and social improvement. Moreover, I am 
certain that we must be careful not to increase the 
fear of war and of the Russian and Communist 
strength. 44
Although Bevin's proposals were somewhat removed from tjie 
dramatic suggestions for a return to political warfare discussed 
by the Cabinet, in its scope Bevin's plan was no less ambitious. 
Rather than seeking a return to wartime propaganda methods, Bevin 
grasped that opportunities for essentially overt propaganda in 
peacetime were much greater. Certainly outside the Iron Curtain 
countries Britain gained v by being able to use in peacetime all 
the various types of overt publicity which could not be used in 
occupied countries during the war.' What was far more important 
than the development of covert channels of influence was a
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propaganda campaign that was closely coordinated, intensive and 
above all consistent. The defining feature of Bevin's proposals 
was that the new propaganda policy depended on consistent 
application from the highest level to the most mundane. From 
Minister's speeches, to personal contacts between British 
officials and representatives of foreign governments, the media 
and the public.
Organising the New Propaganda Policy
The Cabinet paper on future foreign publicity policy 
recommended that the only new machinery necessary to implement 
the new propaganda policy would be a 'small section in the 
Foreign Office to collect information concerning Communist 
policy, tactics and propaganda and to provide material for our 
anti-Communist publicity through our Missions and Information 
Services abroad.' 45 Christopher Warner as Assistant Under- 
secretary concerned with information activities was tasked with 
establishing the new machinery. Warner informed the Russia 
Committee that for administrative purposes the new propaganda 
policy would be organised around three key functions:
i) an offensive branch attacking and exposing 
communist methods and policy and contrasting them with 
'Western' democratic and British methods and policy, 
ii) a defensive branch which would be concerned with 
replying to Soviet and communist attacks and hostile 
propaganda.
iii) a positive branch which would deal with the 
'build-up' of the Western Union conception. 46
From the outset it was decided to separate the positive 
aspect of the new policy from the defensive and offensive 
aspects. Consideration of positive publicity was assigned to a 
new working party in the Foreign Office. 47 This working party 
on the 'spiritual aspects of Western Union' was chaired by Warner 
and comprised senior Foreign Office officials including Gladwyn 
Jebb, P.M. Crosthwaite head of the Western Department, Paul Gore- 
Booth incoming head of the European Recovery Department, heads 
of Foreign Office information departments and the renowned 
Director-General of the wartime PWE Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart. 
The working party was tasked with the not inconsiderable feat of 
putting meat onto the bones of the Western Union concept outlined
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by Bevin in the Commons. Its terms of reference were to 'examine 
the common factors to the Western Union countries, other than the 
political, strategic and economic which can contribute to 
building up the Western Union conception. 7 It was to recommend 
measures to build up the Western Union through publicity and 
cultural agreements. To consider which countries should be 
included in the Western Union for the purpose of such work, and 
consider which could be brought into consultation over 
information work and how. 48
The more substantial, and specifically anti-communist, 
offensive and defensive aspects of the new policy were to be 
handled by the new Foreign Office information department. A 
circular telegram to missions outlining the new propaganda policy 
set out the terms of reference for the new department:
... to collate information concerning Communist 
policy, activities and propaganda, to prepare the 
material of our long-term anti-Communist publicity for 
dissemination through His Majesty's Missions and the 
Information Services abroad, to prepare quick replies 
to Communist propaganda attacks and to brief 
Government spokesmen at home and at conferences abroad 
on the Communist propaganda lines and replies 
thereto. 49
After some discussion the new department was given the 
innocuous title Information Research Department (IRD) . According 
to the Foreign Office Order Book, "the name of this department 
is intended as a disguise for the true nature of its work, which 
must remain strictly confidential.' 50 There were several 
reasons for this secrecy. Initially the primary concern was that 
the Soviet Union should not be alerted and launch a propaganda 
counter-offensive before the new propaganda policy was properly 
organised. Warner cautioned the Russia Committee that if Britain 
launched an anti-communist propaganda offensive before being 
fully equipped they ran the risk of provoking a x violent reaction 
on the part of the Russians and unless we could reply to such a 
reaction fully and effectively, we should be left at a 
disadvantage.' 51 Thus, it was decided that, initially, the 
existence of the new policy would be kept secret.
It has been suggested that the Soviets knew about the new 
propaganda policy from the start through Guy Burgess, the Soviet
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agent in the Foreign Office. Christopher Mayhew has recalled how 
he appointed Burgess to a position in the IRD early in 1948. He 
showed, Mayhew recalled, 'a dazzling insight into communist 
methods of subversion and propaganda, and I readily took him on.' 
Burgess lasted only a few months before he was sacked by Mayhew 
for being x dirty, drunk and idle. 752 Nevertheless, it has been 
suggested that in this time Burgess made a tour of British 
missions to brief officials about the IRD, and was able to 'pass 
on a full account of IRD's operations to Moscow.' 53
Nothing has been found in the IRD files about Burgess or his 
position in the department. Nevertheless, it is apparent that 
at this time, Burgess was passing a large amount of Government 
documents to his Soviet controllers. 54 Moreover, a report in a 
Polish newspaper in April 1948, suggested that the new propaganda 
policy had been compromised, most probably by Burgess. This 
article, repeated in the Soviet Monitor in Britain, referred to 
recent instructions to British missions regarding an intensified 
anti-communist campaign, 'including propaganda and the 
dissemination of false rumours.' 55 It may also be significant 
that in September 1951, shortly after the defection of Burgess 
and Maclean to Moscow, a meeting of British information officers 
from Western Europe was informed that, x the communists themselves 
were aware of what we were doing.' 56
However, given that Burgess was only in the IRD for 'a few 
months' at the beginning of 1948, 57 it is unlikely that he could 
have passed on a vast amount of information regarding the IRD's 
operations. It seems highly unlikely that Burgess was entrusted 
with touring British missions to inform them of the IRD's work. 
All British missions were informed of the new policy in a 
circular telegram in January 1948. 58 In the extensive replies 
there is no reference to a personal visit from anyone from the 
new department. Although it seems likely that Burgess passed on 
a copy of this circular, more specific directives regarding 
propaganda in different regions were not drafted until the summer 
of 1948 when Burgess had almost certainly left the IRD. 
Similarly, he would have been unable to give the Soviets advance 
warning of the IRD's first setpiece campaign regarding Soviet
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59forced labour, launched in the United Nations in October 1948. 
It is also unlikely that the Soviets were surprised that the 
British Government had decided to launch an offensive against 
communist propaganda, and one might question what they could do 
about it. The Soviet counter-offensive that the Foreign Office 
feared certainly did not materialise. By December 1949, it was 
decided that it was no longer necessary to conceal the fact that 
Britain was conducting anti-communist propaganda abroad through 
official channels. 60
Nevertheless, the unofficial channels used by the IRD 
remained concealed. The existence of the IRD, and its methods 
were to remain secret. The IRD's output was effectively x grey' 
propaganda, that is propaganda emanating from an unidentifiable 
source. Those who received propaganda material from IRD, such 
as information staff, Ministers, journalists and the BBC, were 
aware of its origin but were expected to pass this material on 
without revealing its source. x Non-attributability' according 
to Foreign Office historians was a x central and distinguishing 
feature of IRD material.' 61 This had several important 
advantages: it allowed the widest possible circulation for the 
IRD's output, whilst protecting the existence of an officially- 
inspired anti-Communist propaganda campaign. It was believed 
that anti-communist propaganda would have greater impact on the 
recipient if it were not seen to emanate from official 
sources. 62 Secrecy also allowed the IRD to enlist prominent 
individuals to the anti-communist cause who might otherwise be 
reluctant to lend their name to material with an official 
imprimatur. As the IRD head wrote in May 1948: x it would 
embarrass a number of persons who are prepared to lend us 
valuable support if they were open to the charge of receiving 
anti-communist briefs from some sinister body in the Foreign 
Office, engaged in the fabrication of propaganda directed against 
the Soviet Union' 63
Initially the IRD had a fairly modest establishment. The 
original staff requirements were for 10 members including 4 
clerical staff. In common with most Foreign Office Departments 
desks were established for geographical areas, with the addition
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of an intelligence sections. Sections were later added to cover 
the United Nations, economic affairs, international 
organisations, NATO and war planning. 64 From the beginning, 
however, the general profile of the staff was somewhat different 
to the standard Foreign Office recruitment. Recruits were drawn 
from the existing information departments, but also from 
individuals with experience in publicity outside the Foreign 
Office, including wartime propagandists and journalists. Ralph 
Murray, a veteran of the PWE and the current head of the Foreign 
Office's Far East Information Department, was recruited to head 
the department. He was provided with three assistants to cover 
the coordination of intelligence, preparation of material and 
cooperation with the BBC, the Central Office of Information and 
British posts abroad. Russian expertise was provided by 
J.H.Brimmell, recently returned from the Russian Secretariat in 
the Moscow Embassy, and Robert Conquest. 65 The department also 
relied increasingly on 'contract' staff: emigres from Eastern 
Europe and freelance journalists. In one example, in the late 
1940s, H.H.Tucker the chief foreign sub-editor for The Daily 
Telegraph, worked for IRD on a freelance basis providing 'a 
professional touch to some of the briefs and background papers. 7 
Tucker joined the Foreign Office in 1951 and eventually rose to 
the post of assistant to the Head of IRD. 66 For another early 
recruit IRD provided a somewhat unexpected and, not entirely 
happy, introduction to Foreign Office life:
I came with a First in History from Cambridge and was 
surprised and bemused to be lodged in such a way-out 
department. It lived in a rabbit warren in Carlton 
House Terrace ... There were a lot of temporaries, a 
good many of them from the journalistic world. The 
atmosphere was hard working and somewhat frenzied1 
... not what I had expected from the F.O. and within 
eight months or so I was happily transferred to one of 
the traditional departments. 67
The starting budget reflected the Department's modest 
establishment. The IRD was established with £7,500 generated by 
economies in the other information departments. In addition the 
Treasury agreed a lump sum of £150,000 as a starting budget. 
Despite these modest beginnings it is clear that ambitious plans 
were already anticipated. In approaching the Treasury for
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funding, Harold Caccia suggested that, in addition to the costs 
of establishment, the Treasury might wish to consider the 
possibility of additional operational expenditure. This extra 
expense, 'probably substantial, but at present incalculable, 7 
Caccia said, would be necessary to expand IRD's activities at 
home and abroad, including increased BBC broadcasts, possibly 
involving extra wavelengths. 68 Others suggested that the 
expenditure might rise to between one quarter to a million 
pounds. 69 It may be that Caccia deliberately pitched his 
proposal high in order to ensure that at least the minimum 
requirement was forthcoming. However, Warner was disturbed th,at 
suggestions for expansion were being made before the department 
had actually begun work. He reassured the Treasury that they 
were, 'going quite cautiously about the new policy 7 and any 
further plans would be, 'examined ruthlessly from the point of 
view of the most rigid economy. 770
From the outset it was intended that funding for the new 
department should be discreet. In putting its proposals to the 
Treasury the Foreign Office noted that it was 'undesirable that 
undue public attention should be drawn to this new activity. 7 
They were particularly anxious that the lump sum should not be 
listed as an additional item in the published estimates for 
information expenditure. As a result the Foreign Office devised 
a plan whereby the additional £150,000 was disguised under other 
items of publicity in the estimates. Thus, an extra £30,000 was 
added to the proposed estimate for publicity in the press; 
£80,000 to films, and photography; £20,000 to broadcasting; and 
£20,000 to miscellaneous expenses. 71 This was the only occasion 
on which such a method was used. When Murray proposed further 
expenses of £100,000 in September 1948 it was agreed that funding 
for IRD would now be provided under the secret vote, 72 where it 
remained until 1973. Secret funding served a number of purposes: 
it hid IRD from unwanted public attention, it also allowed the 
department freedom to recruit staff unrestricted by the 
limitations of civil service pay and conditions. This became 
particularly important as the department's specialist 
requirements led to the recruitment of journalists and emigres
97
from outside the normal ranks of civil service appointments. 
Such specialists were not paid according to civil service rates, 
and x in some cases the recipients led double lives, and could not 
let it be known that they received a salary from IRD. /73
IRD's modest establishment reflected the intention that the 
department would play a supplemental role in implementing the new 
propaganda policy. IRD arrived rather late in the postwar 
development of Britain's propaganda apparatus and it seems 
apparent that initially its role was to supplement the work of 
Britain's already substantial information apparatus. As IRD's 
terms of reference indicated although the department was to 
coordinate the anti-communist aspect of the new propaganda 
policy, it was only to play a supporting role in the collection 
and dissemination of anti-communist material. The paper on 
'Future Foreign Publicity Policy' had suggested the creation of 
a "small Section in the Foreign Office' which would 'collate' 
information on communism, and disseminate this material through 
the 'usual channels. 1 ''* IRD was to provide a central collection 
point for material on communist activities and this material 
would be disseminated through the Government's existing 
information apparatus.
The new department collated information on communist policy 
and practices from across Whitehall. Foreign Office departments 
were asked to forward IRD all papers on Soviet and communist 
policy, organisation, tactics and propaganda in the Soviet Union, 
Europe, the Middle and Far East. Items on conditions in 
territories under communist rule were particularly valuable, 
especially material the exposure of which would be likely to 
diminish communism's hold over adherents or its appeal to 
neutrals. 75 It was felt that the detailed papers of the Foreign 
Office Research Department (FORD) and the press reading 
facilities of the Russian Secretariat at the Moscow Embassy would 
be particularly valuable. Detailed intelligence requirements 
were submitted to the intelligence authorities at home and those 
in exceptional positions in the field such as the Intelligence 
Division in Hereford, and the Intelligence Organisation in 
Vienna. 76 Most importantly British representatives abroad were
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asked to provide 'any material 7 likely to be of value for anti- 
communist propaganda. They were to forward material, which if 
widely known would 'expose, damage and help defeat the Communists 
and... encourage anti-communists by illustrating the frauds, 
deficiencies and drawbacks of communism and the superiority of 
the policies and way of life of those who share our beliefs.' 
Missions in Eastern Europe in particular were expected to provide 
x much useful material for anti-Communist publicity.' 77
IRD's intelligence requirements were broad and somewhat 
unusual but clearly reflected the themes which were to be pursued 
in the new propaganda policy. Not surprisingly the rather 
general request for any material likely to damage the communists 
met with a muted response from British missions. Although they 
were quick to recommend the kind of material they could use 
locally, Information Officers were less helpful in providing IRD 
with material on which it could base its propaganda. It is 
apparent that British representatives abroad had little 
understanding of the kind of material which could be used in the 
new propaganda policy. For example, the British Embassy in 
Prague felt unable to help because it believed that any 
information it could provide would not be "sufficiently dramatic 
or instructive' to be of use in other countries. Others simply 
ignored the request. 78 Consequently, in March 1948, the IRD 
issued more specific intelligence requirements, asking missions 
to provide details of the hierarchy, personalities, finance, 
propaganda, strategy and tactics of communist organisations in 
their territories. 79 Missions behind the Iron Curtain were 
informed that although their despatches provided a great deal of 
political information, IRD was also interested in the details of 
everyday life under communist rule. To assist this, IRD provided 
a generic list of individuals - the worker, the peasant, the 
public servant, the professional, the trader, the student and the 
parent - about whom they required information. 80 By the end of 
1949 the department had established long and detailed 
requirements for intelligence from communist-dominated countries, 
under the headings: labour conditions, social conditions, 
political conditions, cultural conditions and religious
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conditions. These included requests for specific information on 
such topics as: wages, housing conditions, medical standards, the 
cost of commodities, organisation of secret police and 
individuals involved, and support or suppression of local customs 
and laws. 81 This emphasis on the details of everyday life under 
communist rule became the staple of IRD's intelligence 
requirements. It was clearly novel to British information staff 
abroad and was, according to Murray, an "eye opener' for the 
intelligence authorities at home. 82
Within the IRD this material was drafted into briefing 
papers designed to provide information staff abroad with anti- 
communist background material for use in discussions with local 
contacts or for unofficial local distribution. These 'basic 
papers' comprised the bulk of IRD's output. In their subject 
matter the papers followed the guiding principles set out in the 
new propaganda policy. In keeping with the new policy's aim to 
disillusion the people of Europe and the Middle East about 
Russia's pretence to be a 'Worker's Paradise' the first papers 
focused heavily on life under communist rule. The first basic 
paper was entitled 'The real conditions in Soviet Russia' and was 
followed by papers including 'Conditions in the new Soviet 
colonies', 'Labour and trade unions in the Soviet Union', 
'Peasant collectivisation in areas under Soviet control' and 
'Daily life in a communist state.' 83 These papers provided 
basic information on everyday life behind the Iron Curtain, the 
kind of public interest details which might be taken up by the 
popular press. 'The real conditions in Soviet Russia' for 
example described the common man's living conditions in the 
Soviet Union: low wages; the high cost of basic foodstuffs; 
consumer goods which were prohibitively expensive; overcrowded 
housing; poor working conditions; and an education system which 
was 'far behind Western standards.' 84 Other basic papers 
focused on the threat to world peace from communist foreign 
policy. The first paper considered mature enough for printing 
was the 'Essence of Soviet foreign policy', it was followed by 
papers on 'Communist conquest of the Baltic states' and 'The 
facts of Soviet expansionism.' 85 Finally some papers offered
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more sophisticated analyses of the x principles and practices of 
communism. 7 These included a lengthy paper on 'The Foundations 
of Stalinism' by the Northern Department's Soviet expert Thomas 
Brimelow. Brimelow's paper was based on Stalin's statements as 
head of the Communist Party. It was followed by a companion 
piece entitled 'The Practice of Stalinism,' by W. Barker of the 
Russian Secretariat in the Moscow Embassy. 86 These detailed 
papers were clearly designed for consumption within Government 
or distribution to foreign politicians and opinion formers. Both 
papers were given widespread distribution within Whitehall. 
Initially up to 700 copies of Brimelow's paper were printed, 55 
of which went to the Foreign Office News Department compared with 
130 copies for the Joint Intelligence Committee. 87
In July 1948 in response to requests from some missions for 
shorter more pointed material the basic papers were supplemented 
by a weekly "Digest 7 of news stories regarding Soviet and 
international communism. The Digest was divided into two 
sections. The first part consisted of a detailed treatment of 
one topical event. The second part comprised recent information 
on communist activities under a number of broad headings 
including labour affairs, agrarian affairs, the Islamic world, 
human rights and international movements. 88 The Digest was 
intended to provide quotable material on events which were not 
necessarily common knowledge. The information was presented in 
a form easily used by information officers who were expected to 
pass selected items to their contacts rather than hand over whole 
issues of the Digest. In order to make the material more useful 
to editors, where possible stories were attributed to a named 
source. 89 The IRD also made use of the Foreign Office system of 
guidance telegrams or Intels which were designed to provide 
Embassies with quick answers to incorrect information about 
British policy. Murray however found the Foreign Office 
telegraphic system somewhat unsuited to the exigencies of 
effective rebuttal. 'They take too long to draft and clear, they 
go Saving and arrive too late, ' he complained. 90
Although the tone of IRD's output was certainly anti- 
communist the papers they produced were not intended to present
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an inaccurate picture of Soviet communism. The Foreign Office 
stuck to the long-held view that the most effective propaganda 
was straight news and facts. Indeed, some of the basic papers, 
such as those by Brimelow and Barker were thoughtful and well 
balanced assessments of Soviet policy. Moreover, for propaganda 
purposes, conditions in Soviet controlled territory were such 
that it was felt that exaggeration was not necessary. In order 
to "expose the myths of the Soviet paradise' it was felt 
sufficient merely to present the harsh realities of life under 
Soviet rule. The impact of the basic papers about life behind 
the Iron Curtain was predicated on the fact that conditions 
behind the Iron Curtain were poor and that such information was 
not widely available in the West. Although the Foreign Office 
Minister Hector McNeill felt the papers were a little overstated 
for a British audience, 91 Christopher Warner thought the first 
papers were perhaps "too dully written 7 and in need of "pepping 
up' :
But when I say pepping up I do not mean exaggerating 
the facts; for the papers are strictly factual and it 
would be very difficult and, I am sure, a mistake for 
us to water down the facts. Our whole object is to 
enlighten those who have no idea how unpleasant the 
conditions in Communist controlled countries are. 92
The only deception involved the dissemination of this 
material. The material in the digests was meant for unofficial 
distribution and was designed to be used unattributably. The 
basic papers and digests were printed "white 7 with no indication 
of authorship, sometimes undated, and most importantly no 
indication of their origin in the British Foreign Office. 
Distribution outside of official circles was to be on a strictly 
unattributable basis. A detachable cover sheet attached to each 
basic paper outlined how the material was to be used:
The attached material is for the use of His Majesty's 
Missions and Information Officers in particular. 
The information contained in this paper is, as far as 
it is possible to ascertain, factual and objective. 
The paper may, therefore, be used freely as a 
reference paper, but neither copies of it nor the 
material contained in it should be distributed 
officially without the sanction of the Head of 
Mission. It and/or the material in the paper, 
however, may be distributed unofficially in whatever
102
quarters seem useful so long as it can be assured that 
there will be no public attribution of material or of 
the paper to an official British source.
This note must be detached from any copy of the material 
before it passes beyond official use. 93
Although the preparation of x grey' ant i-communist propaganda 
was IRD's principal role, the new propaganda policy required a 
change in the policy of other agencies with responsibility for 
Britain's overseas information activity, from x white' to *black' 
propaganda. The policy of Britain's overt propaganda agency, the 
Central Office of Information, was changed to reflect the new 
anti-communist line, and arrangements were made to more closely 
coordinate covert propaganda with the new propaganda policy. In 
addition to the preparation of ant i-communist propaganda, the IRD 
sat at the centre of the machinery for coordinating the new 
propaganda policy across Whitehall. Through a network of liaison 
committees and informal contacts, the department collated 
information on communism, generated ant i-communist propaganda for 
dissemination abroad, and oversaw the implementation of the anti- 
communist propaganda policy by Britain's other propaganda 
agencies. On the one hand this was a matter of budgetary 
restraint. For example, rather than establish its own production 
facilities, the IRD was instructed to employ the technical 
expertise of Britain's existing information apparatus, most 
notably the Central Office of Information. On the other hand, 
as Bevin had directed, it located overall control of the new 
propaganda policy firmly within the Foreign Office. Assigning 
anti-communist propaganda to a dedicated Foreign Office 
department was meant to ensure effective control and the 
coordinated implementation of the new propaganda policy. It also 
gave the IRD influence over Britain's instruments of overseas 
propaganda out of proportion to the department's own size and 
resources.
Information activities in Britain's colonial possessions 
were the responsibility of the Commonwealth Relations Office and 
the Colonial Office, but concerns about communist attacks on the 
Western colonial exploitation coupled with the rise of communist 
movements in some British colonies meant that the new propaganda
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policy being developed in the Foreign Office was also applicable 
in the colonies. 94 In July 1948, the Cabinet Committee on anti- 
communist propaganda established the Colonial Information Policy 
Committee (CIPC) to coordinate the propaganda activities of the 
Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the 
Colonial Office. The CIPC was chaired by Christopher Mayhew and 
comprised Parliamentary Under-Secretaries and officials from the 
three Departments along with Robert Fraser, Director General of 
the Central Office of Information, and Jacob of the BBC. 95 The 
CIPC terms of reference were x to coordinate the collection and 
presentation of publicity material regarding British colonial 
policy and administration.' 96 Although initially the three 
departments were to remain wholly independent in the conduct of 
this propaganda, the dominant role of the Foreign Office in 
directing anti-communist propaganda was soon evident. In 
November 1948 the CIPC terms of reference were expanded x to 
stimulate and concert the dissemination of publicity designed to 
counter Communist propaganda in countries overseas, especially 
in the self-governing and Colonial countries of the Commonwealth 
and neighbouring territories. 797 Moreover, although the 
Colonial and Commonwealth Relations offices prepared publicity 
material projecting the British way of life and the benefits of 
colonial administration, material for combatting communist 
propaganda in the colonies was usually supplied by the Foreign 
Office. 98
Machinery was also established for liaison on ant i-communist 
propaganda between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff. 
The ostensible purpose of this liaison was to ensure the supply 
of military intelligence that could be of use for propaganda 
purposes. Informal committees were established in each of the 
Service Departments, comprising the Director of Plans, the 
Director of Intelligence, and the Public Relations Officer. 
These informal committees would collate information from the 
Services at home, and British military attaches abroad, and pass 
any relevant information through the Secretary of the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee to the head of IRD. The aims of this liaison 
were threefold: to ensure that military intelligence about the
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strength and weakness of the enemy was made available to tfre 
Foreign Office; to ensure that intelligence about Britain's 
military strength and that of Britain's allies was available to 
the Foreign Office; and to ensure that routine announcements made 
by the Service Departments were framed in line with the new 
propaganda policy." In the light of their frustration at the 
slow pace of Britain's planning for political warfare, it is 
apparent that the Chiefs of Staff hoped this channel of 
communication would also afford them some influence over the 
direction of Britain's cold war propaganda:
Once this channel of communication is established we 
contemplate that information and advice would flow 
through it in both directions. It would enable the 
Chiefs of Staff and the Service Departments to make 
their contribution towards the conduct of anti- 
Communist propaganda. It would also enable the 
Foreign Office to keep the Services informed of the 
propaganda measures which they were taking. 100
Significantly, on the Services' recommendation, this liaison 
organisation had been modelled on that which served the needs of 
the wartime Political Warfare Executive, and x would form a 
working nucleus which could be rapidly expanded in case of 
need.' 101 Faced with such pressure from the Service Departments 
the Foreign Office asserted their authority over the application 
of the new propaganda policy. It was later agreed that although 
the Service Committees would not be debarred from making 
practical suggestions for activities in the field, x it rested 
with the Foreign Office whether any such suggestions were acted 
on or not in the light of political considerations.' 102
Whilst IRD handled the distribution of unattributable 
briefing material it also oversaw the application of the new 
policy by Britain's overt propaganda agency the Central Office 
of Information (COI). The COI was not a policy department and 
only rarely originated propaganda campaigns in its own right. 
Since its establishment in 1946 the COI's function was to supply 
Government departments with technical publicity advice and 
provide a number of common distributive services. Although the 
COI maintained no staff overseas it provided British embassies 
abroad with books, pamphlets, posters, and photographs. It also
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ran the London Press Service (LPS). This telegraphic service 
provided British missions with a daily bulletin on diplomatic, 
industrial, social and economic affairs. It was not a current 
news service but was designed to provide commentary on the 
assumption that the "hard news' had already reached foreign posts 
through the news agencies and the BBC. It was a free, 
attributable service unrestricted by secrecy and copyright and 
was designed for diplomats, information officers and the local 
press to use in whatever manner they saw fit. 103
Since 1946 the COI's overseas services had been geared 
towards the 'Projection of Britain. 7 Following the approval of 
the new propaganda policy in January 1948 the COI was provided 
with a new directive in which they were required to 'take every 
suitable opportunity that offers for drawing the comparison 
between the merits of our own methods in Britain, tfre 
Commonwealth and the Empire, and the vices and dangers of 
Communist methods.' Although they were encouraged to exercise 
"tact and discretion' COI's output was to be 'forthright and 
effective in our comparison, and on occasion in our denunciation 
of Communist methods.' 104 In February 1948 the IRD head Ralph 
Murray outlined a detailed plan for the employment of CO I 
services. He suggested that the LPS should increase it emphasis 
on labour affairs in Europe, and might even carry a regular 
commentary on Soviet affairs which would enable them to include 
a great deal of IRD material. In order to facilitate the new 
policy Murray suggested that LPS should establish direct and 
daily contact with IRD- He proposed that the directive for COI 
photoprint editors should be altered to include subjects to 
emphasise the contrast between conditions in the West and behind 
the Iron Curtain. In particular they might be asked to prepare 
feature sets illustrating "What Liberty Means', with pictures of 
"guardians of civil liberties in the democracies' and contrasting 
illustrations of the Secret Police in communist dominated 
areas. 105 Murray was particularly keen to use COI contacts to 
develop a series of signed feature articles from well known 
commentators. Signed articles it was felt had a much greater 
impact, particularly on foreign audiences, than official
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statements and were frequently requested by Information 
Officers. 106 Murray proposed that articles should be 
commissioned from writers, 'out of the ordinary run' of COI 
contributors. 107 Like the IRD basic papers articles were to 
focus on comparative standards of living between the Western 
democracies and the Soviet "paradise 7 and stress civil liberties. 
Although 'tactically 7 Murray said, they should probably be angled 
as part of the 'Projection of Britain 7 'each article should be 
equipped with a powerful sting in its tail. 7108 IRD could 
provide the writers with material to help in their research but 
'for reasons of discretion 7 it was suggested that COI should 
commission the papers. 109 In October 1948 IRD presented the COI 
with a detailed list of topics for feature articles. These 
included, communist penetration of the Middle East; Soviet secret 
police action; a comparison of Soviet and Nazi aggression in 
action; Soviet disregard for human rights; and a series of signed 
articles on 'Impressions of the USSR 7 and 'The Russian Economic 
Grip on the Iron Curtain Countries. ' 110
The Central Office of Information was not entirely happy 
with its involvement in the new propaganda policy. Robert 
Eraser, Director General of the COI, thought it unwise for the 
COI to produce anti-communist material as part of its general 
service for the Foreign Office. It was not, he believed, in the 
interests of the COI to 'get mixed up with secret or semi-secret 
work. 7111 When reviewing IRD 7 s progress in August 1948, Murray 
described efforts to mobilise the COI as 'quite fruitless. 7 He 
bemoaned 'interminable negotiations 7 over improved London Pr^ss 
Service output, the production of a bulletin on Labour affairs, 
and anti-communist feature output , and 'equally fruitless 7 
negotiations over films, photographs, strip cartoons and 
books. 112 Nevertheless, cooperation between the Foreign Office 
and the COI did bear some fruit. The COI secured a number of 
impressive commissions for feature articles, including a series 
on conditions in the Soviet Union from Edward Crankshaw, articles 
on Soviet and Fascist methods and on Soviet sabotage of atomic 
energy from Malcolm Muggeridge, and on Soviet penetration of the 
Middle East from Elizabeth Monroe. 113 The IRD and COI also
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established close and effective cooperation in the development 
of anti-communist themes in LPS services. LPS maintained a daily 
contact with IRD. By March 1949 IRD was pleased that suggestions 
for the emphasis of LPS bulletins met with absolute cooperation, 
and the use of IRD themes was 'very satisfactory in quantity... 
and far from bad in quality.' The only regrets arose from the 
natural limitations of the LPS service, material needed to reach 
LPS by 10am, it did not carry news, and it could not carry signed 
articles. 114
Arrangements were also made to coordinate IRD 7 s anti- 
communist propaganda with the activities of Britain's covert 
propaganda agencies. Although Bevin had given his Cabinet 
colleagues the impression that any covert propaganda was 
impracticable in the present circumstances, at least one Minister 
was informed confidentially that ' "black" activities were in fact 
going on to a limited extent 7 early in 1948. 115 Responsibility 
for black propaganda was, however, somewhat disjointed. Covert 
propaganda was divided between MI6 who handled black propaganda, 
and a body in the Ministry of Defence responsible for deception 
planning, the London Controlling Section (LCS). The LCS, which 
was established during the war to prepare strategic deception 
plans, had been preserved within the Ministry of Defence as a 
reservoir of specialist skills and knowledge. 116 An examination 
of the organisation of black propaganda and deception in early 
1948, concluded there was very little coordination between the 
agencies responsible. The Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook wrote 
that he could not 'see any clear dividing line between black 
propaganda and deception. 7 x Deception', he observed, 'is only 
one aspect of 'black propaganda. 7 Yet the activities were 
divided between two Departments who did not appear to have any 
arrangements for cooperation. 117 Moreover, it is apparent that 
SIS was ill prepared for black propaganda activities. In January 
1948 Air Chief Marshall Sir John Slessor had expressed dismay at 
SIS 7 s inadequate plans for covert propaganda. 118 Norman Bropk 
also found SIS was not properly equipped to handle 'black 7 
propaganda. 'Functionally 7 he wrote, 'it is an intelligence 
collecting organisation 7 which handled propaganda due to the
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circumstances that it inherited the remnants of SOE, and it 
controlled the channels through which black propaganda was 
disseminated. However, in a remarkable admission, Brook 
commented, X I don't believe that C himself knows anything about 
propaganda; and I have not been able to get any assurances t^at 
he has on his staff anyone who does.' 119
The organisation of the new propaganda policy attempted to 
provide improved coordination of black propaganda, by making 
arrangements to allow the Foreign Office an overview of such 
activities. Coordination with SIS was established through Sir 
Stewart Menzies, Director General of SIS who maintained contact 
with Christopher Warner in the Foreign Office, and the Director 
of Plans in the Service Departments. 120 A separate informal 
contact was established between Warner and a representative of 
the LCS. 121 Through this machinery IRD was able to coordinate 
black activities with the rest of the Government's overseas 
propaganda activities. It also went some way towards providing 
closer coordination of the two agencies responsible for covert 
propaganda. As there was little apparent appetite for closer 
coordination from the secret agencies themselves, this 
effectively left the Foreign Office as the only agency with an 
overall view of Britain's black propaganda activities, and more 
importantly the coordination of these activities with the new 
propaganda policy. As Brook observed, the liaison machinery left 
the problem of coordination in the hands of the Foreign Office 
on the basis that, x the Foreign Office are responsible for policy 
on both sides and must be left to see that the executive agencies 
of propaganda, "black" and "white" carry out that single 
policy.' 122
Clearly the organisation of the new propaganda policy placed 
the new Foreign Office department in an influential position. 
In addition to the job of collating and disseminating anti- 
communist material the IRD oversaw all of Britain's anti- 
communist propaganda activities overseas. This central 
coordinating role for the Foreign Office may have been exactly 
what Bevin intended. There was to be no return to the wartime 
organisation for political warfare with an executive agency
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outside the Foreign Office responsible for the preparation and 
application of offensive and defensive propaganda. In the Cold 
War the Foreign Office was to retain overall control. In the IRD 
the Foreign Office established the primary agency for the 
preparation of Britain's anti-communist propaganda, and the 
central coordinating authority for the application of the new 
propaganda policy across Whitehall.
Moreover, in the months following its creation the IRD 7 s 
role expanded rapidly. It soon became clear that the original 
intention that IRD would merely act as a central collection point 
for anti-communist material for distribution through existing 
channels was unworkable. By August 1948, although the IRD had 
grown to 16, Murray found it impossible to increase 'this slow 
laboured trickle of output 7 without an enlarged establishment. 
He needed competent editorial staff, reference section assistants 
and specialist readers of the Russian and Iron Curtain press 'for 
our purposes. 7123 The reluctance of some Government departments 
to become involved in the new propaganda policy coupled with the 
specialist nature of IRD's anti-communist campaign led IRD to 
develop its own capabilities. The COI's reluctance to produce 
material without an official imprimatur led IRD to develop their 
own production facilities, and commission their own anti- 
communist feature articles. 124 Similar circumstances led the 
department to develop its own substantial research and 
intelligence sections. Members of the Foreign Office Research 
Department (FORD), whose role mostly closely resembled that of 
IRD, resisted a proposed merger with IRD on the grounds that, 
'they are not and do not wish to be propagandists. 7125 IRD 
officials also had reservations about the suitability of such 
departments for propaganda work. Although FORD 7 s detailed papers 
were admired in Whitehall it was felt that a 'short readable 
document 7 was more effective for propaganda purposes. 126 Murray 
noted that 'pure FORD research minds are not necessarily what I 
need 7 and Warner observed that 'persons selected for research in 
FORD are averse to and totally unsuited for anything in the 
nature of propaganda. 7127 Similarly, in 1949 when Foreign 
Office inspectors recommended the creation of a separate Russian
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and Satellite intelligence department to service the needs of 
Foreign Office departments128 IRD resisted the dilution of their 
intelligence cadre. Warner argued it was impracticable for the 
same people to do intelligence work for different purposes, 
namely political, economic and propaganda. Without an intimate 
knowledge of Soviet propaganda and also of the particular themes 
and campaigns IRD were running it would be impossible for tfte 
intelligence analyst to pick up useful items. 129 By mid 1949 
IRD had expanded to 52, which was according to Murray, 
approximately the strength he had envisaged at the stage of its 
construction. The intelligence section alone numbered 21 and as 
a result of the COI 7 s disappointing supply of feature articles 
Murray next proposed to expand the department's output 
capability. 130 Although the IRD continued to use the facilities 
of the Government's existing research and propaganda agencies the 
development of its own capabilities meant the 'small section' 
created in 1948 to coordinate Britain's anti-communist propaganda 
continued to expand almost throughout the department's 
existence. 131
Implementing the new propaganda policy
Dissemination: Methods and Media
Once the machinery for coordinating the new propaganda 
policy had been established, the IRD set about organising 
channels through which ant i-communist propaganda could Ipe 
disseminated. The Cabinet paper on x Future Foreign Publicity 
Policy' stated that the new department would 'provide material 
for our anti-communist publicity through our Missions and 
Information Services abroad.' It also suggested that anti- 
communist material should be made available to Ministers, and on 
an informal basis to Labour Party and Trade Union officials. 132 
In a circular telegram to British missions outlining the new 
policy, diplomats were instructed that preparations would take 
some time and they should not therefore, 'initiate any general 
change to the new policy in local publicity pending further 
instructions.' They were merely required to make 'observations 
and suggestions' regarding the methods and media to be adopted, 
the character of material required and the probable effect of the
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new policy on the work of their information staff. 133
British missions were at the forefront of communist 
propaganda attacks and the IRD was heavily dependent on Foreign 
Office representatives abroad to provide information on communist 
propaganda for use in Britain's response, and to implement tjie 
new propaganda line. In the early months of 1948, in the phoney- 
propaganda war before IRD began work, the themes to be pursued 
in the new propaganda policy, and the channels through which that 
propaganda was to be disseminated were delimited in a series of 
telegrams between the IRD and British missions abroad. A 
circular to all British Missions on 23 January outlined the broad 
framework of the policy defined by the Cabinet paper on 'Future 
Foreign Publicity Policy.' It listed five broad themes. The new 
policy should: advertise British principles as the best way of 
life compared with the communism and unrestrained capitalism; 
stress the civil liberties issue, pointing to the many analogies 
between fascist and communist systems; highlight the 
destructiveness of communist foreign policy; answer Soviet 
misrepresentations about Britain; but in all this take care to 
emphasise the weaknesses and deficiencies of communism, not its 
strength. 134
Missions were told that the target audience for the new 
policy was to be the 'broad masses of workers and peasants.' The 
principal target area was to be Western Europe where it was 
stated that the new policy was designed to give a lead and 
support to democratic elements resisting the inroads of 
communism. It was stated that the new policy would also require 
"special application' in the Middle East and certain Far Eastern 
countries such as India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, 
Indonesia and Indo-China. An additional circular was sent to 
Middle East missions who were informed that they should for the 
time being continue to implement the anti-communist measures set 
out in the directive 'Russia in the Middle East' of October 
1946. 135 British Embassies in Eastern Europe and in Russia were 
also given specific instructions. It was accepted that these 
missions would not be able to carry out anti-communist measures 
locally, but hoped the positive side of the new policy could be
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implemented. Such anti-communist activity as was possible was 
to be limited to repeating suitable material from Ministerial and 
official statements covered by the BBC. They were to avoid 'any 
incitement to subversive activity.' These missions were however 
vitally important in providing material on conditions behind the 
iron curtain for use in Britain's anti-communist propaganda. 136
The reaction of British missions to the new propaganda 
policy was somewhat mixed. Although it was broadly welcomed, 
some aspects of the new policy were questioned and it was obvious 
that the policy as it stood was not applicable in all regions. 
Several missions questioned the wisdom of attacking "unrestrained 
capitalism.' In the Middle East, it was pointed out, capitalism 
was generally associated with the ruling class and big foreign 
oil companies, 'who already have enough trouble on their hands 
without the aid of our official policy.' 137 Similarly, in some 
countries, for example in Latin America, communists were already 
attacking 'American imperialism' and an attack on capitalism 
would naturally be assumed to be directed against the United 
States. 138 The proposed appeal to democratic Christian 
principles was another feature of the new policy which was not 
of universal application. In Catholic Latin America Britain did 
not appear an appropriate champion of Christian values, and in 
the Middle East an emphasis on Christian principles was hardly 
likely to be profitable. 139 The British Middle East Office in 
Cairo concluded, not without some truth, that the new policy 
seemed to have been designed with Europe in mind. With regard 
to countering communist influence further East it was effectively 
a step back from the 1946 publicity directive 'Russia and the 
Middle East' which sought to defend Britain and America against 
Soviet charges of aggressive imperialism and reply to Soviet 
misrepresentations 'with all the means at our disposal.' 140
Missions were asked to comment in particular on the methods 
and media of dissemination likely to be most fruitful in 
implementing the new policy in their region. Their replies 
suggested that five broad channels would be used for the 
dissemination of Britain's new anti-communist propaganda: the 
press; broadcast media, principally the BBC; books; visual media
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such as film and posters; and personal contacts. The extent to 
which each of these channels could be employed varied 
considerably depending on local circumstances. In Eastern Europe 
information officers were clearly aware of their vulnerable 
position and stressed the need for discretion. Belgrade and 
Prague, for example, both cautioned that they could not take the 
offensive through their existing overt information programmes, 
such as reading rooms, for fear of giving the authorities an 
excuse to shut down their information departments. 141 It was 
widely felt in Eastern Europe that the BBC was the 'safest and 
most useful method' for the dissemination of information. 142 
Nevertheless, there was scope for implementing the new policy 
more discreetly through the development of personal contacts. 
According to the Helsinki Embassy, such a policy should aim for 
'maximum influence; minimum display.' 143 The Embassy in Prague 
stated boldly that "active anti-communist propaganda 7 in 
Czechoslovakia was by no means impossible, although such activity 
would need to be indirect. Material could reach the Czech public 
through personal contacts with anti-communist politicians, non- 
communist newspaper and magazine editors, and reliable leading 
Czechs from other walks of life who could disseminate material 
amongst their own political or professional circles. 144
In Western Europe, where information departments in British 
Embassies operated with greater freedom, a more varied range of 
media was suggested. The Embassy in Madrid, for example, offered 
a long and diverse list of methods for disseminating anti- 
communist material including the BBC Spanish Service, Embassy 
bulletins, films, photographs for the press and window displays, 
posters, lectures and verbal propaganda by means of 'calls.' 145 
In some countries in Western Europe a more discreet approach to 
anti-communist propaganda was still recommended. In France and 
Italy, on the frontline of the struggle against communism in 
Western Europe, it was suggested that, although propaganda could 
openly project British achievements and espouse the virtues of 
Western Democracy, the dissemination of ant i-communist propaganda 
should be more indirect. In Rome, the Ambassador, Sir Victor 
Mallett, said that the Embassy and Consulates should not be used
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for the direct dissemination of anti-communist material for two 
reasons. Firstly, feelings were running so high between the 
communist and non-communist parties, that the sacking of Party 
publicity offices was a growing pastime and British information 
offices would do well to stay out of the arena. Secondly, the 
strength of ant i-communist feeling in the majority of the Italian 
press was such that there was little need to disseminate such 
material officially from the Embassy. Instead, Mallett 
recommended, anti-communist material should be disseminated 
discreetly through personal contacts with sympathetic sections 
of the press and non-communist political parties. 146 Similarly, 
in France the Ambassador said that British officials should avoid 
any overt anti-communist statements, but would seek to 
"personally inspire public men, editors, publishers and writers 
with material for their own activities in this field. 7 He even 
suggested that a confidential arrangement could be made with 
small press agencies in France to include IRD material in their
services . 147
Outside of Europe, as the Russia Committee had predicted, 
there were problems with the proposal to direct the new policy 
at the "broad masses of workers and peasants. 7 In the Middle 
East the existing propaganda policy targeted the educated elite. 
In response to the new policy the British Middle East Office in 
Cairo argued in favour of maintaining existing policy. Students 
and graduates, they suggested, would be a more appropriate target 
than uneducated workers and peasants: "the semi-educated townee 
is the most dangerous class in the Middle East. . . It is they who 
usually start the trouble. 7148 A detailed programme of anti- 
communist measures from the Embassy in Baghdad identified three 
groups in the Middle East to whom ant i-communist propaganda could 
be directed. The small professional and English-speaking cla^ss 
had the most to lose from communism and therefore was largely 
opposed to communism already. Propaganda directed at this class 
would be preaching to the converted. The student class was the 
most susceptible to the blandishments of communism. However, 
their grasp of English was often rudimentary and an approach to 
them, it was felt, was best made in Arabic. Finally, the
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remaining masses were largely illiterate and must be approached 
by 'visual methods, the radio and a whispering campaign. 7149
Reaching these groups required different methods than those 
employed in Europe, with a greater emphasis on visual and oral 
media, and a need for more material in local languages. TJie 
educated classes, Baghdad suggested, should be influenced through 
anti-communist material placed in the local press. This could 
be done both locally and through London. It was noted that every 
overseas newspaper subscribed to some syndicated service in the 
United Kingdom for its feature articles. Editors of services in 
Britain should be encouraged to increase the production of anti- 
communist material. It was even suggested a feature service 
might be set up in London to feed articles to the Arab world. 
Local information officers would also ensure that articles were 
translated, placed in the local press, and the producing 
newspaper distributed to all posts. Thus articles placed in just 
one local newspaper would, according to Baghdad, be repeated 
throughout the region, thereby obscuring their origin and 
impressing upon the reader the seriousness with which communism 
was regarded in many countries. 150 The Ambassador in Cairo 
reported that various local newspapers were already following an 
ant i-communist line and would welcome such material. 151 Baghdad 
also suggested that the semi-educated should be targeted with 
"cheap literature that can be placed in the many hole-in-the-wall 
bookshops.' 152 The idea of producing cheap books for sale or 
distribution to reading rooms and libraries was suggested by a 
number of Posts. In the Far East the British representative in 
Burma recommended x a special campaign of cheap simple literature 
for popular bookshops or for presentation to schools and 
associations.' Similarly, the information staff in Batavia 
called for cheap books by British non-official writers focusing 
on the Soviet Union and its international behaviour but 
'preferably free from polemic.' 153
To target the illiterate masses Baghdad suggested an 
ambitious programme of visual propaganda. This included a poster 
campaign showing the consequences of forced labour and 
collectivisation; a feature film with a Middle East setting
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depicting the progressive infiltration of communism into a 
country; and newsreels. There was concern, however, that 
newsreels would need to become more hard-hitting. Current 
newsreels, according to Baghdad, tended to present British 
achievements x rather effetely.' 'Such subjects as the Chelsea 
Arts Ball, bathing beauties and sports are not calculated to 
inspire confidence in us. ' Other posts also stressed the value 
of visual media for targeting a mass audience. 154 Short films 
in local languages were recommended in the Far East, and Cairo 
suggested the return of cinema vans which had been used widely 
to bring newsreel to isolated areas during the war. 155 Finally, 
the most important medium for reaching the illiterate masses was 
oral propaganda. This ranged from the most powerful medium of 
broadcasting to small scale whispering campaigns. As in Europe 
the BBC was the most important overt medium for the new policy 
and could openly carry the Government line, in the form of 
Ministerial statements, to the largest audience. There were also 
a number of local services. Some army stations like Radio SEAC 
were directed at British troops abroad but had built up lar^je 
local audience. Other services broadcast in local languages 
under British direction, most notably Sharq al-Adna. 156 Covert 
oral propaganda was also considered. The Foreign Office and SIS 
had begun to organise the covert oral dissemination of anti- 
communist propaganda through agents in Persia early in 1947. A 
more widespread programme was now advocated. One notable channel 
was the Brotherhood of Freedom a secret anti-Nazi society 
established in Cairo by the British Ministry of Information in 
World War II. Modelled on the Muslim Brotherhood which stressed 
religious plurality and a secular democratic political system the 
Brotherhood of Freedom had spread across the region and had over 
40000 members by the end of the war. In the post war years the 
Brotherhood had continued to operate promoting social reform, 
counteracting false ideas about the advantages of communism and 
stressing the need for mutual cooperation under the UN. 157 
Although the Brotherhood's origins were widely known it was 
highly regarded and its experience, local organisation and 
contacts could, it was felt, once again serve the interests of
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158Britain's propaganda policy.
Although IRD's principal role was the provision of anti- 
communist material to British Information Officers abroad, tfre 
department was also given the task of briefing Government 
spokesmen at home x on Communist propaganda lines and replies 
thereto.' The new propaganda policy had of course been launched 
in a series of Ministerial speeches and Bevin was keen that a^ll 
official statements were to be 'framed with the new propaganda 
policy in mind.' 159 In addition to the material prepared within 
IRD, information officers abroad were instructed to make use of 
anti-communist statements reaching them through the normal 
diplomatic channels or repeated in the media. In particular they 
were to draw attention to statements by prominent members of the 
Government, the Labour Party and the TUC. Christopher Mayhew 
observed that speeches by Government Ministers which were 
x automatically sent all over the world by the news agencies, 
foreign correspondents and the BBC, can put over in a few hours 
His Majesty's Government's attitude on an essential theme in a 
way that explanations by Heads of Missions and the work of our 
Information Officers in the field can seldom, if ever, 
achieve.' 160 But as Mayhew indicated, if official statements 
were to play an important part in Britain's propaganda abroad, 
it was important to maintain a consistent line at home. 
Consequently, IRD material was distributed x on a strictly 
personal and confidential basis' to Percy Cudlipp of the 
Cooperative Movement, Herbert Tracey publicity Director for the 
TUC and the Labour Party, and Denis Healey head of the Labour 
Party's International Department. 161 Mayhew also suggested that 
IRD material should be regularly sent to all Cabinet Ministers, 
and that the Foreign Office should circulate anti-communist 
speakers notes or talking points to all Ministers and selected 
MPs. In a revealing insight into the remaining Cabinet divisions 
regarding the Soviet threat, the Minister of State, Hector 
McNeill, rejected Mayhew's suggestion for a general circulation, 
'by all means let them have the stuff on a personal basis, but 
a general circulation would be highly dangerous.' Instead, IRD 
drafted a stock of personal letters from Mayhew to selected
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senior Ministers enclosing a selection of IRD's output, and 
urging its use in forthcoming speeches. 162 The first batch went 
to Attlee, Herbert Morrison and the Minister of Defence 
A.V.Alexander. Attlee was of course, v glad to lend all the 
assistance in my power to our overseas anti-Communist propaganda 
campaign. /163
On 27 March 1948 British missions were informed that IRD had 
begun work and that information staff abroad were free to begin 
implementing the new propaganda policy. In response to concerns 
expressed by several posts regarding the application of the new 
policy in their regions, they were cautioned that the new policy 
should be implemented 'with due regard to local political and 
general conditions' and that they should keep the Foreign Office 
informed of any activities, proposals, and requirements. Those 
organising the propaganda policy in the Foreign Office and tjie 
IRD remained aware that the Soviet propaganda machine was well 
established and highly organised and they were careful not to 
become involved in a full-scale propaganda war before British 
defences were established. Shortly before the IRD began work the 
IRD head Ralph Murray warned that x we must have an efficient 
intelligence machine, and an efficient output machine before it 
is any good taking a leaf out of the Soviet book.' 164 Given the 
diversity and ambitious nature of some of the suggestions 
received from British missions abroad it is apparent that 
initially at least the IRD wished to keep a close rein on tjie 
application of the new policy. By exercising such control the 
IRD was able to ensure consistency in British propaganda, whi^Le 
at the same time discouraging any action likely to provoke an 
unwanted reaction from the Soviets:
You will appreciate... that it is most important that 
in our general presentation of Soviet policy, 
institutions, doctrine and practices the lines taken 
by different posts should be consistent. You should 
therefore be cautious as regards local interpretation 
of general issues and rely as far as possible on the 
output of material from here which though meagre to 
begin with will, it is hoped, be more satisfactory in 
the near future. 165
Posts were told that they would shortly be receiving 
propaganda material in support of the new policy from three
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sources. They would receive a supply of basic papers from IRD 
on various aspects of conditions in the Soviet Union and of 
events in Iron Curtain countries, designed to meet tfre 
requirements expressed in their comments on the new policy. In 
addition their attention was drawn to the fact that due to recent 
events in Czechoslovakia attitudes towards communist 
organisations had crystallised in the Labour Party and TUC and 
that there had been clear Ministerial statements to this effect. 
Such information would reach them through the normal official and 
unofficial channels and should be given due prominence in their 
information work. Thirdly, they were informed arrangements were 
being made with the Central Office of Information for the London 
Press Service and their other services, both written and visual, 
to take account of the new policy in their official publicity 
material , 166
Conclusion
By comparison with the ad hoc response to Soviet propaganda 
since the end of the war, the new propaganda policy adopted in 
January 1948 was designed to be highly organised, coordinated and 
global in scale. It was in several respects a return to the 
policy and methods of a wartime propaganda counter-offensive. 
Certainly, the new propaganda policy and the proposed methods for 
its implementation derived a great deal from Foreign Office 
experience of overseas propaganda in the two world wars. A 
defining characteristic of the new policy was that Britain's 
response to communist propaganda should be based on the truth. 
In the projection of British principles, and the description of 
life behind the Iron Curtain, it was felt that exaggeration was 
counterproductive and largely unnecessary. Similarly, and 
perhaps somewhat contradictory, the defining feature of the new 
Information Research Department's output was that its source 
should not be revealed, and the very existence of the new 
propaganda campaign should remain secret. It was felt that 
information emanating from unofficial, but otherwise 
authoritative sources, would have greater impact than an official 
response to communist propaganda and the methods for countering 
communist propaganda should therefore be indirect. The ideas
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that the most effective propaganda was based on the truth and 
that propaganda recognised as emanating from an official source 
was x almost useless 7 had been guiding principles of the Foreign 
Office approach to propaganda since the First World War. 167
There were other parallels with propaganda during wartime. 
Some, although by no means all, of IRD's early recruits came with 
experience of working in propaganda during the Second World War. 
Also, not surprisingly, many of the suggestions from British 
information staff abroad for channels and methods to be employed 
in the new propaganda policy were based on wartime experiences. 
The views of many information staff regarding the central role 
of the BBC in the new propaganda policy reflected a long held 
assumption about the importance of accurate news as the backbone 
of British propaganda. A view encapsulated by the founding 
father of the BBC Lord Reith in the aphorism, x news is the 
shocktroops of propaganda. 7168 More specific suggestions such 
as the employment of cinema vans, covert whispering campaigns and 
the use of the Brotherhood of Freedom in the Middle East all owed 
a great deal to activities of the wartime Ministry of Information 
and the Political Warfare Executive.
However, the new propaganda policy did not mark a return to 
offensive wartime methods and the Information Research Department 
was not a resurrected Political Warfare Executive. 169 Bevin 
firmly resisted calls from Cabinet colleagues and the Chiefs of 
Staff for a return to wartime methods of political warfare. The 
phrase 'political warfare 7 was not to be used even in the closest 
government circles to describe the new propaganda policy. 
Moreover, in the administrative arrangements for control of 
overseas propaganda the wartime models of an executive agency or 
even an interdepartmental planning staff were eschewed in favour 
of assigning responsibility for the implementation and 
coordination of the new propaganda policy to a dedicated Foreign 
Office department with ultimate responsibility for all overseas 
propaganda in the hands of the Foreign Secretary alone. 
Furthermore, the new propaganda policy was not directed at 
occupied Europe. It was not an offensive strategy designed to 
undermine communist rule in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
121
Its primary purpose was the consolidation of democracy in those 
free countries threatened by communism, principally in Western 
Europe and the Middle East. This was markedly different from the 
psychological warfare directed at enemy forces and occupied 
peoples during wartime, and clearly had implications for the 
methods employed and the tone of the propaganda. The new 
propaganda policy also had several distinct features which owed 
more to the Labour Government's perception of the Cold War than 
the Foreign Office's approach to propaganda in previous 
conflicts. Most notably the new propaganda policy was to be 
directed at "the broad masses of workers and peasants' a quite 
different audience from the educated elite usually targeted by 
Foreign Office information staff, as several officials noted with 
scepticism. Bevin's strategy for a Western Union defence was 
also central to the new line in British propaganda. Consequently 
rather than promoting strictly British values the new propaganda 
policy was based on the x vital ideas of British Social Democracy 
and Western civilisation.' 170 This lent a distinctly 
progressive internationalist hue to the traditional concept of 
the 'Projection of Britain.' Moreover, in the years which 
followed, the policy's aim "to give a lead to our friends abroad 
and help them in the anti-communist struggle' and the necessities 
of collective defence, would involve British propagandists 
increasingly in the moral support of our allies firstly as part 
of a "Third Force' based on the Brussels Treaty Organisation and 
later an Atlantic alliance with the United States.
122
Chapter 3
Building a concerted counter-offensive: 
Cooperation with other powers, 1948-1950
123
Chapter 3
Building a concerted counter-offensive: 
Cooperation with other powers. 1948-1950
I feel that the major danger is not that we might have 
our hands tied too much by working in cooperation, but 
that, by working in isolation, we should fail to make 
our influence sufficiently felt in building up a 
concerted counter-offensive. Other countries need our 
moral encouragement in the feeble efforts most of them 
put up to defend themselves against communist 
political warfare.
Christopher Mayhew, May 1949. x
Cooperation with like-minded people to provide a coordinated 
response to communist propaganda was a primary objective of 
Britain's new propaganda policy. Although the policy was 
conceived as a distinctly British social democratic response to 
communist propaganda it was not solely concerned with the defence 
of Britain and the colonies against communist propaganda and 
subversion. The threat of communist subversion in Europe and the 
Middle East, coupled with Bevin's strategy for Western Union 
defence, meant that in addition to responding to communist 
propaganda attacks on Britain, the new propaganda policy also 
sought to consolidate the forces of anti-communism in the free 
world. Moreover, as Mayhew suggested, in seeking to build a 
concerted counter-offensive British policymakers had little faith 
in the ability of the rest of the free world to provide an 
effective response to communist propaganda. It was, therefore, 
up to Britain to "give a moral lead to the forces of anti- 
communism in Europe and Asia. 12 In addition to defending 
Britain against communist propaganda, the Cabinet paper which set 
out Britain's "Future foreign publicity policy,' stated that 
Britain should provide an arsenal of anti-communist propaganda 
for its allies:
[W]e must see to it that our friends in Europe and 
elsewhere are armed with the facts and the answers to 
Russian propaganda. If we do not provide this 
ammunition they will not get it from any other 
source. 3
Once the new Foreign Office Information Research Department 
(IRD) was established, its head, Ralph Murray, turned his 
attention to these wider aspects of the new propaganda policy.
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In reviewing the progress of the new propaganda policy in August 
1948, Murray observed:
We should be more active in our contacts with the 
Americans.,. And surely we should be approaching the 
Dominion Governments soon, tricky though they may be. 
And we should surely be exploring the potentialities 
of cooperation with our co-signatories of the 5-Power 
Treaty, which presumably must come some day, I cannot 
tackle these issues as if they are weary side-issues, 
which they are not. 4
The liaison envisaged by Murray would involve Britain in 
cooperation at various levels with the "forces of anti-communism' 
abroad. Sharing the product of Britain's anti-communist effort 
at an inter-governmental level with allied Governments under the 
Brussels Treaty and later the North Atlantic Treaty became an 
important part of IRD's work, as did liaison with the Dominion 
Governments. There were also attempts to persuade other nations 
to follow Britain's example in responding to communist 
propaganda. However, although the product of Britain's anti- 
communist effort was freely shared with allied governments, the 
degree to which they were taken into Britain's confidence about 
the existence of a coordinated anti-communist campaign, and the 
organisation of the IRD in particular, varied from country to 
country. At the same time as cautious approaches were made to 
friendly governments, the IRD continued to carry out anti- 
communist activities in those states through unofficial contacts 
with the "forces of anti-communism 1 within them. Arrangements 
were made for cooperation with individuals, trade unions, 
political parties, journalists and publishers abroad which in 
many respects went beyond the degree of cooperation afforded to 
individual Governments. Only the United States was exempt as a 
target for British anti-communist propaganda. Britain's 
principal Cold War ally was the only country to which the new 
propaganda policy was revealed in its entirety, and with whom 
Britain actively sought to coordinate propaganda policies.
This chapter will examine the development of British 
cooperation with other powers in the field of anti-communist 
propaganda. It will focus in particular on cooperation with: the 
United States; Britain's partners in the colonies; and allies in
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Europe as part of the Brussels Treaty and North Atlantic Treaty 
organisations. It will be argued that in spite of Britain's 
commitment to a policy of "Third Force propaganda' independent 
of the United States, and reservations about American propaganda, 
the new propaganda policy was, from the start, developed in close 
cooperation with the United States. The development of this 
close and unique level of cooperation, will be contrasted with 
Britain's slow and cautious approach to cooperation with other 
powers in Europe and the colonies. Nevertheless, it will be 
argued that Britain's attempt to cooperate with other powers was 
part of a genuine attempt to give a lead to the forces of anti- 
communism in Europe and Asia. Yet such attempts also illustrated 
that the United States was the only other power with a propaganda 
machinery and policy capable of providing an effective response 
to communist propaganda.
"Shooting at the same target from different angles.' 
The new propaganda policy and cooperation
with the United States.
In conception at least the new propaganda policy appeared 
to reject cooperation with the United States. The Cabinet paper 
on "Future Foreign Publicity Policy' stated that it was up to the 
British "as Europeans and as a Social Democratic Government, and 
not the Americans, to give the lead in spiritual, moral and 
political sphere 1 to the forces of democracy in Europe. British 
Social Democracy was to be the rallying point for the new policy. 
The inroads of communism were to be opposed by a "Third Force' 
comprising "all the democratic elements... which are anti- 
Communist and, at the same time, genuinely progressive and 
reformist, believing in freedom, planning and social justice. 1 
The paper also stated that in the interest of balance, as well 
as decrying totalitarian communism, the new policy would attack 
the "inefficiency, the social injustice and moral weakness of 
unrestrained capitalism.' Although it cautioned that in practice 
this should not involve attacking or appearing to attack the 
Commonwealth countries or the United States, the principles of 
British social democracy were to be held up as "offering the best 
and most efficient way of life. 18
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There were also pragmatic concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of American propaganda, and the intentions of 
American propagandists. The Cabinet paper on "Future foreign 
publicity policy 1 criticised American propaganda for emphasising 
the strength of international communism as this tended to "scare 
and unbalance the anti-communists while heartening fellow 
travellers and encouraging the communists to bluff more 
extravagantly. 1fi Christopher Warner was more forthright in a 
letter to Sir John Balfour the British Ambassador in Washington. 
"On the whole, ' he wrote, "the Americans seem to be very ham- 
handed in their anti-Communist and anti-Soviet publicity.' 7 
Warner was particularly worried that America might employ 
propaganda to provoke subversive action in the Soviet satellites, 
something which was expressly forbidden under Britain's new 
propaganda policy. 8 Warner also doubted the reliability of the 
intelligence on which the Americans based their propaganda. It 
is axiomatic that effective propaganda is dependent on a steady 
flow of reliable intelligence. Although the United States had 
access to a large volume of intelligence Warner felt that an 
agreement to exchange information was liable to "open the 
floodgates' and let through a volume of information "the 
reliability of which might sometimes be in doubt, and which would 
in any event be too great for us to cope with at the present 
stage. 1 It was, Warner felt, better to develop Britain's own 
sources of information. 9 At a meeting of the Russia Committee, 
Warner suggested that the right general policy "would be to 
exchange information on publicity with the Americas wherever 
appropriate.' But he stated "it would be wrong to have a general 
agreement to consult them and to take the same line. We must 
keep our hands free. 110 At the same time Warner felt Britain 
could use its influence to encourage the Americans to be more 
subtle in their propaganda. 11
Despite these reservations the United States Government was 
provided with details of the new propaganda policy at the 
earliest opportunity. In February 1948, W.P.N. Edwards, head of 
the British Information Service (BIS) in the United States, 
discussed Britain's new propaganda policy with Bill Stone, the
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outgoing head of the State Department information programme.
Meanwhile, the incoming head of the State Department's overseas
information programme, George Alien, stopped in London to discuss
British and American propaganda policies, on his way back to
Washington to take up his new post. In these discussions it was
not, however, intended to reveal the new propaganda policy to the
Americans in its entirety. The Foreign Office was unsure about
how the United States government might react to the new direction
in British foreign policy, in particular Bevin's plans for a
British led Western Union. Significantly when a copy of the
Cabinet paper entitled the "First Aim of British Foreign Policy 1
was sent to the Americans in mid-January, the section on the
Third Force was omitted. 12 Similarly, when officials in
Washington were asked to discuss the new propaganda policy with
the State Department, they were warned that, given the proposed
attack on capitalism, care was required when outlining the
details of the new propaganda policy to American officials.
Warner noted that certain expressions and phrases in the Cabinet
paper on "Future Foreign Publicity Policy 1 and subsequent
circular telegram had been included for "rather special reasons'
and would require "rather special explanation to our United
States friends. 1 It was felt therefore that the Americans should
not be shown a verbatim copy of the telegram. 13
However, as a result of confusion between the Washington 
Embassy and the Foreign Office, the Americans were shown rather 
more of the detail of the new propaganda policy than was 
originally intended. Early in February, Warner met with 
Information Officers, Gallman and Charles, from the American 
Embassy in London. They informed Warner that in Washington, 
Edwards had shown Stone a document outlining Britain's new 
propaganda policy. In return Gallman and Charles gave Warner a 
copy of a new American directive detailing their response to 
communist propaganda. Warner mistakenly believed that Edwards 
had shown Stone the circular telegram in its entirety. He was 
somewhat taken aback by this, but believing that the damage had 
already been done, and feeling somewhat obligated by the 
Americans' candour, he gave them a copy of the Foreign Office
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circular telegram detailing the new propaganda policy in full. 14 
In fact, Edwards had not shown Stone the whole of this telegram. 
In a letter which was not received in London until after Warner 
had entertained Gallman and Charles, Edwards wrote that he had 
taken care to omit "any controversial aspect 1 from the document 
given to Stone. 15 By this time it was too late, in the 
bureaucratic confusion Britain's new propaganda policy had been 
revealed in full to representatives of the United States 
Government, only one month after it was presented to the British 
Cabinet.
To Warner's surprise and relief, the Americans were 
remarkably unconcerned by the anti-capitalist aspect of the new 
policy. In fact American officials enthused about Britain's 
plans and felt that the distinctive approach could compliment 
their own attempts to counter communist propaganda. George Alien 
told Warner that there would be "considerable advantages if 
[Britain's] shots came from a different angle from the American, 
so long as they both landed in the same target. ' 16 In 
Washington, Edwards was surprised by a similar lack of concern 
from Stone. It was, Stone felt, only natural that Britain should 
preach concepts of social democracy in which the majority of 
Britons believed, just as the State Department must extol those 
capitalist virtues which the majority of Americans favoured. 17 
The independent approach in Britain's new propaganda policy 
did not dissuade US officials from proposing cooperation. Stone 
informed Edwards that he was anxious to develop "the maximum 
cooperation between us in working out and implementing the new 
policy.' 18 In both London and Washington these first meetings 
following the launch of the new propaganda policy, concluded with 
suggestions from the American representatives that senior 
officials from each country's information programme should meet 
again soon to exchange views with regard to future cooperation. 
In the meantime any formal cooperation was eschewed in favour of 
a general exchange of information between officials in London and 
Washington and if appropriate information officers in the field. 
The shape of the policy was agreed by Warner and Alien and was 
to follow the lines of existing cooperation on political matters:
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[T]hat we should exchange information and ideas where 
desirable without any obligation on either side only to act 
after consultation had resulted in agreement. This 
exchange of information would take place, no doubt, both 
between Foreign Office and State Department and between 
their representatives in the field. 19
The Foreign Office sent a circular telegram to British 
missions informing them of this arrangement. The telegram made 
clear that cooperation in the field was to be on a strictly ad 
hoc basis. The guiding principle was encapsulated in the phrase 
that Britain and American should aim to "shoot at the same target 
from different angles.' The telegram did make one further 
suggestion that set an important precedent for Britain's anti- 
communist propaganda. It gave British information officers 
discretion in cases where there was a risk of British and 
American propaganda overlapping to make "temporary arrangements' 
to avoid this. It was made clear that this should not result in 
Britain abandoning any field of activity or geographic area in 
favour of American propaganda. It did, however, establish a 
precedent for a division of labour in propaganda activities and 
raise the possibility of conceding certain responsibilities to 
the United States. 20
The first example of British and American cooperation in the 
field was in Italy, where the IRD began its anti-communist 
campaign. The British and American governments had been 
concerned for some time about the prospect of a communist victory 
in the elections in Italy in April 1948. At the end of February 
1948, Warner wrote to the British Embassy in Rome that the first 
priority for the new Information Research Department was to "have 
some influence on the course of events in Italy between now and 
the elections in April.' The first IRD basic papers which 
focused on conditions behind the Iron Curtain were produced with 
an eye on the requirements in Italy. Warner instructed the 
Ambassador in Rome, Sir Victor Mallet, to distribute the 
unattributable papers to "key men in Rome and the provinces who 
are carrying on an anti-communist campaign' including "party 
organisers, writers in anti-communist papers and anti-communist 
Parliamentary candidates.' 21 Mallet welcomed the new propaganda 
policy and agreed to the discreet dissemination of material to
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sympathetic sections of the press and other personal contacts. 
The Embassy had, he said, already been asked for anti-communist 
material by the Christian Democrat party. 22 As the elections 
approached a small committee chaired by the Ambassador was formed 
in the Rome Embassy to coordinate Britain's anti-communist 
propaganda."
In early March, the Russia Committee considered what action 
might be taken in consultation with the Americans to prevent the 
communists gaining power in Italy. 2 * The Embassy in Rome was 
asked for its comments on US policy in Italy and replied that the 
US Embassy placed its main hope in the publicity associated with 
the open political support and great economic help the United 
States was giving to Italy. They were also told in strict 
confidence that the US Embassy had for some time been feeding the 
Italian anti-communist press with material "very much on the 
lines now proposed for our information services.' Given the 
similarities of the two campaigns the Embassy asked for 
permission to "coordinate our arrangements with [the US Embassy] 
to avoid overlapping, waste of effort and possible risk of 
contradiction between our respective lines.' 25 The Foreign 
Office replied that subject to the avoidance of arrangements 
which might tie Britain's hands, they could exchange information 
with the US Embassy and make ad hoc arrangements to avoid 
overlapping and hampering each others' efforts. 26 The 
cooperation in Italy was reinforced by contacts in Washington 
where the State Department provided Balfour with a copy of its 
special guidance for US Information Officers on the elections in 
Italy. The Foreign Office reciprocated by providing the State 
Department with copies of the first seven IRD basic papers which 
had been produced specifically for use in Italy, and a brief 
outline of British propaganda activities in Italy. 27
Although it is difficult to determine exactly what impact 
British and American propaganda efforts had on the outcome of the 
Italian elections on the 18 April, the desired Christian Democrat 
victory was achieved. 28 The propaganda campaign in Italy was an 
important test for Britain's new propaganda policy. It was the 
first campaign undertaken by the IRD, and it was organised in
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great haste before the department was fully established. It was 
also a test for cooperation with the United States. Shortly 
after British information staff began distributing IRD material 
in Italy it became apparent that British efforts mirrored a 
propaganda campaign by the US Government which was already 
underway. British officials in Rome, London and Washington 
quickly established an exchange of information with their 
American counterparts which enabled them to coordinate their 
propaganda policies and output.
However, it was not Britain, **as Europeans and a social 
democratic government, ' who gave a lead to the forces of anti- 
communism in Italy. Although the elections in Italy were 
effectively a battle between communism and the non-communist 
centre left, American support, both overt and covert, was more 
decisive than the IRD's campaign. The propaganda campaign 
undertaken by the US Government in Italy was an ambitious 
operation involving considerable overt support backed by the 
psychological effects of the Marshall Plan, and the first 
significant covert political operation of the CIA, 29 Moreover, 
although it is significant that Britain and America cooperated 
so closely in such a formative operation for both powers, it is 
not clear just how much the two sides revealed to each other 
about the more covert aspects of their activities in Italy. 
Certainly the State Department directive on information 
activities in Italy given to the Foreign Office, made no mention 
of the covert support for the Christian Democrats being organised 
by the CIA. 30 Similarly, when Warner discussed IRD's activities 
in Italy with the American Information Officer in London, he was 
careful not to mention that the Christian Democrat Party had 
asked the British Embassy for anti-communist material. 31 This 
raises the tantalising possibility that Britain and America were 
both providing material support to the Christian Democrats 
without informing each other. What is clear is that although the 
propaganda campaign in Italy was by no means a joint effort, 
Britain played an important role in supplementing the American 
support of the non-communist left in Italy. This kind of 
independent pursuit of common objectives was to become
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characteristic of British and American cooperation in the field.
By mid 1948, senior Foreign Office officials began to 
consider the question of expanding cooperation with the United 
States. In August, Ralph Murray noted that, "we should be more 
active in our contacts with the Americans.' 32 Aside from the 
exchange of information in Rome, in most areas liaison in the 
field had failed to develop. This was due not least to the fact 
that US missions had not received instructions from the State 
Department regarding the exchange of propaganda material with the 
British. 33 Warner was particularly frustrated at the lack of 
progress. Although Britain had provided the Americans with 
details of IRD's plans and productions, he complained to the 
Washington Embassy, "we are much more in the dark about what they 
are doing. 13 * Warner proposed to visit Washington in the Autumn 
of 1948 to discuss propaganda activities with the State 
Department. 35 It is apparent that he had begun to consider a 
closer degree of cooperation than he had suggested in January 
1948. In advance of his visit, Warner wrote to the British 
Embassy in Washington that "there should be plenty of room for 
cooperation in fighting the cold war - exchange of ideas and of 
material - and perhaps for some division of labour in the field. ' 
Warner had previously counselled against the joint production of 
propaganda and especially the use of US intelligence. He now 
suggested that the agenda for his visit to the US might include 
consideration of "concerting material 1 and cooperating in the 
collection of intelligence for use in propaganda. 36
Warner's visit to Washington in October 1948 placed British 
and American cooperation in anti-communist propaganda on a formal 
footing. However, in several respects the visit was also 
something of a disappointment to Warner. It served to illustrate 
the degree to which Britain's response to communist propaganda 
was more advanced than that of the United States. The US 
information programme had suffered drastic budgetary cuts since 
the end of the war and was only just beginning to recover. In 
the same period the State Department' s information apparatus had 
undergone four major reorganisations. The most recent of these 
had taken place since the appointment of the new Assistant
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Secretary of State, George Alien, in February 1948. Consequently 
the information apparatus Warner came to view was strained and 
barely operational. Since the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act 
early in 1948 the information programme had received increased 
appropriations. But Warner discovered, the State Department were 
only now sending out information officers to many posts and he 
suspected the American propaganda machine abroad was only just 
being established. Warner noted that, although State Department 
officials were as enthusiastic as ever to cooperate in anti- 
communist propaganda, they were considerably less active than 
Britain. The State Department's Office of International 
Information was not producing anything comparable to the IRD's 
basic papers and was not providing its officers in the field with 
the kind of detailed information on Soviet affairs that the IRD 
regularly sent to British missions. There was little effort to 
insert articles in the local press or distribute "officially or 
semi-officially' material which attacked or exposed communism. 
As far as Warner could establish, American activities consisted 
almost entirely of reproducing anti-communist material published 
in the USA. 37
Although the limited output of the Office of International 
Information meant there was little prospect of a fruitful 
exchange of material with the IRD, Warner discovered that 
material comparable to IRD's briefs was being generated by the 
State Department's Office of Intelligence Research (OIR), 38 In 
particular the OIR produced a series of papers entitled "Soviet 
Affairs Notes' which in subject matter closely resembled the 
IRD's series of basic papers. The OlR's "Soviet Affairs Notes' 
series had been running for several years and covered similar 
topics to the IRD briefs. The papers aimed to provide "reliable 
information to counteract misrepresentations in regard to Soviet 
developments and policies.' Although the lack of an organised 
propaganda campaign meant that the papers almost certainly had 
not enjoyed the large audience of the IRD's briefs they were 
distributed under similar conditions. Like the IRD briefs the 
only indication of origin was on a detachable cover-sheet. This 
sheet stated in bold letters that:
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In disseminating the material outside of the US Government, 
the cover sheet must be detached and neither the Department 
of State nor the US Government may be cited as a source, 39
It was agreed that the OIR papers would form the basis for 
an exchange of propaganda material with Washington. The first 
batch of "Soviet Affairs Notes' was despatched to the IRD in 
October 1948. In return copies of IRD basic papers and digests 
were distributed to the Office of International Information and 
the Division of Eastern European Affairs in the State Department 
and the Policy Planning Staff. 40
This exchange of basic propaganda material was apparently 
profitable. The subject matter of IRD and OIR papers was often 
the same and this exchange provides one example of how 
cooperation allowed Britain and America to develop their 
propaganda along similar lines and attack the same targets, 
albeit from different angles. For example, one of the first 
"Soviet Affairs Notes' received by the IRD was a paper entitled, 
"The inadequacy of Soviet economic statistics. 1 This paper 
described how the Soviet Government rarely published economic 
data and, "even when published the information is not only 
meagre, but much too often ambiguous and incomplete, serving the 
purpose of equivocation or concealment rather than 
enlightenment.' 41 Shortly afterwards the IRD produced their own 
paper entitled "Soviet statistics: a study in secrecy. 1 This 
paper described the "obscurantist process' by which the Soviet 
Government through "strict censorship... enforces a statistical 
blackout which affects a great variety of subjects, ranging from 
production and consumption to unemployment and cost of living. 
The result is to render impossible any sound comparisons between 
the Soviet Union and other countries. 42
Warner's visit established the first formal agreement for 
the exchange of anti-communist propaganda material between the 
British and American Governments. It was agreed that the State 
Department and the IRD would exchange basic research papers 
including IRD's basic papers and Digests, and the State 
Department's Soviet Affairs Notes, information directives, and 
intelligence on conditions behind the Iron Curtain. The locus 
for this exchange was to be Washington, where a British Embassy
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official, Denis Alien, would liaise with the Political Division 
of the State Department. It was also decided that any proposals 
for joint Anglo-American propaganda would pass through the same 
channel, In order to prevent confusion and duplication it was 
decided not to establish a similar liaison through the American 
Embassy in London. 43
Warner also discussed the possibility of cooperation in the 
field of broadcasting, with Charles Thayer, the newly appointed 
director of the Voice of America (VOA) . The State Department had 
taken control of all VOA broadcasts to foreign countries on 1st 
October 1948. State Department officials told Warner that they 
now considered the VOA to be their "principal weapon in dealing 
with communism. 1 * 4 There had, however, been concern in London 
about the strident tone of VOA broadcasts. Warner informed 
Thayer that there had been criticism from some British posts 
which regarded VOA broadcasts as "overdone and antagonising to 
many listeners,' although the most vigourous anti-communists 
preferred them to the BBC. There was, Warner concluded, 
"probably advantage in employing both types of broadcast - the 
vigourous American and the balanced British. 1 Thayer suggested 
the arrangement of a "quick "tie-up" 1 with the BBC on certain 
occasions so that BBC and VOA broadcasts might support each 
other. Warner advised that the VOA should approach the BBC 
directly, although he agreed to raise the matter with Jacob in 
London. It was also agreed that copies of the State Department's 
directives to the VOA would be passed to the IRD through Alien 
in Washington, and Thayer provided a detailed overview of the 
resources used by the VOA to which the IRD might want access. 
These included State Department research papers, telegrams from 
US missions, Russian emigre literature and a card index of quick 
responses to communist propaganda attacks. 45
Some officials in London, however, remained reluctant to 
promote closer ties between the BBC and the VOA. Mrs Ruthven- 
Murray of the IPD wrote a strongly worded minute advising against 
the suggestions made in Washington. "The VOA,' she wrote, "is 
not only inaccurate in substance but also tactless and hectoring 
in tone.' There was she observed a large gap between the BBC's
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policy of ^reflecting the policies and views of HMG', and 
actually undertaking anti-communist propaganda.
With all its faults... the BBC continues to maintain 
a high reputation for telling the truth and in the 
long run is believed. The VGA may impress thq.se 
elements who are longing for the day of salvation from 
the West, but even those elements can never be quite 
sure that what they have heard is true.*8
The IRD, however, was in favour of cooperation at least 
between the Foreign Office and the VOA. Adam Watson asserted, 
there was little harm in the Foreign Office exchanging material 
with the VOA and the State Department. Far from following the 
same line as the VOA, Watson observed, such an exchange would 
save time and prevent duplication. As a result an exchange was 
allowed to develop on the basis that, "if they say it, we 
needn't. '* 7
The success of this cooperation between the Foreign Office 
and the VOA, was illustrated when Charles Thayer visited London 
in February 1949. In addition to meetings at the BBC, Thayer met 
with Warner, Murray and Watson, He informed them that the VOA 
was one of the largest consumers of their material in Washington. 
In fact it appears that the IRD's ant i-communist material was 
more suited to the VOA broadcasts than the BBC. Warner and 
Murray complained that they were not having much success in 
pressing their material on the BBC. The BBC's policy of 
accepting only "friendly advice 1 was making for "strained 
relations' and delays. Nevertheless, Thayer reassured them, as 
a result of his meetings with the BBC, he felt the BBC and the 
VOA was successfully dividing the field. It would, he said, be 
a mistake, "if the BBC and ourselves got into a contest for 
calling the Russians names.' 48
Perhaps the most important result of Warner's visit was an 
agreement that there should be "constant contact and cooperating 
between our information offices in the field.' That British and 
American information officers should have the authority "to show 
and discuss with their opposite numbers any directives or 
guidance instructions which they received, and discuss, where 
appropriate, action upon them. 1 Warner also ensured that, on 
this occasion, the State Department and the Foreign Office would
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both issue circulars to their overseas posts, outlining the
policy for cooperation. 49 Both telegrams stressed that nothing
should be done that gave the impression that Britain and America
were pursuing any kind of joint propaganda policy. In the words
of the Foreign Office telegram, Britain and America would
"continue to attack the same objectives from different angles.'
However, when it came to describing the basis upon which
cooperation was to be undertaken the formulation of the telegrams
revealed a subtle difference. The Foreign Office suggested th^at
cooperation might take the form of division of research and
"sometimes coordination of attack', but otherwise gave its
representatives relative freedom stating that "the details of
cooperation should be left to each post to work out on its
merit.' 50 In contrast the State Department advocated an
"amicable exchange of views' but stressed that information
officers must retain "complete independence of action and
operation. 1 Moreover it suggested, the basis for any exchange
should be a carefully calculated quid pro quo:
The Department perceives no objection to the exchange of 
views with corresponding British officers relative to our 
general policy inasmuch as it is to the Department's 
advantage to receive corresponding information concerning 
British plans and policy. 81
Only a few American missions reacted to the State 
Department's cautious tone. The American Ambassador in Iceland, 
who had been informed of the contents of the Foreign Office 
telegram, noted that the Foreign Office instructions were 
"couched in mandatory terms, which stand out in contrast to the 
permissive terms of the Department's instructions.' In 
particular he was concerned that the Foreign Office did not seem 
to caution against joint action. In his view the Foreign Office 
and State Department instructions were "so much at variance in 
tone and intention 1 that he would not sanction any 
cooperation. 52 Similarly, the US Public Affairs Officer in 
Bolivia, where the British and American information services had 
worked closely in the past, interpreted the telegram as urging 
more restraint in the future. He confidently reassured the State 
Department that they had recently restricted such cooperation and 
would in the future make no further arrangements!
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Nevertheless, most American missions welcomed the State 
Department's sanction for cooperation. Many were only too 
pleased that they now had official approval to respond to the 
approaches made by the British six months earlier. Although the 
vast majority of posts reported "close and informal contacts' 
between their respective information staff, cooperation did of 
course vary from country to country. The closest cooperation was 
often in countries where communist propaganda was most hostile. 
British and American Embassies behind the Iron Curtain reported 
that their enforced isolation often prompted close and friendly 
relations, a degree of contact which facilitated cooperation. 54 
The form of cooperation also varied greatly. Some posts merely 
informed each other about their plans for propaganda and reported 
back to their governments. Several exchanged propaganda 
material, principally the IRD's Digest and OIR's Soviet Affairs 
Notes. The US representative in Stockholm also provided a useful 
"Handbook of Quotations about the Soviet Union.'" In Embassies 
with a more advanced propaganda apparatus equipment was 
exchanged. In Karachi, United States Information Service (USIS) 
films were shown by the British Information Service film van. 56 
In other cases, the British and American Embassies shared 
translation work. In a few cases there was also a certain degree 
of operational cooperation. For example, in Korea and Bangkok, 
US information staff agreed to distribute unattributable British 
propaganda material along with their own. 57 Similarly, in 
Manila the British representative reported wholehearted American 
cooperation, in which "we have arranged to "plant" some of their 
stuff and vice versa.' 58 Nevertheless, even in those posts 
where cooperation extended this far, British and American 
information staff where careful to maintain the appearance of 
independent action. Information officers in the field were 
perhaps more aware than anyone of the importance of independent 
propaganda programmes. As the American representative in Warsaw 
observed, informal cooperation allowed Britain and America to 
"shoot at the same target from different angles', conversely the 
maintenance of separate programmes gave communist propagandists 
two targets to shoot at rather than one. 59
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Third Force Propaganda: 
The Brussels Treaty Organisation and the Colonies
In early 1948, the developing cooperation between Britain 
and America led a number of British posts to question whether 
they could reveal the existence of Britain's new propaganda 
policy to other friendly governments. 60 If there was a 
defining feature of Bevin's plans for a British led Western Union 
it was his call to "organise and consolidate the ethical and 
spiritual forces inherent in this Western civilisation. 161 
Central to this was the extension of the new propaganda policy 
to involve cooperation with Britain's allies in Europe and the 
Commonwealth. The Cabinet paper on future foreign publicity 
policy, stated that Britain would "give the lead in spiritual, 
moral and political sphere to all the democratic elements in 
Western Europe. 1 Similarly, it warned communism would make 
headway in the Middle East, India, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, 
Indonesia and Indo-China, "unless a strong spiritual and moral 
lead... is given against it, and we are in a good position to 
give such a lead.'"
However, the Foreign Office informed missions that, 
initially at least, there was to be no exchange of information 
with Britain's other allies, comparable to that with the United 
States. Although Information Officers were free to pass IRD 
material, subject to the usual restrictions on attribution, to 
politicians and officials in friendly governments, the existence 
of IRD and its methods were to be kept secret. In April 1948, 
the Embassy in Holland was instructed that:
The facts that a definite decision to carry out a 
planned anti-communist publicity campaign has been 
taken, that special machinery for this purpose has 
been set up, are, as you will appreciate, highly 
confidential here, and the only foreign government to 
which we have disclosed this decision and the lines of 
the campaign is the United States. 63
The Foreign Office did not begin consideration of European 
cooperation on ant i-communist measures until after the signature 
of the Brussels Treaty between Britain, France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg, on 17 March 1948. The question of 
coordinating propaganda measures by the Brussels powers was then
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considered by the Foreign Office Working Party on the spiritual 
aspects of the Western Union. In April 1948, Murray presented 
the Working Party with a proposal for a joint information 
executive to be established by the Brussels Pact Consultative 
Council. Murray's proposal was based on article III of the 
Brussels Treaty which stated that:
The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in 
common to lead their peoples towards a better 
understanding of the principles which form the basis 
of their common civilisation and to promote cultural 
exchanges by conventions between themselves or by 
other means. 64
Murray proposed that rather than simply employing this 
article to promote cultural exchanges, "we should seek to make 
active use of the Treaty.' The aim, Murray said, should be "to 
get general and practical cooperation in our pro-Western Union 
and anti-communist propaganda drive without detracting in any way 
from our own independent efforts. 1 Through the Brussels Treaty, 
Murray suggested, the path could be smoothed for Britain's own 
propaganda efforts, while they could also aim to achieve 
internationally what could not be done nationally. For example, 
Murray suggested the establishment of an international newspaper, 
international feature and photoprint services, and international 
"indoctrination courses or courses of instruction and inspiration 
in the anti-communist fight. 1 In order to facilitate this 
effort, Murray suggested the creation of a joint information 
executive to arrange the exchange of information, make 
recommendations for possible cooperation, distribute information 
material and run courses of instruction in anti-communism."
The Working Party was not in favour of Murray's proposal. 
It was observed that a joint information executive would face 
difficulties arising from conflicting policies of the powers in, 
for example, the Middle East. The meeting was also reminded that 
Bevin had been against the growth of large information services 
under the United Nations. There were too many organs of 
propaganda already and what was needed were fewer and better 
ones. The proposal ultimately foundered on the fact that, in 
contrast with the United States, none of Britain's co-signatories 
to the Brussels Treaty had a substantial propaganda machine of
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their own. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick was afraid that joint machinery 
might interfere with the efficiency of Britain's own propaganda 
effort whilst offering little in return." It was decided that 
it would be a mistake to set up a five-power committee to plan 
joint propaganda work as Britain was the only country with "an 
elaborate Information Services machinery" and a worldwide 
broadcasting system. Consequently, any proposals for five-power 
propaganda would almost certainly result in practice in Britain 
receiving "all sorts of requests to use our machine for publicity 
on behalf of the other countries.' It was decided, therefore, 
not to inform the Brussels Powers about the British organisation 
for countering communist propaganda, and not to seek cooperation. 
The Working Party agreed only that periodic discussions between 
officials to exchange ideas and consider specific proposals 
"might well have advantages. 1 "
The question of cooperation with the European allies was 
allowed to languish until October 1948 when Bevin himself raised 
the issue at a meeting with the French Foreign Minister, Robert 
Schumann, and the US Secretary of State, George Marshall. Bevin 
thought that the West was at a disadvantage on the propaganda 
front as "the Russians spoke with one voice and we tended to show 
divergent and contradictory views.' The time had come he said 
to discuss the coordination of propaganda in the same way they 
discussed the coordination of intelligence and other such 
matters. He did not propose a formal coordinated programme but 
"a general exchange of information and ideas.' In a revealing 
insight into the shift in Bevin's thinking on the response to 
Soviet propaganda, he concluded, "we had after all been very good 
at psychological warfare during the war. 1 "
Later that month, at the Brussels Pact Consultative Council, 
Bevin once again called for exchange of ideas on countering 
communist propaganda and a general pooling of propaganda 
material. Significantly at this meeting Bevin also revealed the 
existence of the British organisation for countering communist 
propaganda. The Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak praised the 
volume of information on conditions behind the Iron Curtain used 
by British representatives at the UN. Bevin replied that a small
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body had been set up in Foreign Office which produced regular 
reports which might be of use to the other Brussels Powers. It 
was agreed that although no attempt should be made to coordinate 
the propaganda of the five powers, each would make available to 
the other Governments "information which might be useful in 
dealing with the problem of the ideological aspect of 
defence. f "
Following the discussions in the Consultative Council 
Embassies in the Western Union capitals were instructed to 
exchange propaganda material, including IRD papers, with their 
host Governments. 70 Murray also made a tour of the European 
capitals to explain IRD's work and discuss arrangements for 
exchanging propaganda material. 71 This exchange of propaganda 
material did yield some results. Although the Belgians appeared 
to view the provision of IRD material as obviating their own need 
to produce anti-communist propaganda material72 , the French 
expressed an interest in developing their own organisation on the 
lines of IRD. 73 The French Government had also passed one of 
IRD's papers to a French writer who had published a series of 
articles based on it. 74 There was also some success in Holland, 
where the Dutch Government undertook to disseminate IRD material 
to the Dutch trade unions. 75 Despite these achievements the 
Foreign Office remained concerned about the disproportionate 
effort Britain was exerting in the propaganda field. The 
exchange of propaganda material with the Brussels Powers was 
largely a one-way street. By mid-1949, IRD had distributed 28 
basic papers to the Brussels Powers, and received only "one or 
two fairly interesting papers in return 1 from the French 
Government. 76
Cooperation with the Brussels Powers remained on a different 
level to that with the United States. Firstly, the exchange of 
propaganda material with the Brussels powers was only conducted 
at an inter-governmental level through contacts in the relevant 
European capitals. Concerns regarding potential conflicts of 
interest between the Brussels powers in regions such as the 
Middle East and South East Asia meant there was to be no 
cooperation in the field. The exchange was also limited to
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propaganda material. There was to be no consultation on 
propaganda policies or coordination of propaganda activities77 . 
In March 1949, Bevin instructed British Embassies in South East 
Asia that there had been no agreement to do joint propaganda, or 
even to coordinate the main lines of it. "We have no confidence 
in any attempt to conduct publicity by means of an international 
committee:'
In the case of the Americans, however, cooperation is 
more intimate and reciprocal, and is extended to the 
field, whereas in the case of the Brussels Powers it 
is intended that the exchange of information should in 
general be confined to the capitals. 78
There were also concerns about the security implications of 
cooperation with the Brussels Pact governments, particularly the 
French. The new propaganda policy had been revealed in full to 
representatives of the US government, yet in developing 
cooperation with the Brussels powers, as late as October 1948 the 
IRD was suggesting that, v a lot could be done by. . . communicating 
the results of research without actually notifying to the 
Government in question that we were engaged in anti-communist 
activities. 179 In particular, Murray was concerned that foreign 
governments should not be aware of the extent of IRD's existing 
contacts in their countries, "apart from any political rumpus 
that might ensue, we should forfeit a certain amount of press 
cooperation and confidence which at the moment we enjoy.' 80
Consequently, when the decision was taken to circulate 
material to the Brussels Powers governments the IRD began to 
develop two categories of material. Category A consisted of 
"secret and confidential objective studies of Soviet policies and 
machinations which are designed for high-level consumption by 
heads of states, Cabinet members etc. 1 Category B, was less 
highly classified information suitable for careful dissemination 
by staff of British missions to suitable contacts who could use 
it unattributably as factual background material. 81 Whilst 
Category A material was exchanged with the governments of the 
Brussels powers, IRD continued to disseminate category B material 
directly to contacts in the Western Union countries. It was 
decided not to inform the host governments about these 
arrangements, to the obvious discomfort of some of the diplomatic
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staff concerned. The reason was twofold, to protect the 
confidential nature of IRD's work, and also out of concern that 
in some countries communist sympathizers in the government might 
seek to curb IRD's activities. 82
This two tier approach to cooperation with the Brussels 
powers set a precedent for intergovernmental cooperation with the 
colonies. As with the Brussels Powers anti-communist propaganda 
work began in the colonial territories some time before the host 
governments were informed of Britain's anti-communist campaign. 
British High Commissioners were provided with copies of all IRD 
material and instructions on its dissemination to local contacts. 
As early as February 1948, British information staff in India 
began to distribute anti-communist material to informal contacts 
in the local press. 83 In August 1948, the IRD issued a 
directive regarding counter-propaganda on colonial issues. It 
sought to counter "misrepresentations of our colonial policies 
and the state of affairs in our colonies, 1 whilst at the same 
time drawing attention to "Soviet behaviour in and towards the 
backward areas of the former Tsarist empire, and towards other 
areas on which she as laid her hands.' Information staff were 
instructed to extract information from the directive, and where 
the opportunity arose, "endeavour to find publicity for it.' 84
Cooperation with Commonwealth governments was not considered 
until November 1948 when the Colonial Information Policy 
Committee (CIPC) considered the question of whether the 
governments of India, Pakistan and Ceylon would be ready to 
exchange anti-communist propaganda material. 85 The slow start 
to intergovernmental cooperation with the Commonwealth was not 
least due to the attitude of the Commonwealth Relations Office 
(CRO), whose support for IRD's campaign was less than 
wholehearted. in October 1948, Foreign Office representatives 
on the CIPC expressed concern that the Commonwealth Relations 
Office were not doing "everything that might be done... in the 
field of anti-communist propaganda.' They were particularly 
concerned that the CRO proposed to leave India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon out of the distribution of IRD material, presumably 
because the governments in these territories were not directly
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threatened by the communists. The Foreign Office were inclined 
to view the communist threat in the colonies, particularly in 
India and Pakistan, somewhat more seriously than the CRO. IRD 
was not simply concerned with the internal communist threat but 
the implications of communist propaganda for regional or global 
security. "The growth of communism in India and Pakistan, ' Ralph 
Murray observed, "is intimately related to the growth of it in 
the foreign territories of S.E.Asia and also in Malaya. We 
therefore have a strong, if indirect, interest in successful 
publicity measures being undertaken in India and Pakistan.' By 
way of example Murray pointed to "the dangerous tendency in the 
Indian provincial press, and to some extent in the metropolitan 
press as well, to swallow Soviet colonial propaganda, 
particularly concerning Malaya, hook, line and sinker. I8S
In December 1948, when the Commonwealth Relations Office 
finally agreed to approach Commonwealth governments, cooperation 
was modelled on the exchange of propaganda material with the 
Brussels powers. 87 As with the Brussels powers, IRD was 
concerned that cooperation should not jeopardise the security of 
their activities. In a letter to the Commonwealth Secretary, 
Patrick Gordon Walker, Christopher Mayhew noted that, "we shall 
have to be satisfied that there would not be undue risk of 
leakage either to the public or to the communists that the 
British government were supplying such material.' The 
governments of some of the Dominions, Mayhew observed would have 
a number of inexperienced officials working in their departments, 
"which I suppose are most probably penetrated by the 
communists.' 88 Thus the Governments of India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon were offered IRD's category A "research material' on 
Russia and the orbit, "much as we do the Brussels powers, |89 but 
were not informed about arrangements for the dissemination of 
IRD's category B material in their countries. The US embassy in 
London reported:
Foreign Office and CRO are agreed that dissemination 
category B material... in India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
on exactly same lines as used in non-Commonwealth 
countries without embarrassing GOI [Government of 
India] or GOP [Government of Pakistan] by asking their 
permission. IRD has had no "kick-back 1 from other
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countries where category B program working and is 
prepared assert if question raised that dissemination 
factual category B material is normal function British 
missions present world situation. Exceptionally, 
instructions British High Command Colombo gave him 
discretion to mention category B material to Ceylon 
Government. 90
The objectives of cooperation with the Commonwealth 
governments were not, however, entirely the same as those with 
the Brussels Powers. The IRD's principal complaint about the 
exchange of anti-communist material with the Brussels powers was 
that they received little in return. In exchanging material with 
Commonwealth governments it is apparent that the Foreign Office 
expected little in return. This was because the primary 
objective of cooperation with governments in the colonies appears 
to have been to disabuse the governments themselves of any 
misperceptions about the dangers of communism. In contrast to 
cooperation with the Brussels powers rather than supplying 
colonial governments with material for use in their own 
propaganda, the purpose was to educate senior politicians about 
the communist threat. Mayhew suggested that even if security 
from leaks could not be assured the Dominions governments could 
be provided with material of ^a safe nature' in the form of 
studies of certain questions. If the colonial governments did 
not make use of this material for publicity, he concluded, "it 
would serve the purpose of educating them.' Similarly, Sir 
Archibald Nye, the British High Commissioner in Delhi, warned 
that although the Indian Government recognised the Soviet threat, 
Nehru was not inclined to view the threat as a regional one, and 
continued to think in terms of internal action against communism. 
Nye discussed with Nehru the possibility of an exchange of 
information on communism and received "a friendly response,' 
although Nehru felt India would be able to offer little in 
return. Nye recommended that the Foreign Office adopt "an 
oblique teaching 1 approach, making available to the Indian 
Government the IRD's category A research material, which made 
clear communist views and what they had done elsewhere. The 
Foreign Office were not concerned that the Indians could offer 
little material in return. The Counsellor of the British Embassy
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in New Delhi told officials in the US Embassy, "the proposed 
exchange would probably be almost exclusively a one-way street.' 
In relating this information to the State Department, the US 
Embassy observed, Sir Archibald Nye was, "more interested in the 
gradual change in Nehru's attitude towards communism than in the 
substance of information which may be exchanged.' 91
It is clear then that in developing intergovernmental 
cooperation with the colonies, the Commonwealth governments 
themselves were as much a target for Britain's anti-communist 
propaganda as they were potential partners in any anti-communist 
campaign in their region. In both Western Europe and the 
Commonwealth, cooperation at the intergovernmental level was 
clearly designed to alert friendly governments to the communist 
threat and at best stimulate them into launching their own anti- 
communist propaganda campaigns. However, it is apparent that 
cooperation with governments in Europe and the Commonwealth was 
not the primary means by which the Foreign Office sought to 
counter communism in those regions. Before any approach was made 
at an intergovernmental level, the IRD began to influence opinion 
in Europe and the colonies directly through the cultivation of 
contacts in the press, trade unions, and political parties in 
those regions, with some success. Consequently when the IRD 
began to establish machinery for cooperation with European and 
Commonwealth governments, it was at least in part, designed to 
shield iRD's direct attempts to influence opinion in those 
regions, from the governments involved.
The contrast with the degree of cooperation with United 
States government could not have been more marked. Whilst the 
United States government was informed of the new propaganda 
policy less than one month after the British Cabinet, Britain's 
plans for third force propaganda were not revealed to friendly 
governments in Europe until October 1948 and to Commonwealth 
governments until almost a year after the new policy was 
launched. Moreover, the degree to which the Foreign Office was 
prepared to cooperate with Britain's allies in Europe and the 
Commonwealth, fell some way short of the level of cooperation 
enjoyed by British and American information officers in London
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and Washington, and in the field.
The principal difference was that western Europe and the 
colonies were regions threatened by communism, and as such were 
primary targets for Britain's anti-communist propaganda. The 
United States was not. Of course as the IRD was strictly 
forbidden from carrying out propaganda activities within the 
United States itself, there was less need to conceal iRD's 
activities from the United States government." However, it is 
also clear that Britain's attempts to develop intergovernmental 
cooperation with other powers merely served to illustrate that 
the United States was the only state with a propaganda machine 
and a policy for countering communist propaganda comparable to 
that of the United Kingdom. In so much as any third force 
developed in the field of anti-communist propaganda through 1948 
and 1949 it was limited to the dissemination of the product of 
Britain's new propaganda policy to a growing number of 
governments in Europe and the colonies.
The Decline of Third Force Propaganda: 
Anti-Communist Propaganda and NATO
A series of events beginning with the Soviet blockade of 
Berlin in June 1948 and culminating with the signature of the 
North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, signalled the demise of 
Bevin's Western Union concept, and with it the Third Force aspect 
of Britain's anti-communist propaganda. British difficulties in 
stimulating anti-communist activities by the co-signatories of 
the Brussels Pact reflected wider concerns about the viability 
of Western Union defence which emerged in British official 
circles towards the end of 1948. Britain had neither the 
military might to make a firm commitment to continental defence, 
or the necessary economic strength to support a Western European 
bloc. These problems were thrown into relief from mid 1948 by 
the Berlin blockade. By the end of the year Bevin's hopes for 
a Third Force independent of the United States appeared 
increasingly untenable. In early 1949 the new Permanent Under- 
secretaries Committee, created in the Foreign Office to consider 
long-term planning, presented its first paper, entitled, "A Third 
World Power or Western Consolidation?' It concluded:
149
A weak, neutral Western Europe is undesirable and a 
strong independent Western Europe is impracticable at 
present and could only come about, if at all, at the 
cost of the remilitarisation of Germany. 
The best hope of security for Western Europe lies in 
a consolidation of the West on the lines indicated by 
the Atlantic Pact. 93
In the spring of 1949, Britain's commitment to the Atlantic 
alliance heralded the end of Bevin's plans for a British led 
Third Force independent of the United States. The creation of 
the Atlantic alliance also forced a reevaluation of Britain's 
third force response to communist propaganda, and the policies 
for coordinating anti-communist propaganda activities with allies 
in Europe and the United States.
This was a relief for those officials in the Foreign Office, 
who had been somewhat sceptical about the "Third Force 1 aspect 
of the new propaganda policy. As early as April 1948, in a 
British propaganda directive for Germany, Warner had questioned 
whether "positive 1 projection of the "British way of life' should 
be replaced by the projection of "Western... principles and 
practices.' 94 Following the signature of the North Atlantic 
Treaty the overall tone of Britain's overseas propaganda was 
shifted to project "Western' values. A new directive for British 
Information Officers indicated that Britain's positive publicity 
would no longer be based upon "the vital and progressive ideas 
of British Social Democracy and Western European civilisation 1 
but a more inclusive "belief in the virtues, practices and values 
of Western democracy.' In place of the problematic presentation 
of British Social Democracy as the best alternative to 
totalitarian communism and unrestrained capitalism, Information 
Officers were told to stress that, "the Western democratic way 
of life has more to offer and is more worthwhile than Soviet 
communism. l95
Embracing the Atlantic alliance did not, however, mean the 
abandonment of the idea that Britain should give a lead to the 
forces of anti-communism in Europe. As Britain prepared to sign 
the Treaty, Christopher Mayhew submitted a proposal to Bevin in 
which he stressed that Britain should continue to "take a strong 
lead in encouraging western democracies in combatting communist
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propaganda in their own countries.' Mayhew suggested that some 
machinery be established within the alliance to allow members to 
"help each other in the task of counter-propaganda 1 and exchange 
propaganda material with a view to formulating a unified anti- 
communist publicity directive.
We have already achieved some success in this... 
Discussions have been held with the Brussels Treaty 
powers and our anti-communist publicity material has 
now a very wide circulation throughout the world. But 
there is a definite need to continue giving moral 
encouragement and material assistance to weaker 
governments in the anti-communist field, and I hope 
very much that the signature of the Atlantic Pact will 
lead to close cooperation between the signatories on 
this subject. 96
Following the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
Gladwyn Jebb drafted a more detailed proposal for the creation 
of a NATO subcommittee to promote ant i-communist propaganda. In 
this cautious proposal, Jebb warned that care would be required, 
to ensure that a NATO subcommittee would not hinder Britain in 
developing its on ant i-communist offensive, and that it would not 
commit Britain to "undesirable co-ordination of propaganda policy 
with the other signatories. 1 Nevertheless, he felt it would be 
useful to exchange of information and ideas in the field pf 
"ideological defence. 1 It would also provide an opportunity for 
"stimulating the laggards and imparting the benefit of our 
experience and techniques and that of the Americans.' 97
The experience of exchanging information with the Brussels 
Treaty powers meant that some in the Foreign Office were cautious 
about pursuing further arrangements for coordinating anti- 
communist propaganda with Britain's European allies. Bevin 
minuted that he was "not enthusiastic for more machinery.' 98 In 
considering Jebb's proposal the Foreign Office mantra was 
repeated, that "you cannot actually do publicity by means of an 
international committee.' 99 As with the Brussels Treaty 
Organisation, the principal sticking point was that none of the 
European partners had a propaganda machinery comparable to 
Britain's. Only the United States had a similar capability and 
there was concern that Britain's efforts should not be diluted 
by the lack of impetus from the other members of NATO. Jebb's
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proposal received a qualified approval, but the Foreign Office 
position was clear. The terms of reference of a NATO 
subcommittee should be limited to the development of positive 
ideals with which to promote the North Atlantic Treaty and 
counter communist propaganda attacks. The importance of 
maintaining Britain's freedom of action was paramount. Finally, 
it was asserted, Britain and America would need to take a leading 
role in any NATO propaganda organisation. 100
Although the predominant view in the Foreign Office was 
sceptical of the coordination of anti-communist propaganda with 
anyone other than the US Government, Mayhew's and Jebb's 
proposals for a NATO directive on anti-communist propaganda were 
prescient. Across the Atlantic, US officials had also begun to 
examine the potential for a Western response to communist 
propaganda based on the Atlantic alliance. In 1949, the United 
States Government began to reassess their plans for responding 
to communist propaganda, and the question of liaison with other 
countries in this field came under scrutiny. In December 1949, 
the State Department produced a paper on the status of 
cooperation with Britain in combatting communist propaganda which 
sought to assess firstly, whether cooperation with Britain should 
be expanded, and secondly whether cooperation should be offered 
to other selected governments, in particular the French. 101 The 
State Department felt that cooperation with other powers would 
become necessary as part of American involvement in international 
agreements such as the North Atlantic Treaty, In early 1950, a 
State Department paper entitled "Capturing Initiative in 
Psychological Field 1 stated there was an urgent need for "a 
ringing pronouncement setting forth the common objectives of the 
free world.' In order to achieve this it proposed that the 
United States should:
...promote cooperation with the information services of 
other governments to the end that, while they speak with 
many voices, they promote a clearer understanding of their 
identity of interest in the struggle to preserve freedom 
and coordinate their efforts to penetrate the Iron Curtain 
with generally agreed propaganda themes. 103
Significantly, it was decided that the views of the British 
Foreign Office were to be obtained before a direct approach was
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made to any other government. 103 At the Foreign Ministers 
Conference in London in 1950 the American delegation suggested 
to the British that as the US and the UK had special skills in 
this field they should "lend a helping hand' to other nations 
such as France. 104 The British, chastened by their attempts to 
stimulate the Brussels Treaty powers, displayed little enthusiasm 
for the US suggestion and prior to the joint meetings British and 
American officials agreed that "cold war' problems, including 
anti-communist propaganda, should be discussed bilaterally. 
According to the British representative Shuckburgh, "our own cold 
warriors will probably not be ready to share their methods and 
secrets with representatives of the other eleven countries, and 
any general Atlantic cold war efforts would therefore be much 
more formal than real.' 105
Consequently, the question of a NATO propaganda programme 
was confined to a bilateral meeting between Christopher Warner 
and Edward Barrett, the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of 
State for Public Affairs. Warner and Barrett reached an informal 
agreement on the broad functions to be carried out by the new 
NATO propaganda machinery. In their discussions it is apparent 
that the British view prevailed. As a result of the British 
experience with the Brussels Treaty Organisation, and their 
subsequent opposition to any attempt to organise propaganda 
through an intergovernmental committee, it was decided the NATO 
information staff should not issue its own publicity but should 
coordinate information and stimulate propaganda through the 
existing information programmes of the individual governments. 
It was recommended that the information functions should be 
entrusted to a highly-qualified British or American expert, 
working directly under the Chairman of the Council of Deputies 
and the proposed information machinery in many respects reflected 
the position of the embryonic IRD within the Foreign Office. It 
would provide a central collection point for information suitable 
for propaganda purposes and disseminate this information to 
member governments to use as they saw fit. There would be no 
joint propaganda directives and there was no suggestion that NATO 
would become involved in anti-communist propaganda. Information
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staff would simply make suggestions as to how the information 
programmes of member countries "might improve their contribution 
to the common goal of making the North Atlantic Treaty better 
understood, |los
Despite British misgivings the US Government did pursue 
liaison with the information services of other powers, and 
continued to press for more coordinated propaganda efforts 
through NATO. In February 1950, prompted by increasingly hostile 
communist propaganda attacks on NATO and the Mutual Defence 
Assistance Pact in France, the US Embassy in Paris established 
a Franco-American consultative committee on NAT-MDAP publicity. 
This informal committee brought together US officials and 
representatives of the French Ministries of National Defence and 
Information. It provided the French with information and made 
suggestions for propaganda designed to create a sense of 
confidence in the French public and counteract communist 
propaganda. 107 However, in attempting to organise a coordinated 
propaganda campaign through NATO the United States were 
increasingly frustrated. Following his visit to London in May 
1950, Barrett called at Paris, Rome and Florence to discuss 
information matters with French and Italian Ministers. Although 
the French were clearly flattered to be consulted, Barrett found 
that neither they nor the Italians had any arrangements for 
important foreign or domestic information work. Barrett did not 
wish to establish any exchange of material with the French or 
Italians, but he did set up procedures for "exchange of ideas' 
to "offset any feeling that we were playing ball exclusively with 
the British. 1108 At the Foreign Ministers Conference in 
Washington in August 1950, prompted by "the good psychological 
reaction to Korea,' the US delegation once again stressed the 
need for coordinating the propaganda activities of the NATO 
countries. "NATO information activities should be initiated 
serving as a central point for the stimulation of independent 
national activities. No "Deminform" is intended but general 
propaganda increase is desirable. 1109 However, the European 
allies remained reluctant to commit to a more coordinated 
propaganda programme. To the undoubted exasperation of the US
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delegation the French replied that they had no specific ideas to 
put forth, and the British stressed that ^coordination should not 
mean combination. |X1 ° Later, when pressed by the Americans for 
their views on a NATO propaganda programme, the French Government 
stressed that each country must tailor their propaganda to 
national problems, and the implementation of a propaganda 
programme was a national responsibility. A view echoed by the 
Italians and the Danes. 111
When the NATO International Information Service (NIIS) was 
established in November 1950, its terms of reference attempted 
to reconcile the European view that propaganda was a national 
responsibility with the American desire for a more coordinated 
international propaganda programme. The service was headed Tpy 
a Canadian, Theodore F.M. Newton, and the information staff were 
loaned from the member countries. It was in effect an 
information committee, with no general or operational budget, 
designed to operate through existing agencies and outlets of the 
member governments. The terms of reference were broadly along 
the lines of those proposed by Warner and Barrett, with one 
notable addition. Alongside the promotion of the positive ideals 
of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO information staff would 
actively seek to counter communist propaganda. Following a 
recommendation from the French, it was agreed that the NATO 
governments would each nominate an official to sift information 
from all sources on the USSR and particularly on living 
conditions under Soviet rule, and pass it to NIIS for 
dissemination to member countries. 112
Despite this apparent change of heart on the part of the 
French, the creation of the NATO information machinery remained 
an uneasy compromise between those who advocated a vigorous NATO 
propaganda programme, and those who believed such activities were 
best left to the member states. Predictably it failed to win 
wholehearted approval from the two nations with the greatest 
interest in the Western propaganda offensive, Britain and the 
United States. Although the terms of reference had been 
expanded, the US State Department had hoped for a more vigorous 
and aggressive NATO information programme. They were unhappy
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that the Nils was so small, appointed and paid for by member 
governments, and forced to work through the information services 
of member states. Under the present arrangements they observed, 
the NIIS would not be able to fulfil its potential, "because of 
the inadequacies of national information services, their lack of 
interest in its suggested projects and programs, and in some 
cases outright opposition.' The State Department envisaged an 
international information service appointed by and operating 
through NATO itself. Rather than being subject to the varied 
propaganda capabilities of the member states, such a service 
could provide material support as well as stimulating and 
encouraging the domestic programmes of the member states. The 
work of the NIIS, in the view of the State Department, should 
have been more offensive, "whatever is merely defensive in the 
work of NIIS should be relegated to a distinctly secondary 
place.' The fact that the West was not prepared to take the 
offensive in a military sense, "need not mean the role of the 
free world must be a negative or passive one.' However, the 
State Department concluded pessimistically, concern over the 
state of the NATO information service came mainly from the 
Americans, "the Europeans, by and large, appear to like it tfie 
way it is. 1l13
The British, however, were also unhappy at the shape of the 
NATO information programme, although for quite different reasons. 
The IRD were surprised and dismayed that counter propaganda had 
been added to the terms of reference of the NIIS. IRD had two 
concerns. Firstly, they might find it difficult to place their 
own propaganda material if similar material was emanating from 
a NATO agency. Secondly, with a NATO agency doing anti-communist 
propaganda, member governments might ask IRD to discontinue their 
activities in Europe. Within the IRD, J.H.Peck observed, "this 
does not matter in the least provided that the NATO channel 
produces results better than or as good as our present efforts, ' 
but he clearly felt it would not. 114 Murray feared that "all 
that will result will be additional work for us and others to no 
effect.' He believed that the major task of a NATO information 
office should be positive rather than counter-propaganda. He
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suggested the addition of a preamble to the NIIS terms of 
reference stating that NATO "cannot intervene with anti-communist 
propaganda in the internal responsibilities of member governments 
and that such intervention might indeed do more harm than 
good. |lls
In December 1950, the IRD tried to head-off NATO plans for 
counter-propaganda in a hastily convened meeting between Newton, 
the head of the NIIS, and J.H.Peck of the IRD. Newton informed 
Peck that the NATO Deputies were divided into two groups. One 
headed by the French, and to a certain extent the Americans, 
appeared to visualise the NATO information office growing into 
a sort of counter-Cominform. The other, headed by the UK and 
Canada, regarded it more as a clearing house for information 
which would take great care not to interfere with the existing 
machinery of member Governments. Newton had no clear idea about 
how to reconcile the conflicting opinions, but he reassured Peck 
that he strongly supported the second view, and was "determined 
not to duplicate or obstruct any work which we might be 
doing.' I16
This meeting also allowed Peck to impress upon Newton the 
importance of the IRD's work and the desirability of NIIS working 
closely with IRD when dealing with counter-propaganda. Given tjie 
British experience in this field, Peck recommended that Newton 
should appoint a Briton, Mr Newton currently at the BBC, as his 
assistant responsible for counter-propaganda. Peck gave the NIIS 
head a full and frank overview of IRD's methods of operation. 
He described in detail the multitude of sources from which IRD 
derived the raw material for counter-propaganda. It was a 
considerable undertaking to collate and digest this material and 
Peck suggested it would be "costly and needless duplication pf 
effort 1 for NATO to embark on this. "A view with which Newton 
heartily agreed.' Peck also provided Newton with examples of the 
IRD's output, a copy of the fortnightly "Trends in Communist 
Propaganda,' and a specimen basic paper, "The Soviet Peace 
Campaign. ' Newton felt this was precisely the level at which the 
IRD and NIIS could best cooperate and he agreed that if IRD could 
provide him with material in this form "he would endeavour to get
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it disseminated as widely as possible in Governmental circles in 
the NATO area.' Peck expressed IRD's concerns about saturating 
the market, and given the existing wide distribution of this 
material, the wish to avoid NATO being identified as an IRD 
channel. In order to counter this it was suggested IRD could 
rewrite some of the material in a slightly different form, "since 
the facts could bear repeated reiteration. > 117
Peck's meeting with Theodore Newton was something of a coup 
for the IRD. This early meeting with the new head of the NIIS 
gave Peck a prime opportunity to offer IRD's services and 
position the IRD as the principal supplier of NATO's anti- 
communist propaganda. Although Newton informed Peck that ^any 
Government could join in on this, if we happened to be the most 
prolific nobody could object. 1118 With the provision of 
specially modified material, NIIS gave the IRD another outlet for 
its material at the intergovernmental level. At the same time 
there was no question of NIIS replacing IRD's work. Following 
the same two-tier approach to cooperation with the Brussels Pact 
powers, Peck recommended that, X IRD should continue their present 
activities throughout the NAT territories where they are now 
operating until something happens which makes it necessary or 
desirable to discontinue our operations.' 119
In addition to providing a extra channel for IRD material, 
IRD also gained influence over the direction of NATO's anti- 
communist propaganda. The appointment of a British 
representative as Newton's assistant responsible for counter- 
propaganda gave the Foreign Office an influential input into NIIS 
planning. Moreover, the newly appointed head of NIIS was only 
too pleased to accept the assistance IRD offered. Newton asked 
Peck if the IRD could provide him with a draft directive on 
counter-propaganda which he could put up to the Council of 
Deputies "as his own and that we would not be connected with it 
in any way.' 180 These contacts helped to place the IRD at the 
centre of activities to counter communism in Western Europe. 
Their expertise was such that other European governments began 
to look Britain for advice in this sphere. 121 IRD's influence 
in the NATO information service also allowed them to distribute
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their own unattributable material, whilst continuing to press 
NATO to refrain from any overt anti-communist propaganda which 
might undermine Britain's efforts. 1" However, the question of 
whether NATO itself should actively seek to provide a unified 
response to hostile communist propaganda, or whether such 
counter-propaganda was the preserve of individual nations was the 
subject of debate within the alliance for some years to come. 133
Conclusion
The provision of ant i-communist propaganda material to liHe- 
minded governments was an important and expanding part of the 
IRD's work. By July 1949, the IRD's Adam Watson observed that, 
it was clear that the IRD would need ^to supply more governments 
with material about the workings of communism as time goes on. 1
We already supply the four Brussels Powers and the 
seven Commonwealth powers. We have an embryo system 
for Iraq, though the Iraqi Government has not had 
much. We may soon send stuff to all the governments 
in the Atlantic Treaty. And we are preparing to send 
stuff to the German Government. 124
The same degree of cooperation was not, however, extended 
to all governments. By mid 1949, the IRD had established several 
distinct levels at which cooperation with foreign governments was 
instituted. In developing intergovernmental cooperation in the 
field of anti-communist propaganda the Foreign Office had two 
overriding concerns. Firstly, that the existence of Britain's 
ant i-communist propaganda policy should not be revealed, and that 
IRD's discreet methods and confidential contacts should not Ipe 
jeopardised by public disclosure. Secondly, that by revealing 
their methods to foreign governments the IRD's activities in that 
particular country should not be curtailed. Consequently, 
security concerns weighed heavily on considerations regarding 
which countries to cooperate with, and the level of cooperation 
was defined by the degree to which foreign powers were taken into 
Britain's confidence regarding Britain's anti-communist 
propaganda policy and methods.
At the most basic level cooperation was a one-way street in 
which the Foreign Office provided foreign governments with the 
product of IRD's research. In this case the governments involved 
were themselves the target of IRD's propaganda. Information was
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provided in the hope that they might be influenced to adopt a
more serious view of the communist threat. Closer cooperation
was afforded to those governments such as the Brussels powers who
largely shared Britain's perception of the Soviet threat. These
countries were offered the product of Britain's anti-communist
propaganda policy, they were also informed of the existence of
the anti-communist propaganda policy, and the role and something
of the methods of the IRD. At this level it was hoped that
cooperation would involve a reciprocal exchange of propaganda
material and possibly the adoption of similar policies and
methods by the governments involved. Yet even at this level,
although governments were informed about the IRD's indirect
methods, details of the IRD's activities in their countries were
not revealed to them. In this case the benefits of cooperation
were weighed against the overarching concern that the IRD's
existing information activities should not be in any way
curtailed or undermined. This concern was also behind Foreign
Office reticence towards efforts to establish a multilateral
response to communist propaganda through the Brussels Treaty and
NATO. On practical grounds the Foreign Office had no faith in
the ability to conduct effective propaganda through an
international committee, particularly as Britain was the only
European nation with an established information apparatus. It
was also felt that Britain's anti-communist propaganda would be
blunted if exposed to the consideration and possible veto of the
European allies. When an international information service was
finally established under NATO, British officials ensured that
they were in a position to provide NATO with ant i-communist
material and exert an influence over NATO propaganda policy. At
the same time the IRD continued its own ant i-communist activities
within the NATO countries.
In marked contrast to the various degrees of cooperation 
extended to other powers the United States government was taken 
entirely into Britain's confidence regarding the new propaganda 
policy, the methods adopted, activities undertaken and the 
development of cooperation with other powers. The level of 
cooperation between the Foreign Office and the State Department's
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information apparatus was far above any other bilateral 
cooperation Britain established in the field of anti-communist 
propaganda. In 1948, although the Foreign Office had serious 
concerns about the effectiveness of American propaganda and the 
state of the American propaganda machine, US officials were shown 
complete details of the new propaganda policy a little over a 
month after it was revealed to the British Cabinet. Cooperation 
was instituted between London and Washington and began with the 
exchange of propaganda material. Cooperation was encouraged 
between the BBC and VOA, and in contrast to IRD's relationship 
with other powers, cooperation was also extended to the field. 
British and American information officers around the world were 
given broad discretion to develop cooperation with each other. 
It was established at an early stage that Britain and America 
would not seek to combine their propaganda output and the policy 
of cooperation would be characterised by Britain and America 
aiming to "shoot at the same target from different angles.'
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British and American Cooperation. 1950-1951
In 1950, two years after Britain launched its ant i-communist 
propaganda policy, the United States Government launched its own 
coordinated global response to communist propaganda entitled the 
Campaign of Truth. This propaganda offensive was part of a new 
global strategy for resisting communist expansion and undermining 
the Soviet monolith. It was the product of a fundamental 
reassessment of American national security objectives which began 
in mid-1949. This review was prompted by the Berlin blockade and 
the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb, and given added impetus 
by the communist victory in China, and in 1950 the outbreak of 
the Korean war. The resulting policy document, NSC-68, 
recommended a dramatic military rearmament, increased support for 
America's allies and a programme of psychological warfare and 
covert action designed to "rollback 1 communist power. 2
The development of this new global strategy had a direct 
effect on cooperation with Britain in the field of ant i-communist 
propaganda. In late 1949, as part of the review of American 
strategy, the State Department began to review its overseas 
propaganda activities, and in particular cooperation with other 
powers in this field. Just as the British Foreign Office had 
done in 1948, at the earliest opportunity the State Department 
canvassed Foreign Office opinion, and proposed expanded 
cooperation between Britain and America in the field of anti- 
communist propaganda. Their proposals met with qualified 
enthusiasm. America's new commitment to anti-communist 
propaganda, coincided with the British government's final 
rejection of the Third Force concept. In October 1949, Bevin 
presented the Cabinet with a paper arguing for the rejection of 
the Third Force in favour of "the closest association with the 
United States. |3 Britain's commitment to an alliance with the 
United States, coupled with the launch of the new American 
propaganda offensive resulted in increased cooperation in anti- 
communist propaganda activities. From 1950, although Britain 
would continue to promote the anti-communist propaganda
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activities of other powers, British anti-communist propaganda 
policy was based increasingly on the premise that "there are only 
two governments conducting anti-communist operations on a 
worldwide scale, the British and the United States Governments. 1 
Success against the communist propaganda machine, it was felt, 
was dependent on the closest cooperation between these two 
powers.*
This chapter will examine the expansion of British and 
American cooperation in anti-communist propaganda in the wake of 
America's new global strategy for responding to communist 
propaganda. It will begin by assessing the impact of the 
Campaign of Truth on American strategy for resisting communism. 
The principal features of the campaign will be examined, and the 
policy and machinery for American overt and covert propaganda 
activities will be outlined. The central section of this chapter 
will assess the impact of this new strategy on British and 
American cooperation in the field of anti-communist propaganda. 
As American propaganda activities grew, so did the areas in which 
cooperation with Britain was sought. The policy and 
organisational machinery for cooperation between the two powers, 
in London and Washington, and in the field, expanded considerably 
in 1950. Nevertheless, both nations maintained a distinctive 
approach to ant i-communist propaganda activities, and it will be 
argued that with few exceptions British and American information 
staff maintained the policy of shooting at the same target from 
different angles. The chapter will conclude with an assessment 
of the expansion of Britain's anti-communist propaganda 
activities in which it will be argued that in 1951 propaganda was 
elevated to become a central feature of Britain's strategy for 
fighting the Cold War.
The Campaign of Truth and American Psychological Warfare.
1950-1951
In 1950 a fundamental reassessment of American Cold War 
defences led to a new global strategy for countering communist 
propaganda under the banner, "The Campaign of Truth.' In April 
1950, Edward W. Barrett, the new Assistant Secretary of State for 
Public Affairs, produced a memorandum outlining "proposals for
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a total information effort abroad.' Barrett compared the 
existing information programme with an attempt "to battle a four- 
alarm fire with a bucket brigade.' He advocated an urgent 
strengthening of America's propaganda apparatus and a 
reassessment of their objectives. According to Barrett, if used 
intelligently, American propaganda could perform two important 
tasks: strengthen the free world to resist Soviet imperialism, 
and expose the people of the Soviet Union and its satellites to 
the truth about the peaceful intentions of the free world. 5 
Barrett's paper was passed to President Truman. Later that 
month, in a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 
Truman launched the Campaign of Truth, in which he promised:
...to meet false propaganda with truth all around the 
globe. Everywhere that the propaganda of the Communist 
totalitarianism is spread, we must meet it and overcome it 
with honest information about freedom and democracy. 6
The Campaign of Truth marked the revival of American 
propaganda and America's first organised response to communist 
propaganda. Up to 1950, the American government's anti-communist 
propaganda had been improvised on a piecemeal basis. The 
Campaign of Truth heralded a global counter-offensive which 
signified a shift to "long term strategic planning in American 
propaganda .based on fundamental goals and policies.' 7 It also 
marked a new more offensive response to communist propaganda. 
As George Kennan observed, this entailed a shift away from the 
"full and fair presentation' of America as encapsulated in his 
original concept of containment, towards the development of 
propaganda as a "major weapon of policy.' 8 Planning for the 
Campaign of Truth entailed targeting key regions around the globe 
with a "propaganda weapon 1 designed to "win the cold war.' In 
this first attempt at long term strategic planning for propaganda 
activities the world was divided into four categories: the hard 
core, comprising the Soviet Union; the Iron Curtain, including 
the satellite states, China, North Korea and Tibet; the crucial 
periphery, which included Indo-China, Malaya, Greece, Turkey, 
West Germany, Yugoslavia, Austria and Japan; and the danger zone, 
comprising France, Italy, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia and 
the Philippines. 9
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In order to secure additional funding for this global 
propaganda campaign, the State Department deliberately emphasised 
its offensive nature. Officials in the State Department stopped 
referring to American overseas propaganda benignly as 
"information activities' and instead began to use the term 
psychological warfare. Edward Barrett later conceded that the 
resurrection of the term psychological warfare was to some degree 
motivated by Congressional considerations:
I guess, from a purely philosophical standpoint, that 
I would question the term. I'm afraid it was adopted 
partly as a means of getting appropriations out of 
Congress. In those days we found that money for pure 
information operations, for libraries in neutral 
areas, for sending American performers abroad, was 
very hard to come by. If you dressed it up as 
warfare, money was very easy to come by. 10
The Campaign of Truth was not, however, simply a device for 
securing additional funds for the State Department's information 
programme. It was part of a fundamental reassessment of the 
Soviet threat and America's response which began in 1949 and 
culminated in a major policy review in 1950. The basic 
principles underlining the Campaign of Truth were outlined in the 
influential policy document NSC-68, through which the Truman 
administration began to develop a more offensive strategy 
"intended to check and to roll back the Kremlin's drive for world 
domination. 111 Although NSC-68 was not implemented until 
September 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War, its 
psychological dimension was launched in April when the document 
was first drafted."
NSC-68 began by stressing that the conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union was essentially a conflict of 
ideas, "between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, 
and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin.' 
In engaging in this conflict Soviet power could be resisted when 
faced with economic strength and military power, it could also 
be undermined using America's psychological weapons. 13 Details 
of the information programme's objectives were outlined in an 
Annex to NSC-68 which stated that America's global propaganda 
campaign should aim to: increase the Free World's psychological 
resistance to Soviet aggression; foster a "community of
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interests' in the free world; and create doubt among people in 
the Soviet dominated countries. To implement the new propaganda 
offensive it provided for a series of five year appropriations 
averaging $120,000,000 a year. 14
At least some of the funding for this new psychological 
offensive was channelled into the expansion of the State 
Department's existing propaganda activities. According to the 
State Department, funding under the Campaign of Truth provided 
v improved publications and press facilities, more and better 
motion pictures, larger libraries, and a greater volume of 
information materials of all kinds tailored to the needs and 
understanding of specific audiences.' 15 However, the most 
ambitious plans were undertaken in the field of international 
broadcasting. The centrepiece to the psychological operations 
provided for under NSC-68 was the expansion of broadcasting over 
the Iron Curtain as part of what became known as the radio "Ring 
Plan.'"
Soviet jamming of the Voice of America began in 1948 and by 
1950 had become increasingly intensive. The State Department had 
identified 250 Soviet jamming installations, and estimated that 
a further 1000 installations were operating inside the Soviet 
bloc. 17 The Ring Plan aimed to overcome jamming by encircling 
the Soviet bloc with a ring of high-powered transmitters, strong 
enough to force an audible signal into the Soviet Union capable 
of being received on small medium wave sets. The three-year plan 
provided for fourteen high-powered medium wave transmitters, 
which at 1000 kilowatts each were twenty times more powerful than 
was legally permitted in the United States. Each medium wave 
transmitter was to be accompanied by two medium powered short 
wave transmitters. A further six short wave feeder stations were 
to be built in the United States. Initial authority was secured 
for the first five bases in the Philippines, Munich, Okinawa, 
Greece and Ceylon. 18 In addition, due to the problem of 
obtaining and then securing sites for such installations on the 
Soviet periphery, a further plan, named Project Vagabond, was 
implemented for placing high-powered transmitters on ocean going 
vessels. The first Vagabond vessel, USS Courier, began operating
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in March 1952, and five more vessels were ear-marked for the 
project. The Courier was a reconditioned cargo vessel manned by 
electronic technicians from the State Department and crewed by 
the US Coast Guard, it carried a transmitter more powerful than 
any radio station in the United States. The vessel was dedicated 
by President Truman and was publicised as, "an ingenious new 
instrument devised to aid the Voice of America in carrying the 
testimony of the Free World to peoples behind the Iron 
Curtain. |19
Allied to this overt global propaganda campaign was a 
programme of covert action designed to put pressure on the Soviet 
bloc at certain strategic points. NSC-68 recommended an 
" [intensification of affirmative and timely measures and 
operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and 
political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and 
supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite 
countries.' 20 Although US covert action had been underway in 
selected satellites since November 1948, covert operations 
expanded considerably in the wake of NSC-68. 21 In April 1950, 
before the final draft of NSC-68 was approved, Robert Joyce of 
the Policy Planning Staff instructed the Office of Policy 
Coordination (OPC) to begin consideration of "increased 
activities.' 22 Between 1949 and 1952, the OPC grew from 302 to 
2812 personnel, with 3142 overseas contract employees. Its 
budget increased from $4.7million to $82 million, and in a 
significant indication of the global ambition of this covert 
counter-offensive OPC presence in overseas CIA stations grew from 
7 to 47. 23 OPC activities centred around the organisation of 
emigres from the Soviet Union and the satellites in support of 
a covert American strategy aimed at the liberation of volatile 
sections of the Soviet bloc, most notably Albania, the Baltic 
States, and Ukraine. OPC provided covert support for 
paramilitary incursions into the Soviet bloc by groups of 
emigres. 24 It also supported anti-communist propaganda 
activities by a network of private individuals and groups in the 
United States. This State-private network provided an extensive 
"front' for the more offensive and covert aspects of the US
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asGovernment's attempts to rollback communism.
The most prominent of the private organisations which
benefitted from the OPC's largesse was the National Committee for
a Free Europe (NCFE) . The NCFE was established in May 1949. Its
board was chaired by former Under-Secretary of State Joseph C.
Grew, and included Dwight D. Eisenhower, Cecil B. Mille, and OSS
veterans such as William Donovan and DeWitt Poole. The NCFE
acted as a rallying point for Russian and Eastern European exiles
in the United States. It sought, first of all, to put the exiles
"on their feet, materially and spiritually. 126 When the emigres
were organised, the NCFE aimed to "put the voices of exiled
leaders on the air, addressed to their own peoples, back in
Europe, in their own languages, in familiar tones. |27 In July
1950, the NCFE began broadcasting across the Iron Curtain through
Radio Free Europe (RFE). Although covertly funded and guided by
the CIA, as an independent broadcaster, RFE enjoyed an
operational freedom not available to official national
broadcasters. The station's main task was, v the disintegration
of the Soviet Communist regimes, sowing dismay, doubt, defeatism
and dissension in the minds of the present usurpers. l28 An early
draft RFE policy directive observed that in pursuing this
objective, RFE was not hampered by the restraints under which
stations such as the Voice of America and the BBC operated.
Among the number of other differences are Radio Free 
Europe's emphasis on subject matter of immediate 
interest to its audience - an emphasis which is 
largely if not exclusively dependent on a constant 
flow of excellent inside information - its acceptance 
of rumor and gossip as effective weapons of 
psychological warfare, and especially the informality 
and intimacy of its contact with its listeners."
In the wake of NSC-68, as propaganda became an increasingly 
important, and expensive, part of the US armoury, the US 
government sponsored a range of academic studies designed to 
identify the most effective means of wielding the new propaganda 
weapon. Various studies were undertaken to identify Soviet 
psychological vulnerabilities, the best means of getting the 
American message over the iron curtain, and the most effective 
means of undermining Soviet control. 30 The largest of these, 
entitled Project TROY, was launched by Edward Barrett in October
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1950. Barrett convened a panel of 21 distinguished academics - 
scientists, social scientists, and historians - to consider the 
technical problems of overcoming Soviet jamming of the Voice of 
America. 31 By the time Project TROY reported early in 1951, its 
remit had extended to consider other means of perforating the 
Iron Curtain and it had sought to develop a concept of "political 
warfare. 1 Project TROY reported that "real opportunities for 
political warfare against Russia exist and have been only barely 
exploited.' It advocated "a vigorous unified psychological 
warfare program,' designed to: consolidate support among allies 
and neutrals; impair the functioning of the Soviet regime by 
exploiting fissures in the system; and lay the basis for eventual 
negotiation by creating possible alternatives to Soviet policies 
and organisations:
leaving the way open for the top leadership to move, 
under internal pressure, toward one of these 
alternatives without sacrificing prestige so utterly 
that they would feel compelled to embark upon an all 
out war."
For such a policy to be effective the academics on Project 
TROY were convinced that political warfare "should be organised 
like any form of warfare, with special weapons, strategy, 
tactics, logistics and training.' 33 The reorganisation of 
America's propaganda operations was already being considered by 
others in the US administration. By late 1950, propaganda 
operations were divided uneasily between the State Department, 
the Defense Department, the Economic Cooperation Administration, 
and the CIA. To solve the organisational problems, on 4 April
1951. following protracted negotiations and against State 
Department wishes, President Truman established a Psychological 
Strategy Board to provide more effective planning, coordination 
and conduct of psychological operations. 34 The PSB was composed 
of senior officials of the three interested agencies, State, 
Defense and CIA with an independent director appointed by the 
President. It was not an operating agency, but was authorised 
to plan psychological operations at the strategic level, 
coordinate the implementation of psychological strategy by 
operating agencies, and evaluate the results of the entire 
psychological effort in its fulfilment of national policy. 35
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The creation of the Psychological Strategy Board was the
culmination of a process which began in late 1949, in which
propaganda was elevated from being an adjunct to diplomacy to
become a major weapon in American strategy for winning the Cold
War. The organisational imperative for the creation of the PSB
reflected the expansion of the American propaganda apparatus,
both overt and covert, in the wake of NSC-68. The location of
the PSB within the national security apparatus of the US
government indicates the elevated position psychological warfare
had taken in US planning. According to Dr Edward Lilly's
internal study, the major accomplishment of the establishment of
the PSB was "that interdepartmental planning and coordination in
the psychological field was raised to a much higher level, ' just
below the National Security Council and with a link to the
President. 36 Gregory Mitrovich later observed, "so extensive
and ambitious was the planning for covert and psychological
warfare that it may be considered strategic in nature; that is,
the framers of the plans designed them not only to fight, but
also to win, the cold war.' 37
British and American Cooperation. 1950-1951
In late 1949, as part of the reassessment of America's 
propaganda programme the State Department reviewed the 
possibility of "expanded US-British cooperation in the foreign 
information field.' Cooperation, the State Department suggested, 
could be extended beyond the exchange of propaganda material to 
include an exchange of papers on current and prospective 
information policy. 38 As part of this review US missions were 
asked to comment on current arrangements for cooperation with 
British information staff in the field, and to make 
recommendations of areas in which propaganda cooperation might 
be expanded. In anticipation of additional cooperative measures 
an informal approach was made to the British Embassy in 
Washington to determine the procedures for expanding 
cooperation. 39
The Foreign Office, however, had been somewhat disappointed 
with the results of cooperation since 1948. In October 1949, the 
British Embassy in Washington informed the Foreign Office that
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the State Department was reviewing its ant i-communist propaganda. 
The State Department, they said, had found the exchange of 
material with IRD of the "greatest value, ' and felt the time had 
come for a further exchange of views with the Foreign Office. 40 
Warner replied that, "we have not been particularly impressed 
with the results of [the State Department's] Research Section, 
nor with the activities of US Information Officers in the field.' 
Nevertheless, he added, it would be worthwhile to send someone 
to Washington with a view to finding out "what their resourqes 
are and also to get a better idea than we have at present of how 
they are using them. 1 * 1
In January 1950, the IRD's Adam Watson was despatched to 
Washington. His remit, however, was strictly limited. IRD was 
not keen on any division of labour and Watson was merely to 
report back on US suggestions. He was informed that the Foreign 
Office was not contemplating any closer coordination in the 
policy of anti-communist propaganda, and he was instructed that 
he "should not discuss this at all. 143 It is apparent that 
Foreign Office views of American propaganda had improved little 
since 1948. Closer coordination of activities "would be t;oo 
hampering and prevent our operations being as speedy as is 
essential. 1 Watson was also asked to raise, tactfully, tfie 
quality of America's anti-communist propaganda. Reports from 
some British missions suggested that "the general desire of the 
United States Information Officers put into the field is to be 
able to report large quantitative results, regardless of whether 
they have done any good or not. ' Watson was asked to pass on the 
Foreign Office's concern that the large volume of American 
propaganda material, particularly in South East Asia, could spoil 
the market for Britain's anti-communist material. In addition 
to his meetings in the State Department, Watson was given a wide 
remit to explore other potential sources or recipients of the 
IRD's ant i-communist material, most notably the newly established 
National Committee for a Free Europe, about which the Foreign 
Office apparently knew little. He also planned to visit a number 
of research institutes at the Universities of Harvard, Yale, 
Princeton and Columbia, which according to Warner, generated a
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volume of research material on a scale not practicable for the 
Foreign Office, and "much of which may be of considerable value 
as raw material for publicity. M3
Despite Foreign Office expectations Watson's visit to the 
United States in January 1950 was a success. He spent some time 
working in the State Department and was able to impress upon 
senior officials the need for greater subtlety in US ant^i- 
communist propaganda. Watson explained at length the IRD's 
methods for distributing propaganda material unattributary. 
Citing the example of South East Asia, he discussed the "de- 
Europeanising 1 treatment required in the production of propaganda 
material, he stressed the value of material written by natives, 
signed feature articles by prominent individuals, and interviews 
with refugees by prominent local journalists. Where material was 
sent from home, Watson emphasised the need for accurate 
translations, and in all output, the importance of propaganda 
based on facts. Dissemination, Watson said, was best undertaken 
through, "native, if necessary obscure and small publishing 
houses, unsuspected of foreign contacts. 1 The IRD, he added, had 
already begun to develop such outlets. 44
Watson clearly had some success in attempting to explain tfie 
value of a more subtle approach to anti-communist propaganda. 
According to the British embassy, US officials were particularly 
interested in Watson's explanation of IRD's tactics:
They have freely admitted that, in many ways, they 
consider our publicity techniques in this field 
superior to their own. For example, I gather that 
people like Tommy Thompson (Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for European Affairs) and John Davies {of the 
Policy Planning Staff) have been concerned for some 
time at the relative lack of sophistication and of 
selectivity in the State Department's anti-communist 
publicity. They therefore particularly welcomed 
Watson's visit, since it enabled them to point out 
their own deficiencies to their own people. 45
Observing his terms of reference Watson was deliberately 
vague about any future division of labour in the production of 
propaganda material, suggesting that informal exchanges of 
information in London and Washington and in the field should be 
based upon personal relationships. He stuck to the existing 
Foreign Office line, which allowed a pooling of resource
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material, designed to enable "the two services to aim at the same 
target from different angles. |4S Nevertheless, Thompson felt 
that Watson's "penetrating and substantial conclusions based on 
British experimentation and practice 1 would serve to increase 
cooperation around the world and make "our parallel efforts more 
effective. |4?
Although there was no real change in policy on cooperation, 
the visit was considered a success on both sides of the Atlantic. 
In his attempts to influence the Americans, Warner noted that 
Watson had "evidently done well.' 48 In Washington, Thompson 
declared that Watson's visit, "has brought this initial stage of 
cooperation to a new and promising level. 149 Moreover, both 
powers considered such an exchange of views worth repeating. The 
Embassy in Washington thought the cross fertilisation of ideas 
resulting from such visits was valuable and recommended 
"continuing to concert our anti-communist publicity fairly 
closely with the Americans. 150 Thompson also considered the 
visit to be "eminently worthwhile 1 and hoped that "this type of 
cooperation may be continued and increased in the future.' 51
The launch of the Campaign of Truth in April 1950, 
reinforced the British Foreign Office's positive impression of 
the American anti-communist propaganda effort. The British were 
now also keen to expand cooperation. In May 1950, a Foreign 
Office memorandum regarding priorities in the field of anti- 
communist propaganda, observed that, "the State Department and 
the Foreign Office have now arrived at much the same ideas about 
the general need for publicity, both overt and covert and for 
kindred activities, in order to counteract the spread of 
communism.' sa Although the Foreign Office appreciated that 
differences of resources and policy might lead to certain 
variations of approach, it was felt that "a frank exchange of 
opinion about projects, and about the effects of these projects, 
cannot fail to be beneficial.'
It may therefore prove valuable in future to extend 
the collaboration between the State Department and the 
Foreign Office beyond the existing exchange of 
material and programme of action, so as to include 
comment by each Department, on the general strategy of 
the other, and the results which appear to be
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obtained, as well as observations on individual 
projects while these are still at the planning 
stage."
The Foreign Office was given an early opportunity to discuss 
these proposals at a series of meetings between British and 
American officials which followed the Foreign Ministers 
Conferences held in London in April 1950. Between 20th and 22nd 
May 1950, the most senior officials responsible for the 
propaganda activities of the Foreign Office and the State 
Department, met at the Foreign Office to discuss the increased 
coordination of propaganda policies. The British delegation 
comprised: Christopher Warner, Ralph Murray and Adam Watson of 
the IRD, representatives of the Information Policy Department, 
and J.B.Clarke of the BBC External Services. The US delegation 
comprised: Edward W. Barrett, Bill Stone, Chairman of the 
Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff, and Mallory Browne, 
Public Affairs Officer at the US Embassy. 54
Barrett began the meetings by outlining his hopes for 
extending cooperation in five broad areas: the coordination of 
policy and ideas; the exchange of propaganda material; 
cooperation in techniques of distribution; the Voice of America 
and the BBC; and the consequences in the information field of the 
North Atlantic Treaty." Barrett described the changing 
attitude in the United States towards the use of propaganda as 
a weapon in the Cold War. He emphasised the increase in 
Congressional support for propaganda activities generated by the 
Campaign of Truth. Although American plans, Barrett stated, were 
still in the "preliminary stage 1 , the US was devoting 
considerable resources to the propaganda effort. Barrett 
informed the meeting in the strictest confidence that estimates 
were for 78 million dollars for the first year, and 120 million 
for the second. 56
As Watson had done in January, Warner and Murray sought to 
impress upon the Americans the importance of concentrating less 
on the quantity of propaganda and focus on the need for a more 
subtle, carefully targeted and indirect campaign. Warner said 
that the Foreign Office had found that saturation point for 
directly distributed material was very quickly reached and
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British information officers devoted much time and effort to 
developing local contacts who would print British material, or 
reflect British views in their own writing. In particular, he 
suggested, there was little value in saturating areas such as 
South East Asia and the Middle East with Western-issued anti- 
communist material which would be automatically distrusted. 
American officials once again expressed great interest in British 
methods. Barrett replied that although much could be done 
through public statements which stressed the "unity of purpose 
of the nations of the free world, ' he was also interested in 
developing similar techniques to the British for the use of 
"grey' propaganda, particularly in South East Asia. 57
One area in which the United States was keen to expand 
cooperation was broadcasting. One of the problems in the 
development of the Ring Plan was the fact that with the exception 
of Alaska, where new transmitters were planned, the United States 
had no territory near the Soviet bloc. The British, of course, 
had territory and influence in various strategic locations where 
the Americans hoped to site new transmitters, most notably in the 
Middle East and South-East Asia. Although full details of the 
radio Ring Plan were not revealed to the British at this stage, 
Barrett described American efforts to overcome Soviet jamming. 
He also gave a brief account of American plans for broadcasting 
over RFE, which, he said, would "take a tougher line than the BBC 
or even VOA.'
Barrett did suggest further technical cooperation to 
circumvent Soviet jamming. The Voice of America had already 
begun negotiations with the BBC for relay time on BBC 
transmitters at Singapore, Malaya and Ceylon, in return for time 
on American transmitters in Munich and Salonika. Barrett 
proposed the construction of new transmitters in Ceylon, 
Singapore and Bahrein to relay BBC and VOA programmes. The State 
Department also wished to take advantage of the high powered 
transmitter at Crowborough in Sussex, which under the codename 
Aspidistra, had broadcast BBC and black radio transmissions 
during the war. 58 In early 1950, an American technical team had 
visited the facility at Crowborough, which was now used by the
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Diplomatic Wireless Service (DWS), and found that it was not 
being used to full advantage. 59 Barrett wanted to use the 
Aspidistra's 650 watt medium wave transmitter after midnight for 
broadcasts to Ukraine. He also offered to provide two additional 
transmitters for DWS morse code use, releasing two larger short 
wave transmitters for further VOA relays. The Foreign Office 
supported the proposals for the BBC and VOA to share facilities, 
and agreed to approach the relevant governments regarding the 
construction of new transmitters in Ceylon, Bahrein and 
Singapore. It was also agreed that technicians from the BBC and 
VOA would undertake a joint study of the problems of overcoming 
jamming. A decision on the use of Aspidistra was deferred 
pending further investigations. 60
There were, however, signs that the Foreign Office was 
somewhat uneasy at the Americans 1 ambitious broadcasting plans. 
Warner noted that, BBC contracts with Malaya, Singapore and 
Ceylon included clauses reserving the power of veto over anything 
carried from transmitters in their territories, and he warned 
that broadcasts criticising the Chinese communist government 
might lead to protests. 61 Barrett reassured the Foreign Office 
that the VOA would "avoid anything in their relays which might 
be embarrassing to His Majesty's Government or to the local 
authorities on whose territory relay transmitters were 
situated. |6a The British were also sceptical about RFE. 
British experience during the war had, Warner said, "shown that 
exiles were apt to get out of touch with their own countries 
surprisingly quickly and to be moved by personal and internal 
political considerations rather than strictly patriotic 
considerations. 1 He made it clear that Britain would not be 
returning to "black 1 broadcasting. Wartime experience had shown 
such work had to be "exceptionally brilliantly done, ' and it 
would now be "prohibitively difficult and expensive.' 63 The 
British were also concerned that the expansion of American 
broadcasting in Europe might be provocative and lead to 
interference in domestic broadcasting. The allocation of long 
and medium wavelengths in Europe had been agreed by thirty-three 
nations, including those from the Soviet bloc, at a conference
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in Copenhagen in June 1948. Warner stressed that the British 
government would be "averse to anything which might lead to a 
breakdown in the Copenhagen Plan and broadcasting "war," 
particularly on medium waves. |64 The American minutes recorded, 
"that the British Government is apprehensive about the European 
broadcasting situation and will be careful not to take any action 
which might affect British home services.' 65
The meetings also revealed significant differences in the 
target area priorities for British and American anti-communist 
propaganda. The British gave a higher priority to countries 
outside the Iron Curtain, particularly those parts of the free 
world in danger of communist penetration, and in which "public 
opinion could still exercise a considerable effect on policy, 
especially in times of crisis.' First priority was given to 
France, Italy, Germany and South East Asia. Secondary priority 
was given to India, Pakistan and the Middle East. American 
propaganda, Barrett replied, was principally directed over the 
Iron Curtain, and most strongly at the Soviet Union itself. 
British efforts to penetrate the Iron Curtain with propaganda 
were limited to the overseas services of the BBC. Moreover, the 
Foreign Office focused greater attention on the satellite states 
than the Soviet Union. They considered these countries to be 
"less firmly controlled, more recently Sovietised, and more used 
to listening to foreign broadcasts.' 66
Despite such differences the talks concluded with a wide- 
ranging discussion, in which various degrees of cooperation in 
certain "critical areas' were agreed. In South East Asia, 
Barrett recommended closer liaison at Singapore including an 
exchange of propaganda material, translations and analysis of the 
Chinese press. Warner invited the Americans to send a top man 
or team to work at the British Regional Information Office in 
Singapore. It was also proposed that Chinese press reading could 
be divided between the British service in Peking and US IS in Hong 
Kong. There was a general agreement on cooperation in the Middle 
East, where Britain and America would occasionally pursue joint 
policies to offset communist charges of disagreement and rivalry. 
Cooperation was also to be extended in India and Pakistan. In
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Europe, there was concern at the trend towards neutrality, 
particularly in France. In an effort to counter this trend and 
promote the North Atlantic Treaty, it was agreed to "exchange 
ideas on all possible common lines of action and give more 
attention to developing effective slogans.' It was noted that 
cooperation between British and American information officers in 
Paris was already very close. The British information officer, 
it was reported, even passed on, "insulting remarks about the 
Americans made to him by Frenchmen.' It was hoped that the 
Americans would pass on similar insulting remarks made about the 
British! Finally, there was an agreement to exchange ideas on 
all output to the satellite states. 67
In a significant indication of British and American 
cooperation in covert propaganda activities, it was agreed that 
"further study should be given to exploiting the propaganda 
possibilities in Albania. 1 In late 1948, the British Government 
had formulated a policy of subversion aimed at "detaching 1 one 
of the satellites from the Soviet bloc. The proposed target was 
Albania, and a covert operation was launched in cooperation with 
the American CIA to infiltrate Albanian resistance fighters into 
the country to foment unrest. The first team of men had gone 
ashore at the beginning of October 1949." In planning, it had 
been assumed that special operations in Albania would be 
accompanied by a propaganda offensive. 69 However, the 
restriction on the Foreign Office conducting subversive 
propaganda in communist countries was not lifted until December 
1949, after the operation had begun. 70 Even then, Britain and 
America had few resources for propaganda in Albania. Neither 
Britain or America had embassies in Tirana, and therefore had no 
direct contact with the Albanian people, or local channels for 
the dissemination of subversive propaganda. The IRD conducted 
little anti-communist propaganda in Eastern Europe, and relied 
upon the overseas services of the BBC. The BBC's daily fifteen 
minute Albanian language programme was broadcast ninety minutes 
before the electricity was switched on in Albanian towns. 71 
Radio Free Europe did not begin broadcasting until July 1950, and 
the VGA Albanian service was not launched until May 1951.
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The BBC remained the principal means of directing propaganda 
at the Albanian people. Albanian resistance leaders were given 
time on the BBC's Albanian service, and shortly after the first 
landings the Foreign Office agreed to fund an additional fifteen 
minute Albanian language slot, later in the evening. 73 However, 
with no representation in Albania, it was difficult to assess the 
impact of the operation, or acquire new material for broadcasts. 
At the meetings in May 1950, Warner agreed to ask the French, who 
had an embassy in Tirana, to provide information on events in 
Albania which could be broadcast by the BBC and VGA. 74 Barrett 
said the State Department was also considering "various 
suggestions in the "H.G. Wells" category 1 for penetrating the 
Iron Curtain, such as the use of balloons. 75 A balloon leaflet 
drop over Albania was later aborted when the wind changed. 76 
The whole Albanian operation eventually collapsed when it was 
realised that the country was not ripe for revolt. Those emigres 
dropped into Albania were betrayed by Kirn Philby, the MI6 liaispn 
officer in Washington, and arrested by the Albanian security
services. 77
Although the operation in Albania marked the failure of 
covert intervention as part of a strategy of liberation, the 
meetings in London in May 1950 resulted in the expansion of 
British and American cooperation in the use of propaganda as a 
weapon in the Cold War. The meetings cemented the close personal 
ties between those senior British and American officials 
responsible for anti-communist propaganda, and revealed the 
extent of common thinking in the Foreign Office and the State 
Department regarding the use of propaganda. Barrett recorded in 
his own notes on the trip, that Britain and America now agreed 
"that informational activity, indeed psychological warfare, is 
becoming vitally important.' 78 As a result Britain and America 
agreed to maintain v close and continuous liaison' on all aspects 
of information policy. 79
The most important development was the decision to institute 
continuous liaison through the appointment of information liaison 
officers (ILO) to the British Embassy in Washington and the 
American Embassy in London. The IRD's Adam Watson was appointed
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ILO at the British Embassy in Washington in August 1950. 
According to Watson, his role was, "to explore every part of the 
field as best I could, and to see what could be done to bring 
American and British operations and long term planning as much 
into harmony as possible.' 80 In addition to liaison with the 
State Department, Watson's post involved a certain amount of work 
at the United Nations and liaison with the Voice of America in 
New York. Watson's counterpart at the US Embassy in London, 
W.F.Frye, was instructed to liaise with the British government 
on ^all aspects of current information activities, including 
broadcasting and certain special activities.' Both ILO's were 
also expected to make occasional field trips to attend regional 
meetings of information officers and maintain a personal 
knowledge of the operational problems of information work. 81
The most immediate result of the London talks was an 
increase in cooperation in the field. The State Department and 
the Foreign Office sent instructions to field missions regarding 
the talks and the desirability of extended cooperation. 82 Both 
expressed the importance of maintaining x freedom of action 1 in 
propaganda work, but as the State Department's circular 
indicated, there was a new policy for the closest possible 
cooperation short of joint operations:
While each government will retain complete freedom of 
action in conducting overseas information, there should be 
close cooperation wherever possible in support of common 
objectives. To this end there should be continuous 
exchange of ideas between the Department and the Foreign 
Office and between our missions abroad with a view to 
developing common lines of information policy, planning and 
conduct of activities. It was agreed, however, that such 
cooperation should normally stop short of joint information 
operations. 83
Despite the restriction on joint operations, it is apparent 
that in many countries the extent of cooperation in the planning 
and implementation of propaganda activities was such that joint 
activity was often undertaken. Indeed it is difficult to see how 
information staff could seek to develop common lines in 
information policy, and the planning, and conduct of operations 
without becoming involved in joint activity. In practice, rather 
than avoiding joint operations, British and American information
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staff in the field took great care to maintain the outward 
appearance of acting independently. A US review of field 
comments on cooperation with the British information services in 
August 1950 found that most posts agreed that, "no appearance 
should be given publicly of joint action either in policy 
formulation or programming. |B * Information officers were happy 
to exchange material and consult in private, but there was no 
question that they would seek to combine the output of their 
propaganda activities. In each case the State Department found 
information officers in the field were careful to maintain 
x individuality of output.' 85 The one notable exception to this 
rule was the Middle East. In response to Soviet propaganda which 
sought to highlight Anglo-American rivalry, it was agreed, x to 
lay on from time to time demonstrations of solidarity between the 
USA and UK in the Middle East. |86
In 1950, the Foreign Office and the State Department both 
completed reviews of British and American cooperation in 
propaganda work in the field. Both concluded that British and 
American information ' staff generally enjoyed ^cordial 
relations. 187 The Foreign Office review, which was concluded 
after the talks in London, found a significant expansion of 
cooperation followed the circular instruction outlining the 
result of the talks.
Though there has generally been goodwill before the 
arrival of the circular, and in some cases active 
cooperation, there is no doubt that it has led to a 
complete re-examination of what can be done and in 
many cases to more effective measures for joint 
consultation and the pooling of ideas and for mutual 
help in every possible way. As a result, regular 
discussions between the information staff have been 
arranged in most posts and the exchange of material 
and films has been placed on a regular footing. 88
The degree to which British and American information staff 
worked together continued to vary from post to post. In several 
cases cooperation involved a division of labour designed to avoid 
duplication of effort in, for example, press reading or the 
translation of propaganda material into local languages. 89 In 
other cases British staff provided the benefit of their 
experience regarding possible channels for the distribution of
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propaganda material. For example, the US Embassy in Bombay
reported that British information officers regularly commented
on local editors and "the editorial policies of Bombay
papers.' 90 Similarly, in Hong Kong, British information staff
provided information "relative to subversive activity among local
trade unions so that appropriate pamphlets and posters can be
more strategically distributed.' 91 In posts where cooperation
was even closer, British and American information staff agreed
to distribute each others propaganda material through their own
established channels. In Baghdad, the US Embassy reported, "we
have used certain anti-communist squibs from the British in our
Kurdish bulletin, they in turn have translated some of our Soviet
Affairs Notes material, notably the one on the treatment of
moslems in the USSR.' 92 One notable example which serves to
illustrate several aspects of liaison was Venezuela. British and
American information officers in Caracas inaugurated weekly
meetings in 1950. As a result of these meetings, the US Embassy
reported that the British Press Officer had many journalistic
acquaintances of long-standing, particularly in the provinces,
and "British press channels are somewhat more effective than
ours.' Consequently, it was agreed that anti-communist material
would be translated by the US embassy and given to the British
for distribution. Similar arrangements were made for the
distribution of material on religious persecution behind the Iron
Curtain, which the British passed to Venezuelan parish priests,
with whom they had long established contacts. As a result, the
US Embassy reported, this material often appeared in their weekly
sermons! 93
One area in which particularly close cooperation developed 
was South East Asia. By 1950 British officials concluded that 
since communism had been held in check in France and Italy, 
Western Europe was not the weak spot it had been, and South-East 
Asia was now "the softest spot in the world picture' 94 . The 
decline of the communist threat in Western Europe was, British 
officials believed, due in no small part to the anti-communist 
propaganda effort. On 1st August 1950, the Russia Committee paid 
tribute to the "revolution that has been achieved in the field
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of publicity.'
Partly by the compulsion of events, but also as a 
result of a deliberate counter-propaganda campaign, a 
majority of people, certainly in the English-speaking 
world and Western Europe and a growing number 
elsewhere have come to recognise communist aims and 
methods for what they are. . . Much remained to be done 
in the areas more vulnerable to communism, such as 
South-East Asia. 95
By 1950, the British already had a well established 
organisation for countering communism in South-East Asia. The 
British Government had become concerned about the spread of 
communism in the region following the outbreak of the Malayan 
Emergency in 1948. Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner 
General in South East Asia, was a powerful proponent of what 
later became known as the domino theory of communist expansion. 
The region he insisted should be viewed as a whole, the 
communists planned their actions on a theatre-wide basis and 
Britain should respond in a similarly coordinated manner. In 
late 1948, MacDonald advocated the creation of a regional centre 
to coordinate anti-communist propaganda activities throughout 
South-East Asia. 96 In May 1949, the IRD established a Regional 
Information Office (RIO) at the Commissioner General's 
headquarters at Phoenix Park in Singapore. Singapore was the 
centre for British defence forces east of Suez, and the 
Commissioner General's crowded headquarters at Phoenix Park 
already hosted local centres for the British intelligence and 
security services. 97 The RIO served as a central planning and 
production centre for propaganda, both anti-communist and 
positive, for South East Asia. It produced propaganda material 
"suitably prepared for Asiatic audiences' and where necessary in 
local languages which was passed to "local publicists for them 
to pass on to their own public in their own manner.' It used 
local contacts in the media, trade unions and youth 
organisations. It also passed background information on 
communism and Soviet policy "not of a secret nature but not 
normally available through public channels' to governments in the 
region. 98
In February 1950, as Britain's involvement in Malaya 
intensified, further regional coordination was provided by a
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Joint Information and Propaganda Committee (JIPC) which was 
established in Singapore. Its role was to coordinate the 
propaganda activities of all agencies involved in the campaign 
in Malaya to ensure they all "speak with one voice, ' and organise 
an effective counter to communist inspired propaganda throughout 
the region." In August 1950, following the outbreak of the 
Korean war, MacDonald also established a high level committee of 
British regional Governors which held monthly meetings at Bukit 
Serene to consider "the cold war as it affects us here.' 100 The 
committee devoted considerable time to the discussion of 
propaganda. One of its first meetings, in December 1950, was 
attended by Ralph Murray and Angus Malcolm, respectively heads 
of the Foreign Office's IRD and IPD. The committee informed 
Murray and Malcolm that British propaganda was "of great 
importance in helping maintain stability' in South-East Asia. 
The committee, they were told, regarded "all British propaganda 
here as being anti-communist in effect. 1 Although purely 
negative anti-communist propaganda was required, its impact was 
reinforced by a large volume of positive material, the latter was 
required "not only for its own sake, but in order that we may 
demonstrate how communism is inimical to the alternative way of 
life we offer. |101
The Americans were informed about the plans for the creation 
of the RIO as early as January 1949. loa Shortly after the RIO's 
creation, the IRD's Adam Watson wrote to its director John Rayner 
instructing him to take the Americans on the spot "fairly fully 
into your confidence' regarding the functions of the RIO. 103 
Cooperation between British and American information staff in 
South East Asia expanded considerably following the outbreak of 
the Korean war in June 1950. At talks in Washington in July, 
British and American information officials agreed on the 
importance of coordinating propaganda on Korea to avoid 
divergences of presentation. 104 Later that month, the State 
Department despatched special instructions to information 
officers in South East Asia on cooperation with the British RIO. 
These indicated a "wide area in which cooperation could 
contribute greatly to the achievement of common objectives. 1 It
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inaugurated a regular exchange of all propaganda material, 
particularly "special Chinese-language material' and information 
on groups which could receive locally prepared unattributable 
material. There was also some division of labour, with the 
Americans providing the product of their press monitoring service 
in Hong Kong, in exchange for British translation facilities in 
those posts maintaining such a service. 105
The Americans also began to build up their propaganda 
organisation in the region along similar lines to the British 
RIO. In November 1950, the US Consul General in Singapore 
recommended that he be kept informed of all USIS activities in 
the region so that he might be "in a position to supply RIO with 
information duplicating on the American side what RIO is 
receiving on the British side.' 106 British officials in 
Singapore and in Washington pressed the Americans to establish 
their own regional information office, and in 1951, a Far East 
Regional Production Centre with a similar remit to the British 
RIO was established in the US Embassy in Manila. 107 A Regional 
Liaison Officer, the highly respected Si Nadler, was appointed 
to keep Rayner informed of American propaganda activities in the 
region. 108 Early in 1951, British and American information 
staff also began to hold monthly meetings at Phoenix Park to 
consider proposals for joint activity. 109 A further level of 
liaison was established when the CIA opened a small station in 
Singapore in the early 1950s. 110
Cooperation in anti-communist propaganda did not, however, 
extend as far as Korea itself. On the outbreak of war the US 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, activated an interdepartmental 
information committee chaired by Edward Barrett who immediately 
turned over all the United States Information Service personnel 
in Korea to General MacArthur and effectively turned the 
committee into a psychological strategy board. 111 The handover 
of the State Department's information work to the Army rather cut 
the British out of psychological warfare in Korea. Although 
there was a proposal to attach a British representative to the 
US psychological warfare organisation in Korea, the military 
intelligence section (G-2) of the US 8th Army in Korea, jealously
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guarded its control of this activity. In June 1951, the IRD's 
Peter Wilkinson observed that, "as long as General Willoughby was 
in charge of G-2 there was little chance of any agreement being 
reached to British participation in the psychological warfare run 
by the American military authorities.' Wilkinson added that 
Willoughby would not even allow the CIA's covert action arm, the 
OPC, to operate in this theatre. 1" The US military did provide 
the British with extensive details of their psychological warfare 
activities in Korea. 113 Moreover, a Foreign Office review of 
information work in Korea concluded that Britain had no interests 
in Korea which were not identical with those of the Americans, 
and any service Britain could offer would be "hardly better than 
a poor duplication of the American effort. 1114
Whilst propaganda in Korea was largely controlled by the 
American military, Tony Shaw has shown that the British played 
an important supporting role in South-East Asia. Through the RIO 
in Singapore the British monitored the effect of events in Korea 
on audiences throughout South-East Asia and disseminated replies 
to communist propaganda through local channels. 115 In July 
1950, Paul Gore-Booth, the head of the British Information 
Service in Washington, told Rowland Sargeant the acting head of 
the State Department's information programme that Britain's 
propaganda aimed to "nail the main Communist lies' to the effect 
that: the South Koreans attacked first; the United States or 
South Koreans were premeditating aggression or action of any 
kind; that the Security Council's action was illegal under the 
UN Charter; that the action taken by the United States had even 
less justification; and the "peace 1 campaign can honestly be 
regarded as a genuine effort towards peace. 116
British propaganda on the Korean war also had an important 
secondary aim which was directed at the United States and 
reflected the desire of the British government to localise the 
conflict and rein in what many in Britain saw as a rising tide 
of anti-communism in the USA which threatened to extend the 
conflict to China or even the Soviet Union. The Foreign Office 
informed Rayner in Singapore that it wanted "to avoid giving any 
support to the tendency in some circles in America to regard the
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United Nations as a body to crusade against communism.' 117 In 
Washington, Gore-Booth informed Sargeant that although there was 
in the public mind "little doubt that the Soviet Government is 
in fact behind the Korean adventure,' British propaganda was 
based on the premise that "the Soviet Government should not be 
explicitly identified with the military aggression committed by 
North Korea. 1 They should, he wrote, do nothing which "would 
make it difficult for the Soviet Government to retreat from the 
support of North Korea.' 118 Britain's fears of a wider conflict 
receded, however, following the beginning of the armistice 
negotiations in July 1951. In discussions with USIS staff at the 
end of July, Rayner now agreed that British propaganda would 
stress the achievement of the United Nations in "putting a stop 
to Russian imperialist penetration in Asia,' and present the 
armistice as "a defeat for Stalin and the communist regime. 1119
From 1950, the British RIO and the US Information Service 
cooperated closely in the dissemination of anti-communist 
material in South-East Asia. In 1950, the IRD began production 
of a South-East Asian version of its unattributable weekly digest 
consisting of quotations of news and comment from the South-East 
Asian press and radio. 120 The RIO also distributed a large 
volume of pamphlets most of which appeared "without any 
publishers imprints and constitute our "discreet" 
publications. 1121 One pamphlet, produced by USIS, and 
distributed by the British RIO was entitled When the Communists 
Came and was targeted at the overseas Chinese, with stories of 
extortion and suicide among their families in China. 122 
Articles for which second rights had been obtained were 
despatched from London for distribution to the local English and 
vernacular press in Singapore, including, in December 1950, 12 
articles on China from the Manchester Guardian, which the RIO 
turned into a pamphlet in English and Chinese. 123 USIS and the 
RIO also distributed cheap imprints of prominent anti-communist 
literature in local languages. In June 1951, USIS informed 
British information staff that their new book translation 
programme intended to produce two Malay and twelve to fourteen 
Chinese volumes in the year. Notable subjects were Richard
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Crossman's edited volume of revelatory essays The God that 
Failed, and Orwell's Animal Farm. 124 The American information 
officer in Djakarta reported that the editor of the national 
newspaper Keng Po had received a copy of The God that Failed from 
the British Information Services. He had subsequently written 
two front page editorials on the book, and "pointedly commended 
it to the Chinese of Djakarta as worthwhile reading for those 
toying with communism.' 135
Most of this propaganda material was directed at the 
educated classes. MacDonald admitted in 1951, that the 
Commission-General had no contact with Chinese working classes 
in South-East Asia, and more innovative thinking was required to 
target the less educated. 136 Broadcasting clearly had a key 
role to play. In the early 1950s, the VOA had only modest medium 
wave broadcasts in the region, but the BBC Overseas Service was 
considered an important branch of overseas propaganda and was 
kept fully informed by the Foreign Office of the government 
propaganda line. 127 The British also had important contacts 
with local broadcasting services. A Director of Broadcasting 
jointly responsible to the Governments of Malaya and Singapore 
sat on the JIPC. In July 1951, he was provided with the first 
scripts of interviews with captured communist soldiers. 138 
There was also regular consultation regarding propaganda themes 
between the RIO and government controlled Radio Malaya. RIO 
advice was given in particular in connection with weekly series 
of broadcasts entitled "World Affairs' and "This is Communism' 
broadcast in English and various Chinese dialects. 139
Various visual formats were also used. The British 
government had employed film and newsreel to good effect in 
Malaya since 1948, and British newsreel coverage of Korea was 
intensive in the first sixth months of the conflict. 130 In July 
1951, USIS asked Rayner for documentary newsreels showing, 
through the mouth of a Chinese ex-communist soldier, how the 
Korean war had been planned in Moscow, the communist defeat, and 
separate documentaries on each Asian contingent in Korea. USIS 
also ran a "photo review' poster campaign for which they 
requested photographs of Chinese and Korean POWs. 131 The use of
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strip cartoons to illustrate the points made in the printed 
matter was one of the more innovative developments in targeting 
mass opinion in South-East Asia. A film and strip cartoon based 
on the booklet When the Communists Came was produced at the US 
Regional Production Center in Manila. 132 The RIO produced a 
weekly booklet, Inside Soviet China, which included cartoons 
depicting the effects of communism in China/ together with "two 
strip cartoons of our popular Chinese victim of communism, Mr 
Wang.' 133 Plans which were already underway to produce a strip 
cartoon version of Animal Farm were halted when Mrs Orwell's 
agent refused rights on the grounds that a commercial cartoon was 
already planned. The RIO's haste in undertaking this project 
before securing the rights caused some embarrassment in the 
Foreign Office, "because the agent has been most cooperative in 
granting us rights in this and other books.' 13 *
Alongside this considerable propaganda effort British and 
American authorities also worked together to censor opinion about 
China and the war in Korea. In December 1950, MacArthur's 
headquarters introduced direct censorship of military news. A 
Press Advisory Commission was established in Tokyo with the full 
support of the British authorities. In London, the IRD worked 
with the Foreign Office News Department to brief journalists on 
the conflict and when The Daily Worker ran a piece attacking 
Rhee's tyranny and implicitly criticising American policy, the 
Cabinet toyed with the idea of introducing draconian press laws 
banning journalism which brought "aid and comfort to the 
enemy. |13S In South-East Asia, British authorities were less 
chary about wielding their administrative power. In August 1950, 
the British High Commissioner and the Governor of Singapore 
claimed to have enough information to bring a case against two 
pro-communist newspapers in the territory. "The suppression of 
both newspapers' they concluded, "was highly desirable and if 
possible the timing should be coordinated.' 136 In Singapore the 
JIPC considered the control of films, gramophone records and 
songs from Chinese sources and agreed that films which "focused 
the loyalty of the Chinese audience on China,' were "undesirable 
and should be banned.' 137
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British and American cooperation in the production and
dissemination of anti-communist propaganda in South-East Asia was
the primary example of the kind of "close and continuous liaison'
agreed by Barrett and Warner in London in 1950. Britain and
America closely coordinated their propaganda activities in South
East Asia. Cooperation in the production and dissemination of
anti-communist propaganda material was aided by the existence of
a large British propaganda organisation in Singapore, and British
experience and contacts across the region. It is also apparent
that America's propaganda organisation and methods in South-East
Asia were in some degree modelled on the British effort. Both
powers, however, maintained an independent propaganda programme.
There were geographical divisions. The British were satisfied
to take a back-seat in Korea and America limited its propaganda
activities in Malaya. Britain also pursued an independent line
in its policy and propaganda with regard to the Soviet role in
the war in Korea, at least until mid-1951. Most importantly,
Britain and America were careful to maintain an independent
output. "Though collaborating closely in private,' wrote Rayner
in June 1951, "we continue our propaganda separately, in this way
getting the benefit of approaching our target with two separate
weapons.' 13a
The coordination of propaganda activities in the field was 
mirrored by close consultation on the development of anti- 
communist propaganda policies between London and Washington. 
Adam Watson was particularly successful as the ILO at the British 
embassy in Washington and he became an important link in the 
development of cooperation in anti-communist propaganda. Watson 
was a prodigious liaison officer, and established many 
influential contacts in Washington. He had, of course, visited 
Washington in January 1950, and had met Barrett and Stone in 
London in May. He began regular meetings at the State Department 
shortly after arriving in Washington in August 1950. 139 Watson 
also established contact with "certain sections of the CIA, ' most 
notably Frank Wisner of the OPC. Through his contacts with tfte 
CIA, Watson met C.D.Jackson, a highly connected psychological 
warfare veteran, who was a guiding hand behind the NCFE. Jackson
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went on to become Eisenhower's Special Assistant for 
psychological operations. He was, Watson wrote, "warmly 
anglophile 1 and the two "worked very closely together' under 
Truman and Eisenhower. 140 Watson's role became even more 
important in mid-1951 when his counterpart at the American 
embassy in London was relieved of his responsibilities. Frye, 
had failed to establish an effective role in London, and Watson 
proceeded to handle liaison in both directions. He informed the 
Foreign Office:
This means I have been playing the part of a broker: 
exploring the advantages which cooperation in various 
fields might bring, and trying to arrange it where 
desirable. I have been a strictly British broker, of 
course; but the Americans have not minded this. 141
Following a visit from the new head of the IRD, John Peck, 
in May 1951, Watson established liaison with the Psychological 
Strategy Board. During his visit, Peck had astutely recognised 
that the ongoing struggle in Washington for control of 
psychological operations had implications for cooperation with 
Britain and was keen for Watson to establish contact with the new 
PSB. Hitherto, Foreign Office cooperation in this field had, for 
the most part, been with the State Department, whose amenability 
was, according to Peck, "probably greater than that of the other 
governmental agencies concerned with psychological warfare.' 142 
Peck observed, and events in Korea supported his view, that if 
the international situation deteriorated and war became probable, 
"the controlling emphasis will shift from the State Department 
towards the Service Departments,' and Britain's influence would 
diminish. He was, therefore, keen to seize the initiative and 
establish close ties with the PSB and accustom them "to a policy 
of cooperation with the UK. 1143 In August 1951, Watson met with 
Gordon Gray, the newly appointed Director of the PSB, to request 
arrangements for liaison. 144 US officials were in favour of 
extending cooperation to include the PSB as long as it did not 
bring similar requests from other governments, and Watson was 
informed that he should liaise directly with Gray. 145 By the 
end of 1951 Watson had established contact, at very senior 
levels, with all of the principal agencies responsible for 
American psychological operations, both overt and covert.
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From his position in Washington, Watson was well placed to 
witness the elevation of propaganda in America's cold war 
strategy. In October 1950, he reported discussing "the new 
concept of influencing public opinion 1 which was developing among 
"the more thoughtful people concerned in the State Department. 1
More than one of the people concerned here has said to 
me that we must look on these activities as among the 
most important in all foreign policy. . . It was not just a question of "projecting America" but rather of 
seeing how public opinion in each country could be 
influenced so as to incline the Government more 
towards the policy which the US desired it to adopt 
and deter it from those policies which the US 
disliked. In many areas this might involve saying 
little about the United States itself. I will write 
more fully about this in the near future: it is a 
pretty new concept even in Washington and has hardly 
reached the field. But I will quote one remark of 
Stone's "I presume that the Projection of Britain is 
regarded as old time around Christopher Warner's 
office too?" 146
In June 1951, shortly after the creation of the PSB, Watson 
provided a more detailed overview of American thinking on 
political warfare. "The Americans,' he began, "have accepted 
"the struggle for men's minds" as a major feature of their 
general struggle with the Kremlin.' Psychological strategy, he 
stated, had now been given its due place alongside more 
traditional means of waging war. The Administration, he 
observed, was not merely concerned with minimising communist 
propaganda and subversion in the free world, Russia was "the 
heart of the matter. 1 Alongside the plans for propaganda 
advocated in the TROY project, Watson revealed that "other 
aspects of promoting and exploiting disorder inside the Soviet 
Union have been carefully studied.' These plans fitted into a 
broader American strategic concept on how war against Russia 
might be waged. The Americans he said were strongly opposed "to 
slogging the issue out on the plains of Northern Europe: what 
they call "rolling our troops down the old European bowling 
alley." 1 They were looking at other ways of weakening the Soviet 
drive in Europe:
A large proportion of the population of Central Asia 
and Western Siberia is made up of racial minorities, 
political exiles, discontented draft labour and forced
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labour. In war, the Americans seem to think these men 
could be supplied with arms and built up by radio into 
a serious though disconnected threat to Soviet power 
and especially communications with the Far East. 147
The Americans, Watson said, had told him many of the details 
of these schemes, and were "anxious for our cooperation not only 
in the event of war but also now during the preparatory 
period. |148
American officials were particularly keen to encourage 
British participation in Radio Free Europe. In London in 
September 1950, Frank Wisner and Robert Joyce of the OPC met with 
Christopher Warner, the IRD head Ralph Murray, and D.P. Reilly 
of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department. The Americans 
wanted the Foreign Office to join with them in organising Radio 
Free Europe, and pressed them to organise the large Russian and 
Eastern European exile groups in London along similar lines to 
the National Committee for a Free Europe. The Foreign Office 
were cautious about the American proposal and deferred their 
decision pending a closer investigation of the organisation and 
broadcasts of RFE. 149 In Washington, Watson was asked to 
provide details of the station's programmes and policy but warned 
to discourage further developments of the idea of cooperation. 
According to Murray, they had to consider, among other factors, 
"the damage we might be doing to ourselves by boosting Radio Free 
Europe at the expense of the services of the BBC.' 150 As a 
result of wartime experience, officials in London also remained 
cautious about getting involved with exile groups. In February 
1951, Murray informed Watson that they had "only just got some 
way in obtaining authorisation 1 to organise exiles and establish 
liaison with them, "the arrangements envisaged do not go beyond 
appointing a liaison official and providing some finance.' 151 
In a chilling reply, Watson wrote:
Kim Philby, George Jellicoe and I were all most 
interested... that you had obtained authorisation to 
proceed to organise the Eastern European exiles in the 
United Kingdom and to establish some liaison with 
them... in spite of a search we do not know anything 
about this development. Could you therefore please 
arrange for us to be informed?1"
Whilst the Americans went ahead with RFE alone, the Foreign
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Office undertook a detailed review of the service. BBC 
monitoring reports and a sample of RFE scripts provided by Watson 
were scrutinised by the Information Policy Department, who found 
that "their quality is quite good - most of it has been 
reasonably sound, dignified and unsensational stuff.' 153 From 
his contacts in the CIA, Watson also provided information on the 
general policy of RFE, and the extent of guidance exercised by 
the US government. This was, according to Watson "of a very 
general kind.' The exiles were allowed to write their own 
scripts, "subject to occasional warnings and requests,' but, he 
reassured the Foreign Office, "the squabbles and feuds between 
the various groups of exiles here' did not get on the air. 134 
C.D.Jackson impressed upon Watson the importance of RFE, and in 
March 1951, following discussions with Paul Gore-Booth, head of 
the British Information Services in America, Watson urged the 
Foreign Office not to "rebuff overtures from an organisation of 
this calibre to help with cooperation and advice. I15S Such 
cooperation, he added, need not be publicly known. There was 
also, he argued, no reason why RFE should damage the BBC.
If it is recognised that the BBC and the Voice of 
America can shoot into the same target from different 
angles, there must also be a place for a broadcast 
which is not that of a free western power but of 
exiles from the country itself who have found refuge 
abroad. Since the approach is so different, I do not 
see that we should lose anything in effecting an 
improvement in the quality of Radio Free Europe 
broadcasts , 156
The following month C.D.Jackson called on Warner in London. 
He described current and planned RFE services, and agreed a 
programme for cooperation with the British. British missions 
would be asked for comments on the effectiveness of RFE 
transmissions, and this information would be passed to Jackson 
through Watson. In return Jackson would provide the Foreign 
Office with RFE policy directives, and details of any Eastern 
Europeans resident in the UK whom RFE proposed to employ. The 
British Government's comments on these individuals, Jackson 
added, would be welcome. It was agreed that a representative of 
the RFE's editorial organisation in Munich would visit IRD in 
London to discuss "material requirements, ' and that an IRD
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official might visit Munich. 157 At a meeting with Wisner and 
Jackson in Washington in July 1951, British officials agreed that 
the Foreign Office would supply news and "discreet advice 1 to a 
RFE correspondent who was about to be appointed to London. 
Jackson also asked the Foreign Office help him to hand-pick 
people for the new Hungarian and Polish services, as some of "the 
best Poles for the purpose 1 were in London. 158 British 
cooperation was, however, to remain strictly confidential. 
Warner made it clear that any official British connection with 
RFE, "must be kept secret and also the British official origin 
of any material we supply.' 159 Although the offer for the 
Foreign Office to participate in RFE remained open, the 
possibility of putting British representation inside RFE was 
problematic as long as there was no emigre organisation in London 
to act as a front for Foreign Office involvement. B.A.B. 
Burrows, the British Information Officer in Washington, observed 
in July 1951, although the CIA assisted RFE and even had men in 
the organisation, the NCFE had an independent existence and its 
own funds. Consequently, the US Government could claim it was 
an unofficial organisation for which they were not responsible.
If, however, we put someone into Radio Free Europe he 
would in present circumstances have to be either 
directly dependent on the Foreign Office or some other 
government organisation, and if H.M.Government were 
asked questions in Parliament about it they could 
probably not say they had nothing to do with it. This 
would in the American view, gravely prejudice the 
whole operation. 160
The Americans, Burrows said, found the NCFE an 
"indispensable buffer' between themselves and RFE, and pressed 
the British Government to establish a similar buffer. Although 
the IRD were keen on the idea, Bevin turned down IRD's 
recommendation that they should enter into an "informal 
relationship' with the East European section of the European 
Movement, which was headed by Harold Macmillan. IRD put the 
suggestion up again to Bevin's successor Herbert Morrison, who 
was similarly cautious of involvement with exile politics. 161 
It was not until late 1952, under Churchill's leadership that the 
Foreign Office was given permission to provide financial support 
for a new Central-Eastern European Committee of the European
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Movement, with Richard Law MP as President and the former 
Ambassador to the USSR, Sir David Kelly as Secretary General. 
This Committee, the Americans hoped, "would try to coordinate 
long-range activities... with that of its American opposite 
number. ' 16a
Prior to this, although there was no official Foreign Office 
involvement in RFE, informal contact was maintained. Sir lan 
Jacob of the BBC Overseas Services, met C.D.Jackson in April 1951 
and agreed to keep Warner informed of the BBC's contacts with 
RFE. 1" IRD representatives visited RFE in September 1951, and 
in February 1952, the veteran British propaganda expert, Robert 
Bruce-Lockhart provided IRD with a detailed account of his own 
independent tour of RFE. 164 Some degree of institutional 
contact was provided in August 1951, when Mr Ramsey of IRD was 
offered a post as a RFE correspondent in Germany. Following 
discussions with the intelligence section of RFE, it was agreed 
that Ramsey might also "serve as an unofficial link between RFE 
and IRD.' Ramsey, IRD observed, was keen to accept the position, 
not least because the pay was over five times what he was earning 
at the Foreign Office! 1"
In addition to support for exile broadcasting, the US 
Government sought British assistance in the development of the 
Ring Plan. When Peck visited Washington in May 1951, he met with 
representatives of the State Department, the CIA, the PSB and 
VGA. In the course of these discussions Peck was given a 
detailed overview of American offensive psychological operations 
and the objectives of the Ring Plan. The aim of these 
operations, he was told, was to "make things as difficult as 
possible for the Soviet government in their relations with their 
satellites and with their own people.' 166 The objectives of the 
Ring Plan, Peck discovered went beyond planning for psychological 
operations in peacetime. It was, he observed, "an essential part 
of military preparedness 1 for war. In addition to fostering 
discontent in the Soviet bloc, the Ring Plan had three further 
objectives: to divert Soviet electronic research into seeking 
means of countering the American operations; and in the event of 
war, to create a secure wireless link around the world for use
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by American and allied armed forces; and provide a means of 
establishing contact with the Russian people for psychological 
warfare purposes. Peck also heard of a plan, "still in the 
discussion stage,' to use the ring of transmitters as part of a 
combined military and psychological warfare operation directed 
at the "soft under-belly' of the Soviet Union, those regions east 
and north-east of the Caspian sea, "with the aim of detaching tfte 
subject peoples of the region from the Soviet Union and virtually 
cutting it in half.' 1"
The Americans, Peck reported were quite clear regarding the 
assistance Britain could provide in developing the Ring Plan.
They frankly look to us for help in negotiating the 
necessary permission to build radio stations in those 
parts of the world where we have influence, e.g. 
India, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf. 168
Peck, however, was a little taken aback at the wholly 
offensive nature of America's plans for psychological operations. 
He was surprised that although it was clear the Americans 
"intended to go ahead vigorously, both on political and military 
grounds with their preparations for offensive psychological 
warfare,' their approach to defensive operations in the free 
world were, "tentative and uncertain.' Moreover, the operations 
described to Peck, including the Ring Plan, revealed a general 
blurring in American plans between peacetime psychological 
operations and preparations for war. Although the Americans were 
anxious to stress that they aimed to avoid any incitement to 
premature revolt, Peck was concerned that it was not always clear 
whether American psychological operations were intended to be 
part of a plan leading up to open warfare, or whether it was 
hoped they would make war less likely.
Those that I talked to appeared genuinely anxious to 
avert another world war, but they certainly do not 
consider the present situation, in which tens of 
thousands of Americans have been killed in Korea and 
a vast effort is being made to defend America and 
Western Europe, as peace. They have no hesitation in 
seeking to deploy against Russia in peacetime a 
psychological warfare effort as vigorous as that being 
deployed by Russia against the free world. They do 
not think this effort makes world war any more likely; 
but they hope that, if war comes, their current PW 
efforts will have contributed substantially to
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weakening the Russian war effort and strengthening 
that of the free world. 169
Reaction to the Ring Plan in London was decidedly mixed. 
There was a good deal of scepticism as to whether it would be 
effective in overcoming Soviet jamming, and opinions differed as 
to whether the plan was provocative. The Permanent Under- 
Secretary's Department (PUSD) doubted that the plan would be 
successful, but worried that, if it was, the Soviets, "might feel 
compelled to take counter-action.' The PUSD brief on the Ring 
Plan placed it alongside such clearly provocative measures as the 
establishment of US bases in Norway. 170 Foreign Office regional 
departments also identified local political difficulties 
regarding the location of broadcasting facilities. Warner had 
told the Americans that the output of stations in the Middle East 
needed to be carefully monitored to avoid reference to 
controversial political issues such as Palestine. Bahrein was 
felt to be a poor choice because of the need to avoid provoking 
Persian sovereignty claims over the state. 171 The Foreign 
Office Eastern Department also rejected the option of Kuwait on 
the grounds that the regime there was already unstable. They 
concluded that Anglo-American broadcasting would serve to "focus 
upon Kuwait the attentions of all those subversive and communist- 
inspired elements in the Middle East,' this would not only 
"imperil the stability of the present regime but would be likely 
to put in jeopardy both the oil operations and the station 
itself.' 172 The IRD disagreed with the PUSD, and did not 
believe the plan to be provocative. Notwithstanding local 
political concerns, the IRD did not object to the Ring Plan, and 
pursued a policy of "cautious cooperation.' 173 Although they 
accepted that broadcasts that could not be jammed easily might 
be seen as "a good deal more provocative than broadcasts which 
could be jammed, ' IRD officials dismissed the idea that the 
erection of a ring of transmitters was in itself provocative. 174
The IRD's policy of cooperation was, however, almost 
fundamentally undermined by the Foreign Secretary, Herbert 
Morrison in September 1951. The lack of progress in securing 
arrangements for broadcasting facilities in Bahrein and Kuwait,
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following the Barrett-Warner talks, meant that by the spring of 
1951 the Americans had already begun to doubt British cooperation 
in developing the Ring Plan. In September 1951, Morrison visited 
Washington and took with him the Permanent Under-Secretary' s 
Department brief on the Ring Plan. As a result Morrison informed 
Acheson, "we would regard as provocative any scheme for ringing 
the Soviet Union with broadcasting transmitters.' Acheson and 
the State Department were, to say the least, somewhat taken aback 
by Morrison's assertion. The US Embassy in London reported that 
the Secretary of State had been "shocked' by Morrison's 
statement, not least because the Foreign Office, "had been kept 
fully informed of the project for a considerable time and had not 
raised any objections in principle.' 175 The IRD were similarly 
alarmed. They had not been consulted prior to the Foreign 
Secretary's visit to Washington, and the PUSD brief had not been 
cleared in draft form by either the IPD or the IRD. To the 
obvious relief of Acheson and the IRD, the issue was resolved by 
the election of the Conservatives in October 1951. On the 5th 
of November, the IRD's J.W.Nicholls wrote:
I accordingly recommend that we should authorise 
Washington to tell the State Department that Mr 
Morrison's remarks on this subject should not be taken 
as meaning that we were against the project in 
principle; that the doubts that we had expressed on 
previous occasions about particular aspects of the 
scheme (e.g. the proposal for a transmitter in the 
Persian Gulf) were based solely on practical 
considerations and were certainly not mere pretexts to 
conceal any fundamental objection to the scheme; and 
that, so far as provocation was concerned, it was in 
our opinion the uses to which the transmitters were 
put rather than their mere existence which would have 
to be handled with caution. 176
British cooperation with the Ring Plan was not the only 
concern American officials had regarding Britain's commitment to 
the anti-communist propaganda offensive. Whilst American 
propaganda activities had expanded, there had been a gradual 
reduction in British information expenditure since 1947. In 
September 1950, Foreign Office officials expressed "grave 
concern 1 at the effect of successive cuts in the information 
budget. 177 Annual cuts since 1947, coupled with rising costs 
meant that by 1950 the information services had reached the point
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at which there were insufficient funds to maintain basic 
services. At the end of 1950 the Foreign Office information 
departments, the BBC and the Central Office of Information had 
no money left for new campaigns. Even if no further cuts were 
made it would, they claimed, be impossible to carry out work 
planned for 1950 and 1951. The Foreign Office also pointed out 
that the United States Government was stepping up its propaganda 
activities around the world. It would, the Foreign Office 
suggested, vbe difficult to maintain our present close and 
friendly collaboration 1 if the United States was left to take the 
burden of anti-communist propaganda. Moreover, in a phrase which 
echoed the 1948 Cabinet paper, it claimed:
it is important in our and common interest that we, as 
Europeans and with our special knowledge of the Middle 
East and Far East and South East Asia, should be able 
to influence United States planning and day-to-day 
publicity just as we influence United States policy. 178
The Foreign Office proposed that a reserve fund of £250,000 
be created to cover expenses not covered in the previous year's 
estimates. 179 In support of this proposal officials stressed 
that Britain had entered an "acute phase of the struggle against 
Communism, ' in which the Government were obliged to devote large 
sums to all aspects of the country's defences, including 
propaganda:
It is a commonplace that one of the most powerful 
weapons in the Soviet and Communist armoury is the 
propaganda weapon.. . It follows that the publicity arm 
should be an equally important branch of the defence 
of the West. The Cabinet recognised this when they 
laid down their overseas publicity directive in 
January 1948. Since then the Communist propaganda 
campaign has been greatly extended and intensified... 
The burden of our own publicity organs has been 
correspondingly increased. 18 °
The Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Gaitskell was not 
convinced and more drastic cuts were to follow. In January 1951, 
faced with the burden of contributing forces to the war in Korea 
the Cabinet reluctantly approved a massive programme of 
rearmament amounting to £4700 million over three years. This was 
funded by large cuts in government spending not least in the 
health services. 181 It also prompted a reevaluation of
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Britain's overseas information activities. It was Gaitskell's 
view that expenditure on propaganda could be dispensed with more 
easily than other areas of Britain's defence. "We could afford 
"no frills" at the present time', he asserted. The cost of the 
information services were a frequent target for Parliamentary 
criticism and propaganda he believed could be sacrificed without 
serious effect. Far from sanctioning further funding Gaitskell 
suggested a cut of £2million in overall information expenditure, 
and even proposed dismantling the British Council. 1" Although 
the eventual cuts in information expenditure for 1951-1952 were 
closer to £1.4 million, 183 and the British Council was saved, 
the Foreign Office noted with some bitterness that the danger 
from communist propaganda had been largely ignored: "the Treasury 
attitude is "Let us avoid war by all means, provided that it does 
not cost more than £10.5m." ' 184
As the Foreign Office suggested, the Americans were indeed, 
concerned about the proposed reductions. The State Department 
heard of Gaitskell's proposed cuts from Watson early in 1951, and 
quickly sought to impress upon the British the importance of 
maintaining their propaganda effort. Barrett suggested the State 
Department "exert a little pressure 1 to keep the British from 
cutting their budgets, and also asked the OPC "to indicate 
through your channels, the deep concern with which the US 
Government has heard this news.' 185 In February 1951, Acheson 
wrote to Frye, instructing him "to inform Strang personally at 
first opportunity for informal conversation that all our plans 
count heavily on British psychological warfare as important part 
joint defence effort.' 186 Frye replied two days later, after 
having discussed the matter with Murray and Warner. They had 
told him that some cuts in the information budget were 
inevitable, but that although this would result in some paring 
of staff from anti-communist propaganda activities, the cuts 
would be targeted at Britain's positive propaganda work. Murray 
mentioned that Latin American services might be cut down to Press 
Offices only, except for Venezuela where IRD maintained a 
regional centre. The most drastic cuts would be in British 
Council support, and the BBC overseas services would be affected,
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short term cuts in Western Europe would only be made if necessary 
and anti-communist propaganda would be the least affected. 187 
When US embassy officials finally spoke to Strang late in 
February 1951 he was more forceful in reassuring them that anti- 
communist activities would not be affected. He repeated that 
wherever possible cuts would be made in the British Council and 
the BBC and assured the Americans that "no (repeat no) cuts are 
planned in direct anti-communist activities and there even may 
be some expansion in this field.' 188
"Combatting Communism'
The Development of British Political Warfare. 1951 
Strang was not being disingenuous. In the course of 1951, 
whilst stringent cuts were applied to other areas of Britain's 
information activities, the anti-communist propaganda campaign 
expanded. Under the financial pressure of rearmament the Foreign 
Office was successful in presenting anti-communist propaganda 
activities as an essential part of Britain's defence. As 
propaganda work as a whole was pared down, the main focus of 
Britain's overseas propaganda shifted away from the "Projection 
of Britain,' and combatting communism became the principal 
function of the British Government's propaganda both at home and 
abroad.
In May 1951, Patrick Gordon-Walker took over from Morrison 
as Minister with overall responsibility for the information 
services. Gordon-Walker was determined that "all our publicity 
should be geared to the cold war.' 189 He chaired two new 
ministerial committee' s which were created to deal with the 
domestic and overseas information services. In July 1951, 
Gordon-Walker presented the Cabinet with a paper on information 
policy which called for "a renewed and vigorous information 
campaign in this country.' Its principal aim was to counter the 
"uncertainty and confusion in the public mind 1 regarding the 
basis and economic implications of Britain's foreign policy.
What therefore we have to do is to bring home to our 
people with greater emphasis and persistence than has 
yet been done the true nature of the Soviet regime and 
the real motives behind Soviet behaviour in 
international affairs. Only if we successfully bring 
home to our people the root cause of our policies will
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they sufficiently accept the need for rearmament and 
all that it implies. 190
Gordon-Walker also ordered an enquiry into Britain's 
overseas propaganda activities. In July 1951, the IRD presented 
him with a detailed overview of Britain's anti-communist 
propaganda operations. 191 It documented a substantial 
propaganda effort by the IRD, and a considerable expansion of the 
department's work since the launch of the new propaganda policy 
in 1948. In January 1948, the Foreign Office had been instructed 
to conduct propaganda designed to: expose the myth of the Soviet 
workers paradise and reveal the real conditions of life under 
Soviet rule; to promote the virtues of British social democracy; 
and encourage resistance to communism in the free world. To 
these themes, the IRD had added propaganda about: Britain's 
defence arrangements; the Brussels Treaty and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisations; and in addition to the "Projection of 
Britain,' propaganda "about the virtues of the western way of 
life.' 192
The IRD's output had also expanded considerably. By 1951, 
the IRD was producing four main types of propaganda material: 
detailed "Basic Papers' for dissemination to opinion formers; the 
"Digest 1 which was issued in English, French, Italian, Spanish 
and Greek with a total circulation of nearly 2000 copies per 
week; specially commissioned or second rights articles; and 
miscellaneous publications such as Points at Issue, a "handbook 
of comment on Soviet and communist behaviour and practice, ' which 
had gone through five editions since 1949, a total print run of 
32,000. 193 During 1951, there had also been some interesting 
additions to the IRD's output. A new Defence Digest was created 
to provide Ministers with material to sustain public support for 
rearmament. This interdepartmental production, with 
contributions from the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence, 
emerged from the briefing group on rearmament. 194 In November 
a fortnightly Religious Digest was launched. It was intended to 
cover the communist attitude to all religions, although as most 
states under communist control had been Catholic, the first 
editions had a heavy bias towards Catholicism. 195
The most notable new project was the first in the series of
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Background Books. Book publishing was one of the IRD's favoured 
methods. The Foreign Office believed that the public would more 
readily accept information which did not emanate from official 
sources, and the most effective propaganda was attributable to 
authoritative or prominent authors. The IRD's early work in this 
field included the publication of R.N.Carew-Hunt's The Theory and 
Practice of Communism, which had been written as an internal 
guide when Carew-Hunt served in the intelligence service. 196 
The IRD had also sought to buy up and distribute foreign editions 
of prominent anti-communist literature such as, Animal Farm and 
The God that Failed. 197 Securing copyright for existing works, 
however, was often complicated and expensive. By commissioning 
its own work, the Foreign Office and British missions abroad were 
free to make local arrangements for the printing, translation and 
distribution of the Background Books.
The Background Books series ran until 1970, and comprised 
almost 100 titles. They were edited by Stephen Watts a former 
MIS officer and published by Batchworth Press, Phoenix House, and 
most widely and stylishly by Bodley Head. It was to all intents 
and purposes a Foreign Office venture. 198 It is apparent that 
in many cases IRD directly commissioned Background Books from 
trusted confidential contacts, often with a secret service or 
Foreign Office background, such as Robert Bruce Lockhart, and 
Christopher Mayhew. 199 The IRD also provided commissioned 
authors with source material. Brian Crozier, who later worked 
as an IRD consultant, has described how, whilst working for The 
Economist in the 1960s, he "transformed a thick folder of IRD 
documents into a short book called Neo-Colonialism.' Crozier 
added that books produced in this manner would be vetted by IRD 
officials to ensure that secret material had been removed. 200 
Most importantly, the whole series was financially supported by 
the IRD who bought up vast quantities of each title for 
distribution abroad.
This series of small pocket-sized books became the IRD's 
most ambitious publishing venture. A prefatory note on the cover 
stated:
These little books are designed to provide ordinary 
people, interested in what is going on in the world
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today, with some background information about events, 
institutions and ideas. They will not interpret 
current history for you but they will help you to 
interpret it for yourself. Background Books will 
range widely in subject, dealing with what lies at the 
root of the questions thinking people are asking, 
filling in the background without which world affairs 
today cannot be properly seen or judged. 201
The first volume entitled What is Communism?, by an 
anonymous "Student of Affairs' was sent to British posts in 
February 1951. It was, according to IRD, "an anti-communist work 
written in dispassionate style and therefore more acceptable to 
waverers and fellow travellers who recant from arguments more 
trenchantly expressed. 1202 In total the Foreign Office sent 
3,169 copies to British posts, the Colonial Office took a further 
10,000. Copies were also freely provided to the United States, 
the American Embassy in Caracas, for example, agreed to print 
5000 copies. It was followed shortly afterwards by Trade Unions 
- True or False? by Victor Feather, Why Communism Must Fail a 
symposium of essays by Bertrand Russell, Leonard Schapiro, 
Francis Watson, W.N.Ewer and C.D.Darlington, and Cooperatives 
True or False? by J.A.Hough. Posts were asked to seek local 
publishers for the series, and offer copyright "as a minor 
inducement.' Profit was clearly not a consideration, the Foreign 
Office added, "if a means of publication offers itself which 
requires financial help within reason, let us know, and we will 
see what can be done. 1203
In addition to its editorial activities the IRD had also 
assiduously cultivated recipients for its material. The IRD, 
Gordon-Walker was told, worked, "through all available channels 
to ensure that the facts about Soviet aims and methods are known 
as widely as possible.' 204 Internally the IRD briefed British 
spokesmen, Ministers, and delegations to United Nations 
organisations and international conferences. In 1951, it began 
to brief all Heads of Missions on their appointment, and close 
cooperation was developed between Heads of Missions, Labour 
Attaches and Information Officers. 205 It was also responsible 
for day to day monitoring of Soviet propaganda and for initiating 
counter-act ion when necessary, either through the Foreign Office 
News Department, a Ministerial statement, a question in
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Parliament, or instructions to British missions abroad. IRD 
material was disseminated widely to other government departments, 
and British missions. Regional centres for the adaptation and 
translation of IRD material had been established in Singapore, 
Cairo, Buenos Airies and Caracas. There was, IRD reported, still 
a "growing tendency 1 for foreign governments to cooperate with 
British missions in anti-communist activities. 206
There had however, been a significant, if predictable, 
change in the IRD's methods since 1948. Mayhew and Bevin's 
instruction that British propaganda should be directed at the 
broad masses of workers and peasants in Europe and Asia had been 
dropped. Foreign Office officials who were more accustomed to 
directing information at opinion forming elites had always been 
sceptical about this policy. Since 1948, in practice the IRD had 
gradually reverted back to the entrenched Foreign Office view 
that, "it is better to influence those that can influence others 
than to attempt a direct appeal to the mass of the 
population."07 The paper drafted for Gordon-Walker gave the 
clearest summation of Foreign Office thinking on this subject.
[I ].n any organised community there are certain leaders 
on whom the general public depends for a large part of 
its thinking. These leaders and the confidence 
reposed in them by the public are the key to any 
campaign of indoctrination. By working through them, 
the appearance of official propaganda is avoided. In 
a western state the greater part fall into the 
following categories :- minister and members of 
parliament, trade union leaders, churchmen, editors 
and journalists, certain professors and teachers, and 
leading public figures... To conduct an indoctrination 
campaign effectively and economically it is necessary 
to impress upon these groups the importance and 
urgency of the operation, to enlist their cooperation, 
and provide them with all necessary material facts and 
arguments. 208
In January 1952, British diplomats were informed, that 
combatting communism was no longer simply a publicity task and 
should not be left to Information Officers. "The task is one in 
which all the principal members of a Mission have a duty to 
participate.' The greater part of the IRD material was no longer 
designed for dissemination to the general public, but rather 
aimed to "enable or assist recognised leaders of public
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opinion... to influence their own following.' As all diplomatic 
staff had access to local opinion formers, they should all work 
to ensure the widespread dissemination of IRD material. These 
contacts, it was suggested, should be encouraged to turn to them 
for "reliable and accurate advice on the technical and general 
aspects of enlightening public opinion about Communism.' 209
The IRD had developed contacts with many of these leaders 
of opinion, at home and abroad, including the Labour and 
Conservative party headquarters, 210 the TUC and through them the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the British 
Council of Churches, the Quakers, the National Peace Council, and 
"certain selected scientists.' The purpose of these contacts was 
to ensure that those individuals and organisations who wished to 
combat communism had the necessary factual material, "which they 
can work on in their own way to make acceptable and 
comprehensible to their particular target audience.' In certain 
cases, the trade unions, for example, IRD sought to provide 
material which "may induce leaders to take administrative action 
against Communists.' 211 Cooperation with the BBC had become 
particularly important, as this was the only means the Foreign 
Office had for directing propaganda at the communist bloc. There 
was, Gordon-Walker was informed, "very close contact' at all 
levels from the Director-General of the Overseas Services down 
to regional editors and desks.
Not only is the broad policy of their broadcasts to 
the Communist countries agreed but they welcome 
suggestions, criticism and discussion; the Regional 
Editors attend regular meetings with the political 
departments of the Foreign Office; His Majesty's 
Missions in the Communist countries send special 
telegrams designed for the BBC; and there is a regular 
correspondence between His Majesty's Missions and the 
BBC on the subj ect of the BBC's foreign language 
broadcasts to each particular country. 212
The defining characteristic of the IRD's methods remained 
unchanged. Its output was "grey 1 propaganda, disseminated 
discreetly and to be used without attribution. The restriction 
forbidding disclosure of the fact that Britain was distributing 
ant i-communist material through official channels had been lifted 
in December 1949, but there had been no change in the IRD's
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methods. 213 The IRD proudly boasted to Gordon-Walker, that 
"during the three years since it was set up the fact that His 
Majesty's Government is conducting anti-communist publicity 
operations has been successfully concealed from the public at 
home and abroad.' 214 This was not entirely true. References to 
the British anti-communist propaganda campaign had appeared in 
the Eastern European press in 1948. More remarkably Barrett's 
trip to London in May 1950 had been prominently featured in the 
New York Times, and was followed by an article in Pravda. 215 In 
September 1951, the IRD head, John Peck, told a meeting of 
European information officers, "the communists themselves were 
aware of what we were doing.' Nevertheless, he added, "it was 
essential to avoid public discussion at home or abroad of 
H.M.G.'s ant i-communist work.' 216 The Foreign Office remained 
committed to a discreet strategy based on the assumption that, 
"the public has a tendency to react against officially issued 
information. |217
Given the IRD's size, and the scale of its activity, it is 
perhaps surprising that there were not more leaks. By 1951, the 
scope of the IRD's activities was clearly considerable, and 
remarkable when viewed against the substantial cuts in other 
areas of British propaganda. What had begun in 1948 as "a small 
section in the Foreign Office' had by 1951 grown into one of the 
largest departments in the Foreign Office. Most significantly, 
the IRD's expansion reveals how important propaganda had become 
in Britain's Cold War strategy. As the IRD's activities had 
expanded the Foreign Office had also developed a more expansive 
definition of the role of propaganda in British foreign policy. 
This definition was more in line with the American conception of 
psychological operations than the Foreign Office's traditional 
view of propaganda as a useful tool of diplomacy. British 
overseas propaganda was no longer simply used to publicise 
British achievements, and counter communist misrepresentations. 
Like the Americans, the Foreign Office now advocated a strategy 
which elevated propaganda alongside diplomacy and military power 
as part of a coordinated political warfare offensive. Propaganda 
was no longer simply an adjunct to British foreign policy but an
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essential and indivisible part of a combined strategy for 
combatting global communism.
This shift towards a combined political warfare offensive 
was outlined in the IRD's memorandum for Gordon-Walker. The 
phrase "anti-communist propaganda,' the IRD argued, was now an 
s incomplete and in some respects misleading' description of the 
department's activities. Firstly, it was not communism they were 
seeking to counter but the aggressive aims of the Soviet 
government, which operated through communist parties and 
communist controlled organisations. Communism was "merely a 
technique of political agitation 1 used by the Soviet government, 
alongside other rallying cries such as "peace,' it merely served 
as "a convenient umbrella for such diverse activities as sabotage 
and fomenting disunity in the West. 1 Secondly, as political, 
military and propaganda activities were interconnected in the 
Soviet strategy of political warfare, it was insufficient to 
counter it with propaganda alone, "propaganda and diplomacy must 
go hand in hand, and the Soviet military threat must be 
counterbalanced.'
To "counter communism", therefore, what is required is 
a worldwide operation of factual indoctrination, 
sufficient military strength to eliminate fear of 
aggression as a motive for listening to Communist 
arguments, and sufficient police and internal security 
precautions and democratic vigilance to ensure that 
there is no forcible interference with the sources of 
knowledge; on the positive side measures to sustain a 
hope of economic improvement and to promote an 
understanding of and enthusiasm for the democratic way 
of life are no less important. 218
By the end of 1951, the Foreign Office was moving closer to 
the US position regarding the use of propaganda as a weapon to 
undermine Soviet rule behind the Iron Curtain. In October 1951, 
the Conservatives had returned to power, under Winston Churchill. 
Churchill had made it clear that he believed world tension could 
be relaxed, and war avoided, by seeking a negotiated settlement 
with the Soviet Union on a range of issues. 319 Almost 
immediately on taking office, Churchill was presented with a 
detailed Foreign Office review of British policy towards the 
Soviet Union. This review, prepared by the Permanent Under- 
Secretary's Committee (PUSC), sought to dampen Churchill's
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enthusiasm for a negotiated settlement by arguing that the West 
was not yet in a position to negotiate from strength. It raised 
the possibility of a counter-attack against the Soviets involving 
covert action designed to "compress and disrupt' the Soviet bloc, 
but stopped short of advocating a strategy of liberation, such 
as that favoured by the United States. "Operations designed to 
liberate the satellites are impracticable and would involve 
unnecessary risks. 1 Nevertheless, it argued, useful measures 
could be taken, including, "intensified psychological warfare 
operations', to "cause trouble and disturbance in the 
satellites. 1 Although this policy was along similar lines to 
the US strategy of liberation, the United States it suggested, 
"will probably wish to go faster and further' than Britain. 
Britain should, therefore, be prepared to exert a moderating 
influence." 0
Whilst the PUSC review was being prepared, the IRD was 
revising its own policy for anti-communist propaganda operations. 
In December 1951, a revised version of the memorandum presented 
to Gordon-Walker, questioned whether British propaganda should 
be more offensive. There was, it argued, a certain dualism in 
British propaganda policy, in that it attacked communism but was 
not concerned with the internal regimes of the Soviet Union and 
other communist dominated countries. It suggested that Britain 
should not be content to attack communist subversion in the free 
world, but should "attack communist regimes wherever they are 
found. ' It argued that British propaganda should be based on the 
assumption that Soviet communism was "a wicked system 1 and hold 
out some hope of bringing about some "fundamental change in the 
Soviet Union... and that the peoples of the satellite countries 
need not endlessly suffer under their present regimes.'
It would mean that the aim of our propaganda to 
communist countries should be to weaken the existing 
regimes and that subject to the policy considerations 
of the moment, we should openly in our propaganda to 
the Soviet Union and the satellite countries adopt the 
line that they live under a tyranny from which we wish 
to see them free themselves."1
Such a policy, it was argued, would prevent a "widening 
divergence' between Britain and America in the field of
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propaganda. It would allow Britain to agree with the general 
American approach to "psychological operations.' As the PUSC 
review had suggested, it would also allow Britain to exert a 
restraining influence over American operations, "to ensure that 
they were well planned and well worked and did not by rashness, 
blatant inaccuracy, and lack of constant adaptation, do more harm 
than good. |2 "
This marked the beginning of a new phase in Britain's anti- 
communist propaganda policy, in which a more offensive strategy 
of political warfare was developed, often in cooperation with the 
United States Government."3 The new strategy was heralded in 
a circular letter to Heads of Missions from the Permanent Under- 
secretary, William Strang, on 30th January 1952."* It was, 
Strang wrote, almost four years since British Missions had been 
informed of the new propaganda policy and the establishment of 
the IRD. The department's functions were at that time expected 
to be an extension of Britain's existing propaganda policy. "In 
the last year or so, ' he wrote, "it has become apparent that the 
task is essentially a combined operation calling for a joint 
diplomatic and propaganda approach.' Strang reassured British 
diplomats that Churchill's much publicised plans for an 
accommodation with the Soviet leadership did not mean that "we 
have felt able to revise our basic assumption' regarding the 
long-term aims of the Stalinist regime. Nor, he wrote, should 
the recent cuts in information budgets give rise to the 
impression that the Government was relaxing its efforts to 
counter Soviet political warfare.
I want in the first place to reassure you that so far 
from curtailing their activities in this field the 
Government are resolved to continue their efforts to 
the highest possible degree." 5
Moreover, the objectives of Britain's propaganda policy had 
changed. The short term aim remained largely the same, that was, 
to increase knowledge of the true nature of the Soviet regime, 
of Soviet policy and the methods by which the Soviet Government 
attempted to achieve its aims. The long term aims, however, were 
somewhat more offensive and, as with American psychological 
operations, an essential part of preparations for war. The long
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term objectives were: to convince "responsible leaders of free 
communities' that the only way of reaching a lasting settlement 
was for the free world to neutralise the Soviet military threat 
as quickly as possible; to undermine the strength and 
effectiveness of Communist parties "until Communism as an 
instrument of Soviet policy has palpably failed'; and finally, 
to create throughout the world, a climate of opinion which, in 
the event of war, would be solidly united against the Soviet 
Government, and would represent a major defeat for the Soviet 
political warfare offensive. This campaign, Strang conceded, was 
now concentrated "wholly on the negative, anti-Communist, anti- 
Soviet aspect.' Strengthening the morale of the free world 
remained an essential part of British foreign policy. However, 
the failure to motivate the anti-communist activities of most of 
Britain's allies meant the need for Britain to take a leading 
role in combatting communism was even greater than it had been 
in 1948. Strang observed, "the halfheartedness of a few of our 
associates, and the lack of means of most of the remainder 1 were 
all the more reason for Britain to make the fullest use of its 
resources and experience. He concluded:
Our justification for taking so prominent a part in an 
operation which is in fact the task of every 
government is that, apart from the United States 
Government, we are virtually the only Government which 
has made a worldwide study of the problem and has the 
organization to carry out counter-measures on a scale 
in any way comparable to that of the Soviet 
Government."6
Conclusion
Cooperation between Britain and the United States in the 
field of anti-communist propaganda expanded dramatically in the 
period between January 1950 and January 1952. In 1948, British 
officials had been keen to inform the United States of Britain's 
new propaganda policy. British officials, however, had not been 
impressed with the product of cooperation with the United States 
between January 1948 and January 1950. In 1950, the willingness 
of United States officials to seek British advice and experience 
regarding the most effective methods of conducting anti-communist 
propaganda, coupled with the launch of the Campaign of Truth, 
restored British faith in the American anti-communist propaganda
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policy. Cooperation was formalised at a series of meetings 
between senior officials from the Foreign Office and the State 
Department early in 1950. Instructions to British and American 
missions following these talks prompted Information Officers in 
the field to do, what to many came naturally, cooperate with 
their opposite numbers. Relations were particularly close in 
South-East Asia, where the propaganda effort was in many respects 
combined. Both nations, however, were careful to maintain 
"individuality of output. 1 The policy of "shooting at the same 
target from different angles' remained the guiding principle for 
cooperation in the field.
The most important development, however, was the appointment 
of Adam Watson as Information Liaison Officer at the British 
Embassy in Washington. Watson was one of those officials, like 
Sir John Dill or Oliver Franks, who seem to embody the "special 
relationship 1 between Britain and the United States. Watson was 
the linchpin of British and American cooperation in anti- 
communist propaganda. He assiduously cultivated contacts with 
the most senior officials in the State Department, the VOA, the 
CIA, RFE and the PSB. Every aspect of the American propaganda 
offensive, overt and covert, was discussed with him. After only 
eight months in Washington, Watson claimed to know more about 
American anti-communist propaganda than he did about British 
policy." 7
To be sure, American hospitality was not entirely benign. 
It is clear that the US Government was keen to elicit British 
support for many of their psychological operations. In 
particular, organising Soviet and Eastern European emigres and 
developing Radio Free Europe. The State Department was also 
dependent on British facilities to expand VOA broadcasting 
through the Ring Plan. The extent to which American plans for 
anti-communist propaganda depended upon British cooperation are 
revealed by the American reaction to British cuts in spending on 
propaganda activities. Acheson, urgently sought to impress upon 
the Foreign Office that, "all our plans count heavily on British 
psychological warfare as important part joint defence 
effort. 1 " 8
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However, whilst cuts in spending led to dramatic reductions 
in Britain's positive propaganda activities, anti-communist 
propaganda expanded considerably. By 1951, all of Britain's 
propaganda activities at home and abroad were geared towards the 
Cold War. The IRD's editorial output was increasing and the 
department had established contacts with a great number of 
prominent opinion formers. Moreover, the IRD had begun to 
develop a more expansive definition of Britain's anti-communist 
propaganda policy, which by the end of 1951 would bring the IRD 
closely in line with the US strategy of political warfare.
215
Conclusion
216
Conclusion
It was with some reluctance that the British Government 
embarked on a new anti-communist propaganda policy in January 
1948. The postwar Labour Government was not averse to the use 
of propaganda. Although wartime propaganda agencies, such as the 
Ministry of Information and the Political Warfare Executive, were 
dismantled, substantial elements of the propaganda apparatus were 
retained within the Foreign Office and in a new Central Office 
of Information. Moreover, the Labour Government was ready to use 
propaganda to explain British policies abroad, and in the face 
of declining power, to advertise British achievements. Bevin in 
particular was keen that Britain should not "hide its light under 
a bushel. 11 Given such enthusiasm it was perhaps inevitable 
that propaganda would once again be used in an offensive 
capacity. However, faced with an increasingly hostile barrage 
of anti-British propaganda from the Soviet Union and communists 
around the world, Bevin resisted calls from senior officials in 
the Foreign Office to respond with offensive propaganda. Events 
at the end of 1947, most notably the creation of the Cominform 
and the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings 
in London, prompted Bevin to reconsider this position. He was 
persuaded to adopt a new propaganda policy when his Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary, Christopher Mayhew, combined the Foreign 
Office's call for a propaganda offensive with the promotion of 
Bevin's own strategy for "Third Force' defence.
The new propaganda policy was an uneasy compromise between 
Foreign Office thinking, and the desire of Bevin and the Labour 
Government to promote a British led "Third Force. 1 The new 
propaganda policy had several radical features. It was to be 
based upon the "vital ideas of British Social Democracy' and 
attack by comparison the "principles and practice of communism, 
and also the inefficiency, social injustice and moral weakness 
of unrestrained capitalism.' Moreover, British propaganda was 
to be directed at the "broad mass of workers and peasants.' a 
Although the new propaganda policy was designed to take the 
offensive against communism, Bevin was quite clear as to how far 
that offensive would be allowed to go. He firmly resisted a
217
return to wartime methods of political warfare. In contrast with 
World War II, British anti-communist propaganda was not directed 
at the enemy, but was designed to consolidate democracy in the 
free world. Bevin resisted calls to embark upon a campaign of 
"political warfare 1 against the Soviet Union. Very little 
propaganda was directed at the Soviet Union or the satellite 
states, and propaganda which aimed to incite unrest in the 
communist bloc was, until December 1949, strictly prohibited. 
Britain's new propaganda apparatus was not modelled on the 
wartime Political Warfare Executive, and Bevin forbade the use 
of the phrase "political warfare,' even within Whitehall, to 
describe Britain's propaganda activities. 3 Moreover, in 
contrast to wartime arrangements, all overseas propaganda 
activities were the responsibility of the Foreign Office. The 
new Information Research Department (IRD), was located within the 
Foreign Office, and Bevin resisted pressure from the Services for 
a more offensive propaganda policy and organisation.
The IRD's methods were informed by Foreign Office experience 
of propaganda in two world wars. This experience dictated that 
the most effective propaganda was the truth, and that propaganda 
of any kind, was most likely to be believed if it was not seen 
to emanate from an official source. Consequently, the IRD's work 
was well researched and authoritative. It was also disseminated 
on discreet basis, to be used unattributably. The Foreign 
Office, however, was uncomfortable with certain aspects of the 
new propaganda policy and the policy was modified somewhat 
between January 1948 and January 1952. The idea of attacking 
capitalism was never a sensible proposition and officials in the 
Foreign Office had few qualms about dismissing it in practice. 
More significant was the shift from targeting mass opinion 
towards a propaganda campaign directed at opinion formers. The 
Foreign Office was more accustomed to targeting elite opinion, 
according to the principle that, "it is better to influence those 
who can influence others than to attempt a direct appeal to the 
mass of the population.' 4 From the beginning the IRD's output 
was a little too detailed and scholarly to appeal to mass 
opinion. Although genuine and imaginative attempts were made to
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develop propaganda with mass appeal, most notably in the Middle 
East and South-East Asia, the Foreign Office gradually shifted 
back to its traditional position of targeting leaders of opinion.
The Foreign Office also found the positive side of the new 
propaganda policy problematic. The positive aspect of the new 
propaganda policy was treated separately from its negative anti- 
communist aspect. The IRD was tasked with coordinating anti- 
communist propaganda and was never asked to produce positive 
propaganda. This is a significant point, because the IRD has 
often been castigated for ignoring the positive side of the new 
propaganda policy. The positive projection of British values and 
the merits of a British led "Third Force 1 were the responsibility 
of a new Foreign Office working party on the "spiritual aspects 
of the Western Union.' This work continued alongside but 
independently from the anti-communist work of the IRD. Although 
the idea of a British led "Third Force, ' independent of the 
United States, ultimately proved untenable, perhaps the biggest 
blow to Britain's positive propaganda work was financial. 
Budgetary constraints led to severe cuts in Britain's overseas 
propaganda work, and positive propaganda bore the brunt of these 
cuts. As the Cold War intensified only direct ant i-communist 
propaganda was considered essential. By 1951 all British 
propaganda, both at home and abroad was directed towards fighting 
the Cold War.
In one important respect, however, the IRD did seek to 
promote a "Third Force' propaganda campaign. Although the 
department was not concerned with the positive projection of the 
"Western Union' it did seek to give a lead to the forces of anti- 
communism in Europe and Asia by providing an arsenal of anti- 
communist propaganda for Britain's allies. The IRD established 
a complex series of arrangements for cooperating with foreign 
governments in the field of anti-communist propaganda. It also 
provided a vast amount of anti-communist material to individuals 
and organisations in friendly countries sometimes with the 
knowledge of the host government. If this campaign was not 
always conducted independently of the United States it was 
certainly led by Britain. Whilst the United States launched
219
campaigns to counter-communism in key crisis points such as 
Italy, France and Korea. The IRD's campaign to counter communism 
in the free world was global, highly organised, and coordinated. 
If there was, in any sense, a Third Force propaganda campaign, 
this was it.
Nevertheless, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of 
Britain's anti-communist propaganda policy was the extent of 
cooperation with the United States. It is extraordinary that 
only days after the Cabinet approved a memorandum which stated 
that it was up to Britain, "not the Americans' to give the lead 
to the forces of anti-communism, and which openly criticised 
American propaganda, the same document was being shown to 
American information staff in both London and Washington. 5 
However, given that Britain and America had developed 
complementary perceptions of the threat from communist propaganda 
and subversion prior to 1948, and were already working together 
in some areas to respond to that threat, the continuation of 
cooperation after 1948 is perhaps not so surprising. Moreover, 
Britain's attempts to lead a coordinated counter-offensive to 
communist propaganda ultimately foundered because none of 
Britain's allies in Europe or Asia had a propaganda apparatus 
comparable with that of Britain. Only the United States had the 
inclination and the resources to pursue a similar policy for 
responding to anti-communist propaganda.
This thesis has shown that the extent of cooperation between 
Britain and America in the field of ant i-communist propaganda was 
far greater than has previously been appreciated. The United 
States was informed of Britain's new propaganda policy only one 
month after the British Cabinet, and practical cooperation began 
almost immediately, in Italy in March 1948. In contrast with 
cooperation with other powers, British cooperation with the 
United States involved the formal exchange of propaganda material 
between London and Washington, and a great deal of close and 
informal contact between information staff in British and 
American missions around the world. The United States was keen 
to involve Britain in some of their own more ambitious projects, 
most notably Radio Free Europe and the radio "Ring Plan. 1 The
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policy for cooperation developed at a regular meetings between 
senior officials from the Foreign Office and American propaganda 
agencies which took place in February 1948, October 1948, January 
1950, May 1950 and May 1951. In between these high-level summits 
there were numerous trips between London and Washington by 
representatives of the Foreign Office, the State Department, the 
CIA, VOA and RFE. Cooperation expanded considerably in 1950, 
following the launch of the American Campaign of Truth. 
Information Liaison Officers were appointed to the British and 
American Embassies in Washington and London, and a policy of 
v close and continuous liaison 1 was agreed with a view to 
developing, "common lines of information policy, planning and 
conduct of operations.' fi
It has been generally assumed that Britain's anti-communist 
propaganda effort was soon eclipsed by the greater resources of 
the United States, and British propaganda was redirected against 
other K anti-British' targets. 7 This thesis has sought to argue 
that, although Britain clearly took the lead in providing a 
coordinated global response to communist propaganda in 1948, it 
did not merely hand the baton to the United States in the 1950s. 
Britain retained and expanded its anti-communist propaganda 
policy and machinery, and expanded cooperation with the United 
States. In many respects British and American approaches to 
ant i-communist propaganda were complementary. Firstly, although 
this was not intentional, Britain and America effectively divided 
the world between them for the purposes of conducting anti- 
communist propaganda. Although the anti-communist propaganda 
policies of both nations was global in scale, Britain 
concentrated its effort on countering communism in the free 
world, the principal focus of American propaganda was the Soviet 
Union and the Iron Curtain countries.
Similarly, although Britain and America adopted quite 
different methods, these methods were often combined to good 
effect. Britain favoured a discreet approach, whereas American 
propaganda was often more overt, or at least more prominent, 
conducted through large broadcasting operations such as Radio 
Free Europe. It has been suggested that the IRD could not
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compete with the din of the CIA's "mighty Wurlitzer.' 8 However, 
as officials in the Foreign Office were keenly aware, the scale 
of the output did not necessarily guarantee its impact, and there 
were benefits in both approaches. Britain's more discreet 
approach was more appropriate for countering communism in the 
free world. The more bold propaganda of the Americans was more 
suited to bolstering resistance behind the Iron Curtain. 
Moreover, the two approaches were not mutually exclusive. A 
Foreign Office review of British and American cooperation 
completed in 1950 observed:
It seems that our general approach is often somewhat 
different from that of the Americans and, on the 
whole, the discreet and personal approach of our 
Information Officers gets more material effectively 
placed than the American reliance on volume of output. 
The rather aggressive portrayal of the American way of 
life is not always welcome and may be self-defeating. 
In any case it is preferable to maintain the two 
independent lines of approach, since both together 
certainly cover more ground than either could hope to 
do working alone. 9
It has not been the purpose of this thesis to assess the 
effectiveness of the IRD's campaign. Nevertheless, the evidence 
suggests that through its discreet approach the IRD achieved some 
remarkable successes. The department's first set-piece campaign, 
the publication of documents and a series of Ministerial speeches 
to publicise the use of forced labour in the Soviet Union, 
received widespread coverage in the press around the world, and 
in every national newspaper in Britain. The Daily Telegraph, the 
IRD recorded, "splashed on page 1 a story from its Vienna 
Correspondent giving details of life in forced labour camps 
allegedly told by people who have escaped, but in fact all based 
on various IRD papers.' 10 Numerous examples of a similar use of 
IRD material may be found in the IRD' s day to day work. In June 
1949, the British information service in Karachi reported that 
it had been able to place in the local media, one hundred percent 
of everything issued by the IRD. 11 Most remarkably, a review of 
British overseas propaganda in 1952 reported that, "in one major 
European country large passages of the Prime Minister's speeches 
during the last two years have been lifted bodily from IRD 
publications.' 12 The department also commissioned and
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distributed articles on Soviet affairs by some of the most 
prominent commentators of the day, including Harold Laski, 
A.J.P.Taylor, Woodrow Wyatt, R.H.S.Crossman, and Leonard 
Schapiro. 13
British and American officials were keenly aware of the 
value of each others anti-communist propaganda, although the 
Americans were a good deal more complimentary about the IRD's 
work than British officials were about American propaganda. Both 
also recognised the value of maintaining their own independent 
propaganda campaigns. The policy for cooperation was 
characterised in a Foreign Office circular to British missions 
in May 1948, as "shooting into the same target from rather 
different angles. 114 This aphorism was used frequently to 
describe the relationship between British and American propaganda 
throughout the period covered by this thesis. By maintaining 
"individuality of output 1 in anti-communist propaganda Britain 
and America sought to concentrate their fire from as broad a 
front as possible. The policy had the added advantage of 
presenting the communists two targets to aim at in response.
Finally, rather than shifting its focus to ''anti-anti- 
British 1 operations, through its cooperation with the United 
States the IRD was drawn towards a more offensive anti-communist 
propaganda policy. By the end of 1951, the IRD had developed a 
strategy for offensive political warfare and was advocating an 
increase in British propaganda directed at stimulating unrest 
behind the Iron Curtain. These proposals were motivated, at 
least in part, by the desire to exert a restraining influence 
over some of the Americans' more provocative plans. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that in the 1950s Britain went on to 
develop, in cooperation with the United States, a more offensive 
strategy for the use of propaganda to undermine communism in the 
Soviet bloc. An unpublished section of the 1953 Drogheda Enquiry 
into Britain's overseas information services stated that the 
British propaganda had to do three things: strengthen the morale 
of those weak nations, particularly in Asia, which were "inclined 
to be apathetic about the Cold War;' promote understanding 
between Britain's allies; and "encourage our friends and weaken
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our enemies behind the Iron Curtain, we cannot escape from this 
responsibility. |15
This thesis has traced the origins of Britain's anti- 
communist propaganda policy. It has established the organisation 
and the methods of Britain's principal Cold War propaganda 
agency, the Information Research Department, and it has stressed 
the importance of cooperation between Britain and the United 
States in the field of anti-communist propaganda. The evolution 
of Britain's propaganda policy must be the subject of further 
studies. The Drogheda enquiry concluded that the "struggle for 
men's minds' was likely to continue for some time. 16 It is 
clear that propaganda remained a central and increasingly 
important feature of British foreign policy throughout the Cold 
War. In 1964, the Plowden Committee on overseas representation 
concluded that it was "in the general interest that Britain's 
voice should continue to be heard and to carry weight in the 
world.' Moreover, it added, the "spread of communism' had put 
upon Britain's "representational services a new range of 
activities and problems on a world scale.' 17
The IRD continued to operate until 1977. It was dissolved 
at the height of detente, when the Labour Government "adopted a 
different strategy for dealing with Soviet communism.' 18 
Detente, however, was short lived and British and American ant;i- 
communist propaganda enjoyed a revival, along with Anglo-American 
relations, under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. In Hay 
1980, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Thatcher 
said that because modern weapons were so hideous she did not 
think the Soviet invasion justified taking the world to the brink 
of war. The West, she proposed, should concentrate on methods 
short of war. It was time, she said, for "a massive propaganda 
campaign of a kind we have never mounted yet.' l9 Two years 
later in a speech before the British Houses of Parliament, 
President Reagan called for a new "crusade for freedom.' 20 
British and American cooperation in the field of anti-communist 
propaganda may well prove to have been as close at the end of the 
Cold War as it was at its start.
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